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Abstract 
 This dissertation aims to determine what should be the appropriate base ethical 
limits of health care markets in the United States. I argue that because we do not value 
health care goods and services as commodities, treating them as commodities available 
for market sale can only be ethical when health care markets accord with at least the 
principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care 
goods and services. 
I begin by establishing the theoretical foundation of my argument by expositing 
three theories of commodification and ethical markets that critically examine the 
relationship of goods to the market. Each theory shows how commodification often fails 
to account for the non-market value(s) we attribute to many goods. I then apply these 
theories to health care goods and services to show how they are not properly valued 
merely as commodities, and to lay the foundation of my argument regarding the ethical 
limits of health care markets. I then argue why honesty, respect for autonomy, and 
increased access to essential health care goods and services should be considered the base 
ethical limits of health care markets by examining how each ideally applies to both health 
care and the market.  
 Lastly, I apply my argument to two health care markets: the pharmaceutical 
industry and a possible legal organ market. For the former, I show how many of the 
practices of the pharmaceutical industry violate what I argue should be the base ethical 
limits of health care markets. For the latter, I show the extent to which a legal organ 
market in the United States could or would violate these limits. 
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Introduction 
 
The currently existing marriage between health care and the market in the United 
States is contentious. Markets – generally understood as a collective group of buyers and 
sellers who engage in monetary transactions of commodified goods and services – 
typically create competition among providers and are thusly considered an efficient and 
effective means of generating a wide range of goods and services at various prices. 
Theoretically, health care markets can provide individuals a greater number of choices 
about which medical professionals they visit, what medicines they buy, and even which 
medical procedures they wish to undergo.  
Yet there are many who question the ethical validity of this marriage. Critics of 
health care markets tend to argue that the ends of health care are incommensurable with 
the ends of the market, and that market influences have an overall negative impact on the 
delivery of health care goods and services. By most accounts, health care has intrinsic 
value as a basic human need requiring intimate, fiduciary relationships between medical 
professionals and patients. Within the market, however, goods and services merely have 
instrument value, and are bought and sold to whomever is able and willing to pay for 
them, while those who cannot afford goods and services must often forgo their purchase. 
In a recent article of The Journal of the American Medical Association, Drs. Robert 
Berenson and Christine Cassel argue, for example, that patients and health care 
professionals ought to be cautious before fully embracing market-based competition 
among health care providers because of the potential for lapses in professional ethical 
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behavior that can result as a consequence.1 Norman Daniels, who has written extensively 
on issues concerning just health care, has recently argued that market-friendly strategies 
for promoting just health care have either failed or are currently failing.2 Edmund 
Pellegrino stakes out an even stronger position against health care markets by arguing 
that it is ethically wrong to ever treat health care as a commodity. According to 
Pellegrino, “health and medical care are not, cannot be, and should not be commodities; 
the ethical consequences of commodification are ethically unsustainable and deleterious 
to patients, physicians, and society . . . health care is a universal human need and a 
common good that a good society should provide in some measure to its citizens.”3 
 While I am sympathetic to the ethical concerns raised by critics of health care 
markets, the current realities of the marriage between health care and the market in the 
United States suggest that a divorce between the two is neither imminent nor practical. 
The focus of this project is not, therefore, to argue for or against having health care 
markets. Instead, this project aims to determine the appropriate ethical limits regarding 
the market sale of health care goods and services in the United States. Specifically I argue 
that because health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as 
commodities, treating them as commodities that are bought and sold via health care 
markets should be limited according to at least the principles of honesty, respect for 
autonomy, and increaseed access to essential health care goods and services.  
                                                 
1 Berenson and Cassel, “Consumer-Driven Health Care May Not Be What Patients Need – Caveat 
Emptor,” 321-323.  
2 Daniels, “Broken Promises.”  
3 Pellegrino, “The Commodification of Medical and Health Care,” 244. 
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In making this argument I do not presume that these are the only possible ethical 
limits of health care markets or that by adhering to these limits, the commodification of a 
health care good or service is necessarily ethical. For example, there could be other 
concerns regarding medical appropriateness that might ethically prevent the sale of a 
health care good or service even if the transaction did not violate the limits for which I 
argue.   
Also in making this argument, I do not intend or try to justify the continued use of 
the current market-based heath care system in the United States. This is because it is 
questionable whether or not this system is the best way for persons in the United States to 
meet their health care needs, as it is seemingly failing to achieve the mass level of access 
and distribution for which markets are typically valued. For example, empirical data 
shows that the United States has both the highest per capita spending and the highest cost 
as a percentage of gross domestic product for health care goods and services than any 
other economically advanced nation.4 Yet there are approximately 50 million uninsured 
United States citizens who are required to pay out-of-pocket for most or all of their health 
care expenditures.5 As a result of these factors, there are now many social, political, and 
                                                 
4 According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), health care 
spending in the United States for 2009 was $7,290 per captia (adjusted purchasing power parity) and 
accounted for 16% of its gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, this per captia spending is 
$2,527 more than second ranked Norway, $2,873 more than third ranked Switzerland, and almost two 
and half times more than the OECD average of $2,964. The United States GDP for health care 
spending in 2009 is 5% higher than second ranked France, 5.2% higher than third ranked Switzerland, 
5.6% higher than fourth ranked Germany, and more than 7.1% higher the OECD average of 8.9%. See; 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. “OECD Health Data 2009: How Does the 
United States Compare,” http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/2/38980580.pdf. (accessed July 29, 2009). 
5 National Coalition on Health Care, “Facts on Health Care Costs,” Health Insurance Costs, 
http://www.nchc.org/facts/cost.shtml. (accessed July 29, 2009). 
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ethical debates both challenging and urging reform to the United States’ current health 
care system.6  
Restricting my argument in this way is advantageous for at least two reasons. 
First, I do not have to try to refute arguments that call into question the efficacy or 
fairness of health care markets based on the practical problems with the United States’ 
current health care system. Second, my argument regarding the ethical limits of health 
care markets can still be applicable even if there is a shift the United States away from a 
predominately market-based health care system. 
 The rest of this chapter serves two purposes. First, I clarify some concepts I 
frequently use throughout my argument such as health care goods and services, 
commodity(-ies) and commodification, and health care markets. I then detail the scope of 
the project by briefly outlining each of the following chapters. 
                                                 
6 Daniels, for example, has recently written a well-argued critique of the current market-based approach to 
health care in the United States with respect to the demands of justice. Specifically, Daniels argues that 
current business friendly strategies for managing health care markets in the United States, frustrate 
rather than promote the goals of justice in meeting health care needs, particularly with the financing 
and delivery of health care goods and services. The general promises of the market to foster 
competition among health care providers, thereby theoretically lowering health care costs while 
increasing access to various health care goods and services is, as Daniels carefully shows, a broken set 
of promises. This is mostly because of how current business friendly strategies for managing health 
care markets in the United States have failed to account for the unequal power that favors the supply 
side of health care markets (i.e. health care providers) over the demand side (i.e. purchasers of health 
care goods and services). As Daniels argues, the reasons why this unequal power between the supply 
side and the demand side of health care markets is unfair is because it has resulted in health care costs 
increasing instead of decreasing, while primarily placing the burden of paying for those increases on 
those who need health care goods and services the most, but who are also least likely able to afford 
them because of the correlations between having higher health care needs with a lower or decreasing 
socio-economic status. In particular, there are five broken promises that Daniels addresses. These are: 
1) increased health care competition will result in lower unit prices of health care goods and services, 
2) competition among health care plans will lower the rate of increase of health care costs, 3) high 
deductible health care plans will result in wiser health care purchases and lower health care costs, 4) 
competition among drug plans outlined in the new Medicare drug benefit will slow increasing costs 
and increase access to drugs for the elderly, and 5) the introduction of user fees and growth in private 
sector health care will increase resources for under-funded health care systems in developing countries. 
See; Daniels, “Broken Promises.” 
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1. Clarifying the Basic Concepts of the Argument 
This section sketches out what can be considered reasonable, generally agreed 
upon understandings of the concepts I frequently refer to in my argument. My argument 
focuses on imposing ethical constraints on the sale of health care goods and services. The 
term “health care goods and services” should therefore not only be consistent with how 
health care is regarded throughout typical medical literature, but also broad enough to 
encompass the possible varieties of health care markets such as, for example, markets in 
human transplant organs – in which would-be organ sellers are not likely to medically 
benefit from the transaction. Attempting to meet both criteria, I broadly define “health 
care goods and services” as goods and services that individuals use to help meet their 
medical needs in preventing or combating disease, illness, or injury. Transplantation, for 
example, is a service that combats a disease, such as kidney or heart disease, in the 
recipient even if it does not medically benefit the donor. 
To remain consistent with the market theories I exposit in chapter 1, “commodity” 
or “commodities” refer to a good(s) or service(s) that has or could have an established 
economic value. The process of establishing an economic value for a good(s) or 
service(s) I refer to as “commodification.” When referring to health care goods and 
services as commodities, I am thusly referring to the actual or potential economic value 
of those goods and services.  
Lastly, the term “health care markets” broadly refers to markets in which 
individuals buy and sell commodified health care goods and services. Though by limiting 
the scope of my argument to the United States, I also consider these to be free markets 
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that are regulated but not controlled by the government. In market rhetoric these 
transactions occur between buyers and sellers. However health care transactions are not 
said to occur between buyers and sellers, but typically between patients and health care 
providers such as physicians or institutions like hospitals, health insurance companies, or 
the pharmaceutical industry at-large. This highlights an aspect of the problem of 
incommensurability between health care and the market, and is one reason that I 
specifically do not argue for health care markets. Arguing for health care markets 
requires reconciling and ethically justifying thinking of and treating patients and health 
care providers respectively as buyers and sellers of commodified health care goods and 
services. Additionally, this understanding of health care markets may involve transactions 
between buyers and sellers who are not traditionally thought of as patients or health care 
providers. Take those who are wiling to sell their organs for profit for example. These 
individuals lack the standard medical and professional qualities we attribute to most 
health care providers, even though they directly provide the organs for sale, and so are 
“sellers” of a health care good. 
2. Chapter Outline 
Although I present my argument as a single work, it is possible to view this 
dissertation in two parts. Chapters 1-3 develop my argument that health care goods and 
services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and that ethically treating them 
as commodities requires imposing ethical limits on their market sale. Chapters 4 and 5 
then apply my argument to two health care markets that have both recently garnered 
substantial academic and public interest: the pharmaceutical industry, and a hypothetical 
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legal organ market. 
A. Chapter 1: Examining the Relationship of Goods to the Market 
 Chapter 1 critically examines the relationship of goods to the market by 
expositing three theories of commodification and ethical markets. According to the first 
theory, we can value goods in a number of ways, and that some goods are incomparably 
valued higher than other goods. The second theory provides a pragmatic analysis that 
shows how various goods are properly valued in terms of incomplete commodification – 
in which persons characterize the sale of those goods both in terms of commodification 
and noncommodification. The third theory argues that the commodification of goods for 
market sale is unethical when this results in negative consequences that undermine the 
values characteristic of liberal democracies. Together these theories help explain why 
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and 
provide the conceptual space needed to argue for imposing ethical limits on the market 
sale of health care goods and services.  
B. Chapter 2: Arguing for the Principle of Increased Access to Essential Health Care 
Goods and Services 
 
Chapter 2 sets forth my argument in detail. Building on the view established in 
chapter 1, this chapter aims to show why there ought to be increased access to essential 
health care goods and services, and what it means for this normative principle to be an 
ethical limit of health care markets. I begin by establishing three approaches that each 
help justify the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
Then I attempt to clarify some of the qualities that should define essential health care 
goods and services. As we shall see, how we come to characterize “essential health care 
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goods and services” will need to accord with the goal of this principle to balance wealth 
creation and limited health care resources against the just distribution of those resources. 
I conclude the chapter by drawing some conclusions about how this principle is an ethical 
limit of health care markets. Although I detail the three approaches I use to justify this 
principle in chapter 2, some preliminary remarks about each are helpful here.  
 The first is a market-based approach in which I argue that increased access to 
essential health care goods and services is a matter of wealth creation. This argument 
intends to show how increased access to essential health care goods and services is an 
ideal of the market, even though free markets are not concerned with fairness or equity 
regarding essential goods or services. The major drawback of this approach, though, is 
that it is ultimately insufficient to sustain the normative claim that there ought to be 
increased access to essential health care goods and services if it were not profitable to do 
so.  
 To address this deficiency of the first approach, the next two approaches aim to 
provide a moral basis for why there ought to be increased access to essential health care 
goods and services. The first of these argues that there ought to be increased access to 
essential health care goods and services grounded in a right to health care. The third 
approach establishes an alternative view that even if persons are not entitled to essential 
health care goods and services, we ought to still increase access to them because of how 
we can understand health care as common to all persons within our society. In making 
this argument I first consider how health care is common based on its development and 
distribution, and then based on how it is a part of our shared human nature. To be clear, 
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my intent is not to defend any one of these three approaches as better than another, but to 
merely use these approaches to legitimize the principle of increased access to essential 
health care goods and services as an ethical limit of health care markets. 
C. Chapter 3: Arguing for the Principles of Honesty and Respect for Autonomy 
In chapter 3, I move beyond the question of access to argue for why we ought to 
also limit the market sale of health care goods and services according to the principles of 
honesty and respect for autonomy. For each of these two principles I begin by providing a 
theoretical framework, then argue for how each principle applies to both health care 
relationships between medical professionals and patients, and to business transactions 
between buyers and sellers. I conclude each discussion by addressing what it means for 
both principles to be an ethical limit of health care markets. Some preliminary remarks 
about both of these principles are helpful here.  
There may be some who look at the principle of honesty and think that the need 
for honesty in both health care and market transactions is so obvious that it deserves no 
particular attention in theoretical discussions about health care markets. However, there 
are many cases involving health care and the market where questions about honesty are at 
the heart of an ethical dilemma – a physician working in a poor neighborhood debating 
whether or not to recommend that patients purchase expensive drugs from foreign 
countries at a cheaper cost; medical professionals debating, because of a patient’s ability 
to pay, whether or not to recommend certain expensive treatments, even if those 
treatments are more efficacious than cheaper alternatives; persons debating whether or 
not to lie on insurance forms about known pre-existing conditions that can effect their 
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scope and cost of coverage. Yet as I argue, even though the value of honesty in health 
care and market transactions is not a foregone conclusion, to ethically treat health care 
goods and services as commodities, establishing the principle of honesty is necessary; 
otherwise health care is left vulnerable to the market notion of caveat emptor, which 
seems unacceptable because of the seriousness of negative consequences that can result 
from shifting the burden of responsibility for particular health care choices from medical 
professionals and patients to patients alone.  
The reason I argue that respect for autonomy should be considered an ethical limit 
of health care markets is because of the particular role this principle plays in the success 
of markets and in helping establish stronger relationships between patients and health 
care professionals. As standard supply-and-demand economic theory goes, a successful 
market is one that is able to generate high demand for particular goods and services by 
providing for the widest range possible of consumer wants and needs. So it seems fair to 
claim that markets can only be successful by respecting consumer autonomy because, 
without consumers being able to freely choose what sorts of goods and services they are 
willing to purchase, markets are unable to respond to consumers’ wants and needs 
accordingly.7 
                                                 
7 Note, however, that “widest range possible” can still be limited with respect to providing for consumer 
wants and needs. Successful markets require a balance between having a wide variety of goods and 
services to choose from and having too many choices of goods and services – that is, while consumers 
prefer having free access to a variety of goods and services, too many options can sometimes have the 
opposite effect of causing consumers to become indecisive and simply choose to forgo purchasing a 
good or service at all. However, I am not sure how this idea of a balance between just enough market 
choices versus too many market choices effects my position because health care is not the standard sort 
of market product. Yet my intuition is that the possible backlash from having too many choices with 
respect to health care is not necessarily relevant because (a) health care typically constitutes a need 
(versus just a want), and (b) most people, assuming it is a need for them and they can afford health care 
goods and services, will not simply forgo purchasing it because they are faced with too many choices.  
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In health care, the principle of respect for autonomy is important for two reasons. 
First, respect for autonomy helps health care professionals and patients be more honest 
with each other regarding things like their expectations of success for certain treatments, 
or the satisfaction each party has with the quality of care either given or received. 
Second, respect for autonomy helps prevent relationships between patients and health 
care professionals from becoming overly paternalistic. While some paternalism in 
medical practice is expected (and even appreciated), overly paternalistic relationships, 
where health care professionals treat patients according only to what they [health care 
professionals] believe is best, can actually hinder how well patients respond to certain 
treatments. This is because health care professionals and patients sometimes differ about 
what treatments qualify as “best.” When patients feel as though health care professionals 
pushing certain treatments compromise their values and choices for how they live their 
lives, the ability of patients to positively respond to those treatments diminishes. Respect 
for autonomy helps correct this problem by giving patients the ability to work with health 
care professionals to help determine what treatments are acceptable in accord with those 
patients’ values and lifestyles.  
D. Chapter 4: Is the Current Pharmaceutical Drug Market in the United States Ethical? 
Chapter 4 applies my argument regarding the base ethical limits of health care 
markets to the prescription drug market in the United States. As I show throughout 
chapter 4, the general lack of interference by the United States government toward the 
market sale of prescription drugs has helped the pharmaceutical industry become one of 
the nation’s most profitable. For example, in 2008 the pharmaceutical industry was the 
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most profitable of all American health care industries, and the third most profitable 
industry overall, generating 19.3% profit from revenue.8 Still, regardless of the industry’s 
profitability, pharmaceutical companies are often criticized for abusing their relationships 
with those whom they most frequently interact, namely health care professionals and 
patients. Chapter 4 analyzes five industry practices and shows how and why the current 
pharmaceutical drug market in the United States is unethical because of how these 
practices violate the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, or increased access to 
essential health care goods and services. I then conclude chapter 4 with six suggestions 
for how the pharmaceutical industry could reform itself regarding how it violates these 
limits. 
a. Industry Interactions with Physicians 
The first three practices I address in chapter 4 all deal with how pharmaceutical 
companies typically interact with physicians. Physicians, as the ones responsible for 
prescribing drugs to patients, are the cornerstones of prescription drug sales. 
Pharmaceutical companies therefore have a vested interest in trying to convince 
physicians to prescribe their drugs over those of their competitors. One standard industry 
practice of pharmaceutical companies is to use representatives to market prescription 
drugs to physicians under the guise of “medical education.” However, pharmaceutical 
representatives are in many ways like traveling salespersons whose presentations are 
intended to help boost product sales and company profits, and not necessarily to educate 
physicians. Often pharmaceutical representatives provide objectively questionable 
                                                 
8 Fortune Magazine, “Our Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations: 2009 Top Industries, Most 
Profitable.” 
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information or slant their presentations in favor of the drug being pitched. As I shall 
show, biased drug presentations violate both the principles of honesty and respect for 
autonomy. 
The second practice I discuss is the use of industry-sponsored research to market 
prescription drugs to physicians. Industry-sponsored research often involves 
pharmaceutical companies paying large sums of money to researchers and physicians to 
publish and present research that favors a particular drug, while those companies conceal 
themselves as the sources of funding. Like my argument regarding the use of 
pharmaceutical representatives to give slanted drug presentations, I will show how the 
use of industry-sponsored research violates both the principles of honesty and respect for 
autonomy. 
The third practice I address is gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians. Until recently, the pharmaceutical industry endorsed gift giving as a way 
influence physicians’ prescribing practices – although the industry maintains the actual 
purpose of gift giving is to offset physicians’ time listening to drug presentations. I show 
that, because gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians does not intend to 
benefit patients or physicians (as the gift recipients), this practice also violates the 
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. 
b. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
One way for businesses to help increase their profits is by advertising what goods 
or services are available for sale. So it makes sense for pharmaceutical companies in the 
United States to advertise prescription drugs directly to consumers. The fourth industry 
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practice I address is the direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs. 
DTCA of prescription drugs has two basic forms: branded and non-branded. Non-
branded DTCA does not attempt to market any particular brand-name drug. Branded 
DTCA, however, explicitly markets a particular drug by its brand name. While the former 
is not typically regarded as ethically contentious, the latter is. My examination of DTCA 
therefore focuses exclusively on branded forms of DTCA. Chapter 4 addresses two 
primary concerns of DTCA: the questionable content of DTCA, and the lack of effective 
regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on these two concerns, I 
further argue in chapter 4 that there are several ways in which DTCA advertising violates 
both the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.  
c. Industry Pricing of Pharmaceutical Drugs 
The final practice I address in chapter 4 is the industry pricing of pharmaceutical 
drugs. What I show in chapter 4 is that the free market for pharmaceutical drugs in the 
United States has resulted in higher spending on pharmaceutical drugs throughout the 
United States than any other industrialized nation. A standard argument given by the 
industry for why the United States pays a higher amount on pharmaceutical drugs is that 
the willingness of American consumers to pay top dollar for pharmaceutical drugs is 
necessary to ensure the industry’s ability to pay for future research and development of 
new drugs. This is an argument that I show is false, while further arguing that the 
industry pricing of pharmaceutical drugs violates the principles of honesty, respect for 
autonomy, and the increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
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E. Chapter 5: Is an Ethical Organ Market Possible? 
Chapter 5 applies my argument for ethically treating health care goods and 
services as commodities to a potential legal organ market. In the United States, the 
number of persons needing organ transplants consistently exceeds the number of organ 
donations. Of the various solutions for how best deal with this problem, the creation of a 
legal organ market is one of the more contentious views currently being argued. Not only 
is organ selling illegal in the United States (for both living and cadaver organs), but it is 
also a practice that many consider prima facie immoral because of the perception that it 
degrades the intrinsic value of organs as an essential feature of personhood.  
Without arguing about the morality of organ selling, chapter 5 analyzes five 
practical concerns that would likely accompany the establishment of a legal organ market 
to show the extent to which a legal organ market may violate what I argue are the base 
ethical limits of health care markets. To avoid any possible confusion, I assume that a 
basic characteristic of all transplant organs is that they are necessary for anyone who 
qualifies for an organ transplant. “Would-be sellers” refers to those who are or may be 
willing to sell their organs for profit, and “would-be buyers” refers to those who are or 
may be willing to purchase transplant organs.  
a. Lying to Secure an Organ Sale 
The first concern I address in chapter 5 is that the promise of profit could tempt 
some would-be organ sellers who are of questionable health to lie about their health 
status to avoid jeopardizing the sale. Although the current standards of organ donation in 
the United States require carefully testing the health-quality of organs prior to 
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transplanting them, we do not know if or how these standards might change in an organ 
market. Moreover, even with organ testing, some unhealthy organs can go undetected. I 
then argue how this concern could result in a legal organ market violating both the 
principles of respect for autonomy and honesty. I further argue that lying to secure an 
organ sale may or may not violate the principle of increased access essential to health 
care goods and services.  
b. A Legal Organ Market Poses a Health-risk to Would-be Sellers 
A legal organ market presumably will be regulated to try to minimize the known 
health-risks to both would-be organ sellers and buyers. Moreover, the health-risks of 
organ transplantation in a regulated market are likely to be comparable to that of organ 
donation. My focus regarding this concern is not the degree of health-risk to would-be 
organ sellers, but what the existence of these health-risks may mean for a legal organ 
market to function with respect to what I argue are the base ethical limits of health care 
markets.  
There are two cases I consider with respect to this concern. First is the case of 
would-be organ sellers who are not given information about the known health-risks of 
organ transplantation. In this case I argue that a legal organ market would violate both the 
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. I also consider how, if failing to provide 
would-be sellers information about the known risks of organ transplantation caused an 
overall decline in the numbers of organs sold via the market, this case could violate the 
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
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I next consider the case of would-be organ sellers who are informed of the risks of 
organ transplantation, but who are not provided additional means to help them understand 
that information. Here I show how merely informing would-be sellers of the risks of 
organ transplantation is sufficient to meet the principle of honesty. However, I also show 
how this case would violate the principle of respect for autonomy because of the inability 
for would-be organ sellers to fully incorporate this information into their decision-making 
process, thereby undercutting their ability to act autonomously. 
c. Economic Desperation as the Motive to Sell 
Another concern I address regarding the creation of a legal organ market is that 
economically desperate sellers, all things considered, genuinely oppose selling their 
organs. However these persons are willing to sell their organs anyway to try to assuage 
the bad effects of their economic desperation. Morally, the circumstance of being 
motivated to sell an organ because of economic desperation is considered equivalent to 
coercion. As I show in chapter 5, data coming from the Iranian model of paid organ 
donation suggests that a legal organ market in the United States would likely attract a 
substantially large number of sellers who are economically poor. I then argue how this 
concern would violate the principle of respect for autonomy. Moreover, I address how 
this concern appears to render a legal organ market prima facie unethical, because even 
in a regulated market there may be cases in which would-be organ sellers are strictly 
motivated by their economic desperation while not really wanting to sell their organs. 
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d. Failure to Receive a Fair Price for Organs 
A forth concern about the establishment of a legal organ market is that 
economically desperate sellers may not receive a fair price for their organs. One reason 
for this is that economic desperation creates an imbalance of power in the organ sale that 
unfairly favors would-be buyers. Toward the end of chapter 1, we will see the underlying 
justification for this point when I discuss how one characteristic of noxious markets is 
that they create unequal power between market participants. A second reason for this 
concern is that economically desperate sellers may be willing to accept a lower 
commodified value for their organs because even a small amount of money would be 
advantageous for them. I then give several reasons for how this concern could result in a 
legal organ market violating both the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. 
Furthermore I address how the notion of a “fair” price is not necessarily equal to the 
potential maximal commodified value of transplant organs. 
e. A Decrease in Donation Rates 
The last concern I address regarding the establishment of a legal organ market in 
the United States is that it would decrease organ donation rates. Those who oppose organ 
selling generally find it repugnant partly because it is thought to devalue the cultural and 
social significance of organ donation as a form of altruism. By placing a commodified 
value on organs, there seemingly will be fewer opportunities for individuals to donate 
their organs, while possibly causing some other individuals to no longer be willing to 
donate their organs. There is some empirical evidence that appears to justify this concern; 
namely that once a commodified value is placed on transfusable blood, those who are 
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altruistically motivated to donate transfusable blood are less likely to donate. I then argue 
how a decrease in organ donation rates could result in a legal organ market violating both 
the principles of increased access to essential health care goods and services and respect 
for autonomy. I conclude this section with a discussion about how, even if a legal organ 
market resulted in decreased donation rates, it may still be able to sufficiently meet the 
overall demand for transplant organs.  
F. Conclusion  
This final chapter of the dissertation serves three purposes. First, I summarize my 
argument that treating health care goods and services as commodities via health care 
markets can only be ethical when their sale accords with at least the principles of honesty, 
respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
Second, I briefly address a residual question with my argument: what might be an 
appropriate response for when treating health care goods or services as commodities 
violates the ethical limits of health care markets for which I argue. Third, I broach several 
possibilities for future research on this topic. These include: further addressing what the 
appropriate responses might be for when the sale of health care goods and services 
violate the ethical limits of health care markets; addressing whether or not there are any 
health care goods or services that should never be for sale; what might be the appropriate 
ethical limit(s) of a right to health care; the effects my argument might have on other 
types of non-medical markets; and how my argument might apply to the international 
production and delivery of health care goods and services. 
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Chapter One:  Examining the Relationship of Goods to the Market 
In this chapter I critically examine the relationship of goods to the market. When 
goods are commodified, their price attempts to represent their value based on what 
individuals are willing to pay for them. But, as we shall see in this chapter, it is debatable 
that certain goods can be appropriately valued merely as commodities.  
My goal in this chapter is not to argue against the market as a means by which we 
can appropriately value some commodified goods. Instead, my goal is to show that health 
care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities. To accomplish 
this goal, I exposit thee theories of commodification and ethical markets that show how 
and why the value of certain is goods is not properly captured in their commodification. 
Together, these three theories provide me the conceptual space needed to argue that 
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities. However, 
each of these three theories say very little about the particular issue at-hand regarding the 
commodification of health care goods and services, leaving ample room for me to fully 
develop my view in the following chapters that treating health care goods and services as 
commodities requires imposing ethical limits on their sale. The three theories I exposit in 
this chapter are those of Anderson in Value in Ethics and Economics, Radin in Contested 
Commodities, and Satz in “Noxious Markets: Why Should Some Things Not be for 
Sale?”  
1. Anderson and the Plurality of Values 
Anderson questions the degree to which markets, as mechanisms for satisfying 
people’s wants, should influence how we value goods. For Anderson, a good widely 
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refers to a multiplicity of things that individuals can value in some way including 
physical objects, services, or ideas. Markets may be able to determine the quantitative 
value(s) of a good, such as how much one is willing to pay for that good, but they cannot 
determine the qualitative value(s) of a good, such as the love or caring individuals (ought 
to) feel from receiving a good as a gift.9 According to Anderson, goods are pluralistic in 
that, “they differ not only in how much we should value them, but in how we should 
value them.”10 Anderson then argues that there are some goods we should value in ways 
that cannot be expressed via market valuation, and that to properly value those goods, 
their production, distribution, and use should occur in non-market, social spheres.11 
 In developing her theory, Anderson examines three ways in which people relate to 
goods: in terms of experiencing values, by how we value or care about goods, and by 
forming and justifying value judgments. Experiencing values is, for Anderson, to value 
something as good or bad with respect to the particular response(s) it elicits from us. For 
example, I may laugh at a joke while others do not. This is not because the joke itself 
necessitates a particular response, but because I find the joke funny while others do not. 
However this is not the only way individuals relate to goods because it is possible to 
value goods without directly encountering or experiencing them. No one, for example, 
needs to directly encounter or experience extreme poverty to know that extreme poverty 
is, for the most part, an unfavorable condition for humans to live in.12 
                                                 
9 Anderson, Value and Ethics in Economics, xi-xii.  
10 Ibid., xiii. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 1-2.  
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To relate to goods by valuing or caring about them is to, “have a complex of 
positive attitudes towards it, governed by distinct standards of perception, emotion, 
deliberation, desire, and conduct.”13 This is different than our evaluative experiences of a 
good because this notion is based on how we value the good itself, not the response the 
good elicits from us. For example, an adult may deeply care about or value a painting by 
a young child because the adult is happy that the child is being expressively creative, 
regardless of whether the adult considers the actual painting good or not.  
 Lastly, we can relate to goods by way of value judgments. This is different than 
relating to goods either by our evaluative experiences, or by valuing or caring about 
them. For example, I can value a Rembrandt painting for the exquisite effort put into 
creating it, and for the particular emotive feeling I get by viewing a Rembrandt painting, 
but I can also judge that it is proper to appreciate a Rembrandt painting as an aesthetic 
contribution to the world of art. Relating to goods via value judgments is to therefore 
judge the value of a good based on criteria that is independent of our personal 
experiences or attitudes about those goods. As Anderson puts it, “to judge that something 
is good is to judge that it is properly valued. And to judge that it is bad is to judge that it 
is properly disvalued,” such that for the proposition, ““x is F,” where F is a respect in 
which something is judged to be genuinely valuable, entails that x meets a particular 
standard F, and that x merits valuation in virtue of meeting F.”14 This is to say, for 
instance, that because we think of aesthetic works of art as having inherent value, a 
Rembrandt painting is valuable by virtue of the fact that it is an aesthetic work of art.  
                                                 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Ibid. 
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From these three ways in which individuals relate to goods, Anderson argues that 
there are two ways in which goods are plural. First, given the ways in which we relate to 
goods, goods are plural in that we can sensibly value them in multiple ways. Second, 
goods are plural in that the normative standards by which we judge their value(s) are 
diverse. Anderson further notes that the first sense in which goods are plural is more 
basic than the second because,  
[The first] explains why the second is true: we need a plurality of 
standards to make sense of the plurality of emotional responses and 
attitudes we have to things. The things that sensibly elicit delight are not 
generally the same things that merit respect and admiration. Our capacity 
for articulating our attitudes depend upon our understandings of our 
attitudes, which are informed by norms for valuation.15 
 
What Anderson appears to mean by this is that, to sensibly value goods in 
multiple ways there must be multiple normative standards by which individuals judge the 
value(s) of those goods. Without normative standards by which individuals judge the 
value(s) of goods, individuals could not develop, express, or justify their reasons for how 
and why they subjectively value goods in the ways they do. Because individuals judge 
the value(s) of goods according to normative standards, Anderson claims that an essential 
quality of normative standards is that they are fundamentally social in that they are 
recognized and endorsed by others.16  
 Anderson then discusses how, because goods can be properly valued in different 
ways, goods differ in kind. One way goods differ in kind is by the modes of valuation 
used to judge them. For example, we can value goods by how we use, appreciate, or 
admire them. We can also appropriately value goods by how we personally relate to 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 5. 
16 Ibid., 3, 12, and 141. 
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them; individuals can treasure gifts, show gratitude toward teachers, love family 
members, and express loyalty to friends.17  
Goods also differ in kind by the social, normative standards individuals use to 
judge their value(s). To explain this point Anderson gives the example of a classical 
music concert. Properly valuing such concerts involves obeying particular customs and 
norms – men and women are expected to “dress-up” for the occasion, the audience is to 
withhold their applause until a movement is finished, and criticism during the 
performance is strictly forbidden.18 By contrast, properly valuing a rock music concert 
means following a different (perhaps even opposite) set of social customs and norms – 
audiences are expected to show appreciation for the music by constant, loud cheering, 
and generally engaging in rowdy behavior for the duration of the show.  
With this pluralistic notion of goods in mind, Anderson then argues how some 
goods are incomparably valued higher than others. Claiming that some goods are 
incomparably valued higher than others means, for Anderson, that the worth of those 
goods, “are not candidates for the same mode of valuation.”19 As Anderson further 
explains, goods can be valued higher than others, “if the things concerning it [i.e. the 
higher valued goods] make deeper, qualitatively more significant demands on the 
attitudes, deliberations, and actions of the valuer.”20  
Consider, for example, the difference between the experiences of seeing a concert 
in person versus hearing a recording of that concert. On Anderson’s view, these two 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 8-11.  
18 Ibid., 12.  
19 Ibid., 70.  
20 Ibid. 
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experiences cannot be judged by the same set of normative standards because the former 
is properly valued in multiple and diverse ways that the latter is not. The former 
experience involves making value judgments that are based on one’s aural and visual 
assessment of the live concert, and via the interactions that audiences members have 
between each other, and the interactions that occur between the performers and audience. 
One, however, cannot make such value judgments just by hearing a recording of the 
concert – that is, the mode of valuation for the latter experience is based solely on one’s 
aural assessment of the quality of the recording. Moreover, since the former experience is 
properly valued in ways that the latter cannot be valued, it is justifiable to claim on 
Anderson’s view that the experience of seeing a concert in person has an incomparable 
higher value than the experience of hearing a recording of that concert.  
At this point, we can begin to connect Anderson’s theory of value to health care 
goods and services. Although Anderson does not specifically apply her theory to health 
care goods and services we can still see how, on her view, they ought to be considered as 
having higher value than many other kinds of commodified goods. Individuals can value 
goods like furniture, clothing, or electronics for things such as their aesthetic qualities, for 
their functionality, or their cost. Yet there are few ways that individuals can value these 
kinds of goods that have the same sort of deeply personal impact on one’s attitudes, 
emotional responses, and judgments as health care goods and services. That is, the modes 
of valuation for health care goods and services often require individuals to consider 
aspects of those goods and services that are not expected or necessary to properly value 
many other kinds of commodities. Properly valuing a pharmaceutical drug, for example, 
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involves considerations like: the ability of the drug to address an underlying medical 
condition; whether or not, and to what degree, the drug may interact with other 
medications in ways that can affect one’s health; the potential side effects of taking the 
drug; or the possible consequences to one’s health by not taking the drug. However one 
can properly value goods like furniture, clothing, or electronics without ever needing to 
consider something like how purchasing or not purchasing those goods could negatively 
affect one’s health.  
While Anderson’s theory of commodification helps us see why health care goods 
and services ought to be valued higher than many other kinds of commodities, it does not 
clearly address my concern about the ethical limits of health care markets. I now explain  
how Anderson’s view, while indicating that the values we attribute health care goods and 
services are not properly accounted for in their commodification, is insufficient to deal 
with how we should regard their commodification for market sale. 
A. A Problem Applying Anderson’s Theory to Health Care Markets 
We have already seen how Anderson argues that people are able to value different 
goods in different ways. It is because people are able to value different goods in different 
ways that Anderson further argues for a, “robust system of social sphere differentiation 
that requires sharper limits on the scope of the market.”21 The reason why Anderson 
argues that sphere differentiation requires market limits is that, without market limits 
people would be unable to properly value certain goods according to the normative 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 141.  
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standards embodied and governed by non-market social spheres. Here Anderson points 
out that her use of sphere differentiation is similar to Walzer’s.22 
Walzer, being primarily concerned with the relationship of goods to distributive 
justice, notes that goods concerned with distributive justice are social goods and, as such, 
are valued in different ways.23 He further notes that it is the intrinsic social meaning(s) of 
goods, and not the value of the good-in-itself, that determine the criteria by which goods 
ought to be distributed. That is, “If we understand what it is [i.e. the good in question], 
what it means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and for what 
reasons it ought to be distributed.”24 For example, it is considered prima facie unethical 
to buy political votes in liberal democracies because there is a general social commitment 
to chose political leaders for their abilities to meet the demands of the offices for which 
they running, and not simply because they are wealthy. This is similar to simony, 
prostitution, and bribery, things Walzer notes, “describe the sale and purchase of goods 
that, given certain understandings of their meanings, ought never to be sold or 
purchased.”25 
So for Walzer, it is the social meanings of goods that determine the appropriate 
spheres by which those goods are distributed. The market is the inappropriate sphere for 
distributing political votes. Likewise, goods rightly distributed via markets should not be 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 143.  
23 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 7.  
24 Ibid., 9.  
25 Ibid. 
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sold on the basis of one’s political affiliation – as markets, commonly understood, is 
“open to all comers.”26  
Anderson agrees with Walzer that shared social meanings help justify the 
plurality of goods. However Anderson differs from Walzer in that, for Walzer, shared 
social meanings of goods is the only means of justification he discusses for understanding 
the plurality of goods, whereas for Anderson, justifying the plurality of goods expands 
beyond just shared social meanings to include individuals’ conceptions of value 
(assuming they are rational).27 
Given the idea that some goods are properly valued in non-market spheres, 
Anderson argues that it is proper to value goods as commodities only when their 
production and exchange accord with market norms. When the production and exchange 
of goods do not accord with market norms – that is, when the normative standards by 
which individuals properly value goods are embodied in non-market spheres – Anderson 
then claims, “we shouldn’t treat [those goods] as commodities but rather locate them in 
non-market spheres.”28 Furthermore, Anderson argues that when market norms governing 
the production and exchange of goods undermine important ideals necessary for 
individuals to properly value goods, such as freedom or autonomy, the state may 
legitimately remove the production and exchange of those goods from the market.29 
According to Anderson, market norms have five standard features: they are 
impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and orientated toward “exit” rather than 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Anderson, Value and Ethics in Economics, 143.  
28 Ibid., 143.  
29 Ibid., 143-144.  
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“voice.”30 Markets are impersonal and egoistic in that each party to a market transaction 
views the other as a mere means to satisfy one’s own ends (which are usually developed 
and defined independently of the relationship), while leaving each party free to pursue 
their individual interests without having to consider or care for the interests of the other 
party(-ies). Markets are exclusive in that the benefits of a good are wholly transferred 
from sellers to buyers, and that the ability for individuals to benefit from a good are 
generally limited by the buyer’s ability to pay for it. Markets are want-regarding in that it 
is standard for markets to respond to demand for goods without care or concern for the 
reasons individuals have for wanting them. Markets are orientated toward “exit” rather 
than “voice” in that often, “The customer has no voice, no right to directly participate in 
the design of the product or to determine how it is marketed,” and that “voice” for goods 
or services embodied in sellers may be alienated from them (such as when workers lack 
due process rights to get explanations for managerial decisions that affect their 
employment).31 
However, as we shall see in greater detail in chapters 2 and 3, how individuals 
typically value health care goods and services are not only different from these five 
features of market norms, but are in many ways opposed to them. Health care 
relationships are often valued for being intimate and fiduciary, not impersonal or egoistic. 
Many argue that health care is not exclusive, but a right of all persons, and that access to 
health care goods and services should not be limited based on one’s ability to pay. The 
delivery of health care goods and services is also not want-regarding because it is 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 144-145.  
31 Ibid., 145-146.  
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typically based on need, not just want – for example, health care professionals are not 
obligated to provide health care goods and services to patients if they believe doing so 
would be medically inappropriate. Health care relationships also aim to uphold “voice” 
over “exit” – ideally, health care professionals and patients are expected discuss 
treatment options that both parties find acceptable and that best accord with patients’ 
values and lifestyles.  
On one hand, Anderson’s view of market limits seems to justify removing the 
production and exchange of health care goods and services from the market altogether. 
This is for two reasons. First, because individuals tend to value health care goods and 
services in ways that appear opposite of the standard features of market norms, her view 
advocates that we should not, therefore, treat health care goods and services as 
commodities. Second, the ability for individuals to properly value health care goods and 
services is, in some sense, undermined when their production and exchange is governed 
by market norms. The reason for this is because, again, the ways individuals tend to value 
health care goods and services appear opposite to what Anderson argues are standard 
features of market norms.  
On the other hand, Anderson’s view of market limits also seemingly justifies 
continuing to allow the production and exchange of health care goods and services to 
occur within market spheres. As she points out, her view regarding market limits calls for 
sphere differentiation, not complete sphere segregation.32 In order to respect the 
conditions of freedom and autonomy – conditions that are prima facie necessary for 
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individuals to properly value goods – individuals must be free to commodify goods or 
services either that they own or that are embodied in their persons.  
For example, Anderson argues that achieving excellence in a profession is a full 
time activity. So while doctors and other professionals are valued in accord with how 
well they meet the standards of their chosen professions, they must be paid for their 
work, otherwise only those who are independently wealthy could afford to practice a 
profession. When professionals sell their services to the general public via the market, 
they can enhance their freedom and autonomy by setting the terms of sale for their 
services that buyers are then free to either accept or decline.33 
Herein lies a problem with applying Anderson’s theory of value specifically to the 
commodification of health care goods and services. On her view, in order to respect the 
freedom and autonomy of patients and health care professionals as willing buyers and 
sellers of health care goods and services, it is necessary and appropriate to allow patients 
and health care professionals to treat health care goods and services as commodities. At 
the same time, however, Anderson’s view also suggests that because health care goods 
and services are not valued merely as commodities, and are not properly valued within 
the market sphere, it is inappropriate to treat health care goods and services as 
commodities, and that their production and exchange ought to occur in non-market 
spheres.  
Some may try to counter-argue that Anderson is able to rectify this problem when 
she claims that sphere differentiation is sustainable, “only if market norms do not wholly 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 147-148. 
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govern exchanges of money for professional products or services.”34 However an attempt 
to rectify the problem in this way is insufficient. This is because the problem I have 
highlighted with applying her view to the market sale of health care goods and services is 
not the degree to which we ought to treat health care goods and services as commodities 
governed by market norms, but that according to Anderson’s theory we get two opposing 
views that show how we can and cannot justify treating health care goods and services as 
commodities.  
Anderson’s theory shows us that we ought to value health care goods and services 
as a higher kind of good than many other commodities; implying that, at the very least, 
they are improperly valued merely as commodities. However, her theory does not provide 
a good basis for arguing what the ethical limits of health care markets ought to be 
because her theory justifies two opposing views regarding the commodification of health 
care goods and services. 
I now turn to show how, on Radin’s view, the commodification of health care 
goods and services can be thought of in terms of incomplete commodification and how 
health care goods and services have noncommodifiable value(s).  
2. Radin and Incomplete Commodification 
 Unlike Anderson, who provides a theoretical analysis for how and why some 
goods are inappropriately valued within market spheres, Radin takes a pragmatic 
approach for analyzing the social meanings of various market transactions as they relate 
to one’s personhood. In particular, she focuses on market transactions involving 
“contested commodities” – goods that could be commodified, yet are typically valued in 
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noncommodifiable ways. Specifically Radin argues that when market transactions 
involving contested commodities occur, it is possible to understand how the commodified 
aspects of those transactions coexist with the noncommodifiable ways individuals 
typically value the goods being sold by thinking of the transaction in terms of incomplete 
commodification. “Incomplete commodification” is, for Radin, the concept by which 
individuals perceive market transactions of contested commodities both in terms of 
commodification and noncommodification.35 
Radin argues for incomplete commodification because she does not see how 
standard theories regarding market limits – namely (Becker’s and Posner’s) universal 
commodification (in which everything desired or valued is theoretically subject to 
commodification and market transfer), (Marx’s) universal noncommodification (in which 
markets should be abolished altogether), and (Walzer’s) compartmentalization (in which 
goods are partitioned into social spheres) – are sufficient to address how individuals 
actually perceive transaction(s) involving contested commodities.36 These theories 
regarding market limits see goods as either commodifiable or noncommodifiable. Radin 
argues this is problematic because it oversimplifies and overlooks the complexities of 
trying to commodify goods, “that we have previously valued in a noneconomic way[s].”37 
By discussing Radin’s argument for incomplete commodification and how she relates the 
concept to work and social justice, we are able to see how her view justifies thinking 
about the commodification of health care goods and services in terms of incomplete 
                                                 
35 Radin, Contest Commodities, xi-xiii, and 102-104.  
36 Radin, Contested Commodities, xii-xiii, 2, 79-80, and 103-104; and Radin, “Market Inalienability,” 1853-
1870. 
37 Radin, Contested Commodities, xiii.  
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commodification, and how, under her view, health care goods and services have 
noncommodifiable value(s).   
A. Applying Incomplete Commodification to Health Care Goods and Services  
Radin’s argument for incomplete commodification addresses how commodified 
and noncommodified understandings can coexist in market transactions involving 
contested commodities. For Radin there are at least two states of affairs that explain how 
viewing a market transaction in terms of incomplete commodification is possible. The 
first state of affairs is what Radin calls “contested concepts.” Contested concepts are 
concepts that often generate conflicting understandings when they are externally applied 
to various things. For example, “personhood” is a contested concept when we attempt to 
apply it to fetuses, as some argue that fetuses can be regarded as persons while others 
argue they cannot.38 Given that concepts generally do not apply in the same way to all 
things, it seems possible that this description would allow us to claim that all concepts are 
“contested concepts” in some regard. However Radin’s use of “contested concepts” is 
narrowed only to describe concepts that can create conflicting understandings once they 
are applied to market transactions. So for Radin, understanding incomplete 
commodification via contested concepts occurs, “when a commodified understanding (for 
some people) coexists with a noncommodified understanding (for others).”39  
The second state of affairs Radin discusses for how individuals can view market 
transactions in terms of incomplete commodification is that of internally conflicted (or 
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plural) meanings.40 This is similar to Anderson’s view that persons can value goods in 
multiple and diverse ways. When incomplete commodification occurs via internally 
conflicted meanings, persons characterize the market transaction of a good in seemingly 
opposing or conflicting ways that prevent them from understanding the transaction fully 
in terms of either commodification or noncommodification. An example of this would be 
when individuals value a good like an artwork or family heirloom as priceless, yet have 
that good appraised to determine its monetary value for insurance purposes.41 
Either one of these two states of affairs can apply to the commodification of 
health care goods and services. As I discuss at the beginning of the Introduction, there are 
those who caution against health care markets because they see the ends of health care as 
incommensurable with the ends of the market. Under the first state of affairs, the 
commodification of health care goods and services can be understood in terms of 
incomplete commodification because there are some who disagree with the idea that it is 
ethically possible to treat health care goods and services as commodities.  
We have also seen how Anderson’s theory of value implies that health care goods 
and services ought to be valued higher than many other kinds of commodities, because 
the former involves a deeper, more reflective set of considerations on the part of the 
valuer. Regarding the second state of affairs, the commodification of health care goods 
and services can be understood in terms of incomplete commodification because of how 
their commodification can generate an internal conflict of meaning with respect to the 
noncommodifiable ways individuals typically value them.  
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 I now turn to discuss how Radin relates incomplete commodification to work and 
social justice. Although she too does not specifically discuss health care goods and 
services, her arguments can be used to show how, under her view, health care goods and 
services have noncommodifiable value(s).  
B. Arguing for the Noncommodifiable Value(s) of Health Care Goods and Services under 
Radin’s View 
 
a. Relating Incomplete Commodification to Work 
Radin notes that the work people do often requires some form of human 
interaction between workers who provide goods and services to others, and buyers or 
recipients of those goods and services. Yet the levels and degrees of these interactions 
between workers and recipients vary. When the interactions are less personal, it is easier 
to perceive them more in terms of commodification as simple pay-for-service exchanges. 
However, as the relationships between workers and recipients becomes more personal, 
and workers take greater care in meeting the needs of recipients, the interactions between 
them are also perceived in various noncommodifiable ways.42 According to Radin, when 
the interactions between workers and recipients can be perceived in noncommodifiable 
ways, their relationship can be understood in terms of incomplete commodification. She 
further explains this latter point by stating, 
Incomplete commodification can describe a situation in which things are 
sold but the interaction between the participants in the transaction cannot 
be fully or perspicuously described as the sale of things. If many kinds 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 104-106. Here Radin distinguishes between work and labor. “Work” in an ideal, noncommodified 
and nonmarket aspect, is that which individuals would continue to do if all their necessities were 
monetarily accounted for by other means, whereas “labor” is work that is stripped bare of its 
noncommodified human-element and is thought of purely in terms of commodification. Under this 
distinction, workers conceive of their work as a part of themselves, whereas laborers typically 
disassociate their lives from their work. 
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sales retain a personal aspect even though money changes hands, those 
interactions are not fully described as the sale of commodities. They 
exhibit internally plural meanings. There is an irreducibly non-market or 
nonmonetized aspect of the human interaction going on between seller and 
recipient, even though a sale is taking place at the same time.43 
 
 This view of how incomplete commodification relates to work can apply to health 
care goods and services in how they are exchanged via the relationships between health 
care professionals and patients. The proverbial health care relationship is often perceived 
as a special kind of relationship that typically involves more than mere pay-for-service 
exchanges between health care professionals and patients. Relationships between health 
care professionals and patients are often characterized as being personal, intimate, and 
fiduciary. Even when these relationships are contrived and seemingly impersonal – say 
when they are the result of health insurance plans that limit patients’ options for choosing 
which health care professionals they visit – these relationships still require basic elements 
like trust and honesty if they are to succeed in providing patients with the various health 
care goods and services they need. As such, there are noncommodifiable ways in which 
can we perceive the interactions between health care professionals and patients that 
prevent us from thinking of the sale of health care goods and services completely in terms 
of commodification.  
b. Relating Incomplete Commodification to Social Justice 
Radin criticizes various community based and individual based social justice 
theories that rely on market ideals to describe fair patterns of just distribution for goods. 
According to Radin, 
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Whether we are theorizing about justice for the community or for 
individuals, the still-prevalent liberal metaphor of social contract seems 
itself to perpetuate market rhetoric. Modern contractualists do not always 
mean the language of contract to imply monetary exchange or implicit 
monetizability of all individual and social value. Yet contract is the 
linchpin of the commodified conceptual scheme, and in the liberal 
tradition the contract metaphor must draw its power from the normative 
power of promises to exchange commodities.44 
 
Radin considers social justice theories that rely on market ideals to conceive of 
the relationships between people and other people, and between people and things, just as 
a matter of need fulfillment via some understanding of commodification. She claims that 
under such theories, goods are considered fungible items that merely have instrumental 
worth, while people are seen as self-contained individuals striving to meet their own 
ends.45 The reason Radin considers social justice theories that rely on market ideals 
problematic is that they to fail to account for the noncommodifiable ways that people 
both socially connect to one another, and relate or connect various goods to their own 
personhood. For example, Radin discusses how housing is culturally significant for 
proper self-development, and not just to protect or provide individuals with security or 
welfare.  
She further argues that social justice is also about recognizing how human 
interaction with others is valuable in-itself, and that satisfying one’s own ends requires 
communal interdependence and solidarity.46 When social justice is conceived of in this 
way, Radin claims it reflects the concept of incomplete commodification because it takes 
the commodified understanding(s) of need fulfillment as being coupled with the 
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noncommodifiable ways that persons value their relationships to others and view goods 
as aspects of their personhood.  
By how Radin relates incomplete commodification to social justice there are at 
least two ways in which health care goods and services can be regarded as having 
noncommodifiable value. The first is with respect to the personal meanings individuals 
can attach to various health care goods and services. Certainly health care goods and 
services have some sort of instrumental value for those who acquire and use them. 
However, there are many instances in which individuals do not simply value health care 
goods and services for their instrumental worth. For example, organ transplantation does 
not just help organ recipients regain their health, it also helps them regain aspects of their 
personhood that may have been compromised prior to the transplant such as, perhaps, the 
ability to perform certain activities or functions relating to their work or hobbies. Under 
Radin’s view of how incomplete commodification relates to social justice, we can see 
that health care goods services have noncommodifiable value with respect to the personal 
meanings and significance individuals can attribute to them, and because of how they are 
often valued in connection with human flourishing (which Radin understands as a 
component of social justice47). 
 Second, how individuals acquire some health care goods and services is reflective 
of Radin’s point regarding the integral interconnectivity of persons. Organ donation, for 
example, is both literally and metaphorically a type of gift exchange, and represents a 
situation in which the organ recipient’s health is closely tied to the willing generosity of 
the donor to provide a transplant organ. These types of situations in which one’s health is 
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closely tied to the work or generosity of others cannot be viewed as a mere instrumental 
exchange of goods or services for sake of meeting one’s medical needs. To view these 
kinds of exchanges strictly in those terms would devalue how each party may view their 
relationship to the other or the nonmarket significance each party may attach to the 
transaction (like when the transaction is the result of an altruistic motive).   
C. Concluding Remarks on Radin Regarding the Commodification of Health Care Goods 
and Service for Market Sale 
 
 Ultimately Radin’s view shows us two things regarding the commodification of 
health care goods and services. First, because of the different non-market, 
noncommodifiable ways individuals can think about and value health care goods and 
services, their commodification is not properly understood in terms of universal 
commodification (in which all aspects of health care transactions would be open to 
commodification and market transfer), but instead in terms of incomplete 
commodification (in which only some aspects of health care transactions can be ethically 
open to commodification and market transfer). Second, we can see how, under Radin’s 
view, health care goods and services have noncommodifiable value with respect to work 
and social justice – particularly for how individuals can relate the acquisition and use of 
health care goods and services to their relationships with others and to their own 
personhood.  
 Note however that Radin does not, nor attempts to, argue that goods that are 
incompletely commodified ought to be removed from the market. This, again, is because 
Radin is offering a pragmatic analysis regarding the sale of contested commodities, not a 
theoretical argument for what should or should or should not be for sale. So while 
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Radin’s view shows that we do not simply value health care goods and services merely 
for their instrumental worth, her view also does not clearly indicate what sorts of ethical 
limits might be needed for the sale of health care goods and services to respect the 
noncommodifiable ways individuals can value them.  
 Next I analyze Satz’s argument for democratic egalitarianism to show the conditions 
under which markets are noxious, and why noxious markets in certain goods ought to be 
regulated.  
3. Satz and Democratic Egalitarianism 
Satz aims to analyze the relationship between the market sale of commodified 
goods that historically have not been commodified, such as genetic material or organs, 
and the values closely connected with democratic institutions.48 Satz develops what she 
calls the “democratic egalitarian approach” as a way to understand this relationship. For 
Satz, the democratic egalitarian approach both draws from and is an alternative to four 
contemporary approaches regarding commodification that all address, to some degree, 
questions regarding the appropriate limits of the market. These four approaches are: 
 
- the economic approach: in which regulation of transactions should only 
occur when and where markets fail to be efficient. This approach allows 
for nonregulated, voluntary contracts “between two agents that does not 
have negative externalities on uninvolved outsiders.”  
 
- the ‘distributive equality’ approach: that accepts the legitimacy of relying 
on markets as a primary means of distribution except for those goods 
involving our basic rights or liberties. Here markets are used only to 
achieve an egalitarian distribution. 
 
                                                 
48 Satz, “Noxious Markets,” 11-13. 
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- the social meanings approach: in which the appropriateness of treating 
goods as commodities available for market sale depends on the socially 
shared meaning or value of those goods. 
 
- the perfectionist approach: in which treating certain goods as commodities 
available for market sale can, “undermine the conditions for our best 
flourishing as human beings” in the sense that, “we thrive when certain 
goods closely connected to our ‘personhood’ cannot be bought or sold on 
the market.”49 
 
The reason Satz does not fully endorse any one of these approaches is that she 
considers them to be either too narrowly focused on just the values of efficiency and 
equitable distribution, or “are too controversial and too a priori to be the basis of a theory 
of market regulation.”50 Satz’s democratic egalitarian approach concurs with and utilizes 
the ideas of both the social meanings and perfectionist approaches that a plurality of 
values helps guide our understanding of market regulation. Yet she claims the values 
reflected in the democratic egalitarian approach are more closely associated with the 
economic and ‘distributive equality’ approaches; values she claims are characteristic of 
democratic institutions.51 In particular, the values Satz takes as central to the democratic 
egalitarian approach are liberty, the equal standing of citizens, and accountability.52  
Satz acknowledges that democratic egalitarian values may sometimes conflict 
with one another, and that this will sometimes require making tradeoffs with respect to 
those values. However, for Satz, resolving these conflicts and determining which 
tradeoffs are ethically appropriate is not a matter of philosophical determinism, but a 
matter of democratic politics – that is, the democratic egalitarian approach, “stresses the 
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need to consider institutional alternatives to the market and to make comparative 
judgments—[as] there is a limit to what purely philosophical approaches can tell us to do 
in abstraction from the context and the facts.”53 This is not to say that democratic 
reasoning cannot be philosophically informed, only that a pure philosophical analysis of 
commodification cannot account for all contextual factors regarding the appropriate 
limits of the market. This aspect of Satz’s argument highlights a deficiency in the four 
contemporary approaches she builds her view on – none of the other approaches by 
themselves, “has very much to say about the role of politics in allowing people to 
formulate, voice, deliberate, and decide about how to order conflicting values in the 
context of setting the limits to the market.”54  
When the commodification of goods for market sale violates one or more 
democratic egalitarian values, Satz claims that those markets are noxious.55 According to 
Satz, there are three ways to characterize noxious markets. Markets can be considered 
noxious either when they result in extreme outcomes, “that depress people below the 
level of what they need to function as citizens (or even as human beings);” when they 
allow for some participants to exercise unequal and unaccountable power over others; or 
when they undermine values and procedures necessary to support liberal democracies.56 I 
now turn to elaborate what Satz means by each of these features of noxious markets and 
to show how her discussion of noxious markets relates to the commodification of health 
care goods and services.  
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A. Relating Noxious Markets to the Commodification and Market Sale of Health Care 
Goods and Services  
 
The first characteristic of noxious markets is that they can lead to extreme, 
negative outcomes. Satz’s understanding of extreme outcomes is primarily based on Ravi 
Kanbur’s from his article, “On Obnoxious Markets.” According to Kanbur, the threshold 
of extreme outcomes for markets is a matter of degree with respect to the context. For 
example, if a billionaire and a middle-class worker who earns a hundred thousand dollars 
a year both lose a hundred thousand dollars in the stock market, the negative impact on 
the billionaire is not likely to be viewed as an extreme outcome, whereas the negative 
impact on the middle class worker may be devastating to the degree that it can be thought 
of as an extreme outcome. And while Kanbur acknowledges this is an “untidy” way to 
think about extreme outcomes, he further claims that, “a good starting point is that if the 
outcome renders a family or an individual destitute, below some context-specific poverty 
line, say, that is an extreme outcome.”57 Satz slightly differs from Kanbur regarding this 
last point. For her, understanding when an outcome is “extreme” is not a question of 
whether or not the outcome causes a family or individual to be destitute, but whether or 
not the outcome violates democratic egalitarian values.58 
Satz claims that noxious markets that cause extreme outcomes can be especially 
bad, “when the goods that these markets are distributing are ones that people urgently 
need, as in the case of life-saving drugs or healthcare.”59 She further claims that the 
reason for this is because, “People whose basic needs have not been met – people who 
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lack adequate food, education, or medical care – cannot participate in political life or civil 
society on a footing of equality with others.”60 This is an ambiguous claim and one that 
Satz does not attempt to argue for or explain. In particular, it is unclear what it means to 
meet one’s basic needs, and how meeting one’s basic needs correlates to one’s equal 
political or social participation with others. Moreover, with respect to healthcare, if a 
large number of people lack the same basic access to healthcare or medical care – such as 
the nearly 50 million uninsured United States citizens – wouldn’t those individuals be on 
equal, not different, footing in their ability to participate in political life or civil society? 
However despite Satz’s ambiguity here, the underlying force of her point appears to be 
that noxious markets that produce extreme outcomes are particularly troublesome for 
goods that prima facie appear necessary for individuals to ideally function as members of 
democratic institutions.  
Satz then argues that when the market sale of goods people urgently need cause 
extreme outcomes, the appropriate response is not necessarily to ban their sale. This is 
because banning the sale of these types of goods can also have bad effects like the 
creation of black markets, or an inefficient provision of a needed good.61 Instead Satz 
claims the appropriate response is to partially decommodify the market sale of needed 
goods. Under the idea of partial decommodification, a needed good could still be 
commodified for market sale, but a minimal level of provision would be guaranteed to all 
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current ban on organ sales has driven some to purchase transplant organs either from countries where 
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(although Satz does not specify what that minimum level would be, or how it would be 
determined). The reason Satz argues for partial decommodification is not just because it 
is a way to ensure access of needed goods to all, but also because it expresses the 
importance a society places on these goods. As Satz claims regarding this point, 
A decent society will not only protect its members from poverty, but also 
from some specific forms of disenfranchisement: ensuring access to 
medical care and legal assistance, education, and nutrition… [So] In 
refusing to completely commodify goods like healthcare or life-saving 
drugs, a society expresses its recognition of the importance of these 
goods.62 
 
The second way Satz argues markets can be noxious is when some participants 
are able to exercise unequal and unaccountable power over others. Satz claims this is 
possible because among other socially influential aspects of markets, “they can also 
structure the exercise of power and limit the scope of democratic accountability.”63 Satz 
further claims this is particularly true in cases when markets are not perfectly competitive 
and there are already socio-economic inequalities between the participants.64  
To illustrate this point, Satz gives the example the grain market in Bangladesh, in 
which a recent famine increased the cost of rice beyond what the poor could pay to 
purchase it. The rich landowners however were not affected by this cost increase, partly 
because they were often given rice as payment by their tenets for use of their land. The 
                                                 
62 Satz, “Noxious Markets,” 24. Also in this section regarding the extreme outcomes of noxious markets, 
Satz criticizes both Radin and Walzer for claiming that some healthcare goods and services should not 
be treated as commodities. Although Walzer says in Spheres of Justice that healthcare falls under the 
sphere of security and welfare, and so is not (and cannot be) appropriately distributed via the market 
(Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 86-91), Satz criticism of Radin is seemingly unjustified. Although it is 
possible that Radin makes “ought” claims elsewhere regarding the noncommodification of healthcare, 
she does not in Contested Commodities – again, the most Radin claims is that market transactions 
involving goods like healthcare are best understood in terms of incomplete commodification.  
63 Ibid., 26.  
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poor were not only made more vulnerable to extreme outcomes by the increased cost for 
rice, but also became much more dependent on rich landowners. Although Satz does not 
explain what she means by “more vulnerable to extreme outcomes,” it seems as though, 
given that Satz takes “extreme outcomes” to be outcomes that violate democratic 
egalitarian values, she is referring to the unlikelihood in this case that the poor were able 
to engage in a market relationship with the rich landowners that expressed respect for 
democratic egalitarian values. She thusly concludes that the grain market at that time in 
Bangladesh was noxious because of its effect on the power stratification between the rich 
and poor.65 
Similar to when markets can result in extreme outcomes, Satz does necessarily 
think the appropriate response is to ban markets that allow some persons to exercise 
unequal power over others. According to Satz, this is because banning such markets will 
not address what are often the underlying inequalities that exist between the market 
participants. She states, “For example, if the problem with selling kidneys is (as some 
claim) the ‘desperateness’ of the exchange, banning the sale will by itself do nothing to 
relieve the desperate conditions that prompt it.”66 This also is not to say, nor suggest, that 
regulating these kinds of noxious markets is sufficient to overcome what are often the 
underlying inequalities between the participants. Regulation of organ markets would not, 
using Satz’s example, be able to address what many see as a moral problem that sellers 
are more likely be economically disadvantaged than buyers, and that this underlying 
inequality is tantamount to the poor being exploited for their organs for the sole benefit of 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 26-27. Quote on 27. 
  
 
48
the wealthy. However, given the limit of Satz’s argument to the scope of the market, 
regulating these kinds of noxious markets as opposed to banning them could at least 
prevent potential abuses of power within those markets as a way to try to mitigate the 
severity of any underlying inequality between the participants.  
The last way Satz argues markets can be noxious is when they undermine the 
crucial values and procedures of liberal democracies. The reason Satz considers this 
aspect of noxious markets a problem is because, “The regulative idea of democracy is 
that citizens are equals engaged in a common cooperative project of governing 
themselves together.”67 As such, all citizens of a liberal democracy ought to have equal 
standing in deciding the governing laws and procedures of that particular democratic 
institution.68 Although there seems room here to criticize how well this ideal can be 
implemented within different democratic institutions, Satz’s point is only that the 
freedom granted to citizens in liberal democracies is meaningless if they are without the 
goods necessary, “to participate effectively in the project of self-government.”69  
 To ensure access to goods that individuals need to participate in liberal 
democracies, Satz argues that a case can be made for regulating or banning markets in 
those goods. According to Satz, these goods fit into three categories: (i) political goods 
like voting rights, (ii) goods, like education, that are required for effective participation in 
liberal democracies, and (iii) goods that, “foster the development of people likely to 
support democratic institutions and function effectively in a democratic environment.”70  
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We have already seen with respect to noxious markets and extreme outcomes that 
Satz considers healthcare, like education, a basic need for individuals to ideally function 
as members of democratic institutions. So on her view healthcare would be considered a 
good within the second category. As Satz notes when discussing how markets in these 
kinds of goods can lead to extreme outcomes, a total ban on markets in these goods could 
have worse effects than if they were regulated. Her concern here, though, is not just that 
unregulated markets in these kinds of goods can cause those markets to be noxious by 
leading to extreme outcomes, but that they could also be noxious by limiting access to 
these goods just to those with the resources to afford them. Satz provides further 
explanation of this latter point when she applies her view to unregulated organ markets. 
According to Satz, the problem with unregulated organ markets undermining the values 
of liberal democracies is that,  
Unregulated organ markets would conflict with widely held ideas about 
fairness, to the extent that they allowed the rich to purchase the gift of life 
while others without resources could not. As a social practice, they would 
confer privileges to the wealthy that send the message that their urgent 
needs are more important than those of others.71 
 
There are two particular points we can draw out of what Satz says regarding 
noxious markets and how they relate to the commodification of health care goods and 
services. First, Satz considers healthcare a need that should be provided to all persons in 
at least some basic form. So whatever health care goods and services would qualify for 
what she considers “healthcare,” they are not valued under her view merely as 
commodities, but as necessities for people to effectively participate in democratic 
institutions. Second, Satz is characterizing the features markets exhibit when they either 
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exceed the threshold of democratic egalitarian values, or exacerbate underlying 
inequalities between market participants. However, she also acknowledges that the 
features of different markets raise different moral concerns relative to the kinds of 
relationships that exist within those markets.72 So while Satz explains why it is necessary 
to regulate markets, her view also leaves room to argue what the specific limits of 
different kinds of markets should be.  
4. Conclusion 
So far I have discussed how the views of Anderson, Radin, and Satz justify the 
idea that health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities. 
However, I have also shown that none of these views gives a clear indication of what it 
means to ethically treat health care goods and services as commodities that are bought 
and sold via health care markets. Anderson’s view is the only one under which we might 
consider it unethical to treat health care goods and services as commodities because they 
are not properly valued according to market norms. The problem, though, is that this 
point contradicts another aspect of her view justifying the idea that respecting the 
conditions of freedom and autonomy – conditions necessary to properly value goods – 
would require allowing individuals to willingly treat health care goods and services as 
commodities. Radin’s view shows that health care goods and services can be thought of 
in terms of incomplete commodification, but she does not specify what ethical limits 
should be placed on the market sale of incompletely commodified goods. On Satz’s view 
we see that she regards healthcare as a necessary good that persons need to fully 
participate in democratic institutions, but that banning markets in this kind of good would 
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likely cause more harmful effects than if such markets were regulated. Yet Satz does not 
further argue why “healthcare” is required to participate in liberal democracies, what 
sorts of goods and services she thinks would fall within the bounds of “healthcare,” or 
how we ought to regulate “healthcare” markets.  
This analysis about how health care goods and services are not properly valued 
merely as commodities clears the way and establishes the need for developing a 
theoretical account of how it may be possible to ethically treat health care goods and 
services as commodities. Over the next two chapters I attempt to develop such an 
account. In the next chapter I build on the view that health care is a special kind of good 
that cannot be valued merely as a commodity to argue for why there ought to be 
increased access to essential health care goods and services and how this principle is an 
ethical limit of health care markets. In detailing this aspect of my argument, I attempt to 
specify the goal of increasing access to essential health care goods and services by 
articulating what is and is not included under this principle. 
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Chapter Two: Arguing for the Principle of Increased Access to Essential 
Health Care Good and Services 
 
None of the theories of ethical markets used to show how health care goods and 
services are improperly valued as commodities consequently shows that they should also 
be removed from the market. Anderson argues that goods should not be treated as 
commodities when their production and distribution fall outside market norms. However 
I have also shown why this argument is insufficient for removing the production and 
delivery of health care goods and services from the market, since it contradicts an 
important aspect of her view regarding the ability of individuals to properly value goods. 
I now turn to explore how it may be possible to ethically treat health care goods and 
services as commodities.  
There are two main reasons why I argue for the principles of honesty, respect for 
autonomy, and increased access to essential health care goods and services as the base 
ethical limits of health care markets. First, each of these appear to reflect some of the 
ways individuals can value health care goods and services, or the transactions by which 
those goods and services are exchanged, beyond their mere commodification. Second, as 
we shall in greater detail over the next two chapters, each of these principles play an 
important role in governing what we can think of as the ideal for both interactions 
between health care professionals and patients, and market transactions between buyers 
and sellers.  
This chapter attempts to bridge the view established in chapter 1 to my argument 
regarding the base ethical limits of health care markets. Specifically I aim to show why 
there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services, and what it 
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means for this normative principle to be an ethical limit of health care markets. In making 
this argument I examine three approaches that, together, help justify the principle of 
increased access to essential health care goods and services. The first of these is a market-
based approach, in which increased access can be thought of in terms of wealth creation. 
Then, after noting a problem with this view to ensure access to essential health care 
goods and services, I provide two moral-based approaches that argue for increased access 
on the basis of a possible right to health care, and on the basis that health care is common 
to all persons within our society. I then attempt to clarify some of the qualities that should 
define essential health care goods and services. I conclude by discussing what it means 
for the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services to be an 
ethical limit of health care markets.  
1. A Market Approach for Increased Access 
At first glance, attempting to develop a market-based argument for increased 
access to essential health care goods and services may seem odd. This is because, on one 
hand, most arguments regarding access to essential health care goods and services center 
on the idea that health care is a basic human need that all persons are entitled to in some 
fashion as a matter of justice or fairness. On the other hand, markets, historically, have 
not been used to generate fair or just access to goods or services. Markets typically 
require persons to forgo purchasing commodities they cannot afford, even if the 
commodity is also socially recognized as a need, such as health care. This section 
attempts to reconcile these two opposing views to show that even though markets are not 
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concerned with fair access, the value of health care goods and services as commodities 
justifies increasing access to them.  
One type of market system that seems naturally inclined toward increasing access 
to essential health care goods and services is social welfare capitalism. Under this system, 
the focus of the market shifts away from the traditional goals of wealth creation and the 
attainment of private property, toward protecting and improving the welfare of all 
participants within the market. Theoretically, it is possible to accomplish this shift in 
market ideology by having the government fulfill its duty to citizens by increasing its role 
from merely stabilizing and correcting potential market failures via regulation to actually 
controlling the market.73 The benefit of using social welfare capitalism to argue for 
increased access to essential health care goods and services is that it recognizes and 
emphasizes meeting the needs of market participants to enhance their overall well being 
as tied to economic growth. Despite its promise, though, I reject using social welfare 
capitalism in this project as a basis to justify a market approach for increasing access to 
essential health care goods and services. 
As Cooley notes, a transition to social welfare capitalism would be a paradigm 
shift that replaces current market ideology.74 Using social welfare capitalism to ground a 
market approach to justify the principle access to essential health care goods and services 
would therefore be impractical for my overall argument. This is because my theoretical 
                                                 
73 See for example; Cooley, “Understanding Social Welfare Capitalism, Private Property, and the 
Government’s Duty to Create a Sustainable Environment.” 
I am thankful to Dennis Cooley for his comments, and subsequent e-mail conversation, about my project in 
connection with social welfare capitalism during a paper I gave on the ethical limits of health care 
markets at the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics. 
74 Ibid. 
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discussion of the market up to this point and hereafter focuses on a free market system 
that the government regulates, not a market system that the government controls. 
Moreover my goal in this project has never been to argue for what kind of market system 
is best to ethically manage the production and delivery of health care goods and services. 
A second reason why I reject using social welfare capitalism here is that this is not the 
kind of market system discussed by Anderson, Radin, or Satz (although Satz theory of 
Democratic Egalitarianism appears similar), and is not the kind of market system that 
current health care markets, like the pharmaceutical industry, operate under. So while 
social welfare capitalism may be useful for analyzing the ethical limits of future health 
care markets, it is not necessarily helpful for analyzing the ethical limits of current health 
care markets. However, it is possible to ground a market approach for increasing access 
to essential health care goods and services using the current free market system.   
A standard feature of free markets is to generate as much monetary value as 
possible for shareholders. So even though questions about the fair access and distribution 
of health care goods and services typically fall outside market concerns, free markets 
ought to still focus on increasing access to essential health care goods and services as a 
matter of wealth creation. The reason for this is grounded in basic economic theory of 
supply and demand. According to this theory, markets function best when the amount of 
a good supplied equals the demand for that good, whereas the ability of markets to 
maximize wealth creation is not optimal when either the supply or demand for a good 
outweighs the other. When goods or services have continuous or increasing demand 
markets in those goods or services will therefore function to try to meet that demand.  
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Health care, we know, is one institution that has seen steady increases in demand 
for goods and services since at least the 1960s when public sector financing of health care 
was introduced with Medicaid and Medicare. Using America’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as an indictor of consumer demand, the demand for health care has increased its 
share of America’s GDP from 5% in 1960 to 12% in 1990. Additionally, increasing 
demand led to an annual average of 11% economic growth in health care from 1960 to 
1990 (3 percent above the average growth of the United States’ economy during that 
time). Even as the demand for health care steadily dropped throughout the 1990s – due 
mostly to an increase in managed care systems that saw consumers having to pay higher 
premiums and deductibles for both private and employer-sponsored health insurance – 
annual growth in health care still increased at a rate of approximately 5.5%.75  
The recent economic recession has also slowed the growth in demand for health 
care goods and services – particularly for those paid out-of-pocket. However, according 
to the 2008 summary of health care spending by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, health care spending was still projected to increase by 2.1% between 2008 and 
2009, and increase to 4.8% between 2009 and 2010. The report also highlighted several 
projected spending increases between 2008 and 2009 correlating with increased demand 
for particular health care goods and services. For example, prescription drug spending 
was projected to increase from 3.2% in 2008 to 5.2% in 2009, largely due to an increased 
use of anti-viral drugs associated with H1N1 virus. Also, hospital and physician and 
clinical services spending growth was expected to increase, respectively, from 4.5% and 
                                                 
75 Institute for the Future, Health and Health Care 2010, 25-30.  
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5% in 2008 to 5.9% and 6.3% in 2009, driven largely by increased demand for services to 
treat H1N1 virus.76 
We need to be clear, though, what we mean here by “demand.” When talking 
about the demand for essential goods and services, “demand” refers to the effective 
demand – i.e., the want of a good or service coupled with the ability to pay for it. If goods 
or services cost too much for persons to afford, the demand for them can decrease, which 
can then negatively impact profits stemming from the sale of those goods and services. 
So built into this market approach for justifying increased access to essential health care 
goods and services is the necessity of the marketplace to keep costs for essential health 
care goods and services affordable to the degree that their cost does not negatively affect 
the ability of the market in those goods and services to remain profitable. This is a point 
that I will return to in the chapter on the pharmaceutical industry when I analyze and 
refute the claim that high pharmaceutical drug prices in the United States ultimately 
improve access to prescription drugs. 
There is, however, a concern with this approach being able to fully ground the 
normative principle that there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods 
and services. As long as markets in essential health care goods and services remain 
profitable, basing the principle of increased access on the concept of wealth creation 
works. Hypothetically, though, if markets in essential health care goods and services 
were not profitable, there would no longer be a reason to increase access to them as a 
matter of wealth creation. The specific problem with this approach is that it only 
                                                 
76 United States Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, National Health Expenditure Projections 2009-2019. As of May 2010, I have been unable to 
find any empirical data that allow us to draw any conclusions about the accuracy of these projections. 
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recognizes the commodifiable value of essential health care goods and services, while 
failing to account for how they are necessary for meeting persons’ health care needs. To 
help overcome this problem with the market-based approach, I next argue for two moral-
based approaches in which increased access to essential health care goods and services 
can be grounded either in terms a right to health care or the idea that health care is 
common to all persons within our society.  
2. A Right-to-Health Care Approach for Increased Access 
One way to defend increased access to essential health care goods and services 
beyond the profitability of health care markets is via a right to health care. This is 
because a primary function (if not the primary function) of arguments for a right to health 
care is to justify some form of universal access to health care. However, the intent of this 
section is not to argue for a right to health care per se. Instead the focus of this section is 
to show how there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and 
services based on the plausibility of a right to health care. There are two accounts of a 
right to health care that I use to ground this approach: Daniels’ argument for a right to 
health care on the basis of equal opportunity, and Buchanan’s pluralistic account for a 
right to a decent minimum of health care.77 Before addressing these two views, though, it 
will be helpful to first briefly sketch what we mean by a “right” to health care.  
 
 
                                                 
77 For fuller range of arguments for a right to health care, also see; Daniels, “Health-Care Needs and 
Distributive Justice;” Daniels, “Equity of Access to Health Care: Some Conceptual and Ethical 
Issues;” Davis, “Inequality and Access to Health Care;” Emanuel, “Justice and Managed Care;” 
Galarneau, “Health Care as a Community Good;” Harvard Law Review, “Universal Access to Health 
Care;” and Pellegrino, “The Commodification of Medical and Health Care.” 
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A. Clarifying the Concept of a Right to Health Care 
 Buchanan notes four basic features of valid rights claims. First, “To say that a 
person A has a right to something X, is . . . to say that A is entitled to X, that X is due to 
him or her.”78 Furthermore, claiming that person A has a right to X is stricter than 
claiming that X is either morally good or desired by person A. Second, rights warrant 
enforceability via sanctions or even coercion by some governing body, and that the 
failure of one’s rights to be enforced is itself an injustice. Third, rights trump utility 
maximization in the sense that, “[I]f A has a right to X, then the mere fact that infringing 
A’s right would maximize overall utility or even A’s utility is not itself a sufficient 
reason for infringing it.”79 Fourth, universal rights, such as a right to health care, apply to 
all persons. 
 The third feature requires an important clarification. Utility maximization may 
not be sufficient to infringe upon or override one’s rights, but this is not to say that rights 
are therefore unlimited or that utility maximization cannot be a reason for limiting certain 
rights. The fulfillment of any right is limited according to the resources available to meet 
or enforce it. For example, having a right to health care does not thusly entitle all persons 
to an open-ended array of health care benefits. This is because, as Dougherty explains,  
Such an unbound obligation would conflict with other obligations 
individuals have, including obligations to themselves, and would lead to a 
view of persons as merely resources for satisfying others’ needs with no 
space left for personal self-determination . . . Moreover, such an open-
ended health care obligation would mean the inability to fund other 
important public resources.80 
 
                                                 
78 Buchanan, “The Right of a Decent Minimum of Health Care,” 56.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Dougherty, Back to Reform, 44. 
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Although Dougherty does not further specify what he means by an unbound obligation to 
provide health care conflicting with other obligations to oneself and others, his wording 
here suggests a Kantian line of thinking. Specifically, Dougherty seems to be implying 
that an unbound obligation to provide health care would violate Kant’s famously argued 
view that all persons have an obligation to treat themselves and others as ends and never 
merely as a means to an end.81 However since Dougherty does not argue for this point it 
is unclear that this is his intention, and it is unclear how exactly an unbound obligation to 
provide health care would actually lead to viewing “persons as merely resources for 
satisfying others’ needs . . .” Still, the idea that a right to health care must be limited 
according to available resources is one consideration I address later in the chapter when I 
attempt to clarify some of the qualities of essential health care goods and services. 
 Rights are also often classified as positive or negative. Negative rights are those 
that, apart from enforcement, require others to abstain or refrain from action against the 
right’s possessor.  A negative right to health care therefore refers to the requirement of 
others not to impede on one’s ability to attain health care. Positive rights are those that, 
beyond enforcement, may require others to act on behalf of the right’s possessor in order 
for that person fully attain what is due to him or her. A positive right to health care 
therefore refers to the obligation others to help individuals attain whatever form of health 
care is due to him or her. Health care is generally considered to be a positive right, since 
one’s ability to attain health care typically requires more than just the noninterference of 
                                                 
81 See; Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:428-4:429; and Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals, 6:385 and 6:395. Pagination for all references to these two works is from the Academy 
editions volume 4 for the Groundwork and volume 6 for the Metaphysics of Morals.  
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others. To remain consistent with Daniels and Buchanan, I also treat the right to health 
care as a positive right.  
B. Establishing a Right to Health Care 
Daniels states that attempts to justify a right to health care extend beyond legal 
positivism – which claims that rights only exist when embodied by laws – toward a moral 
right.82 This is because, as he further claims with respect to a right to health care, “Legal 
entitlements, most people believe, should reflect what society is morally obliged to 
provide by way of medical services.”83 According to Daniels, it is possible to base a right 
to health care on the concept of equal opportunity. He argues that disease and disability 
restrict the normal range of opportunities available to persons within a given society to 
construct reasonable “life-plans” for themselves, and so, because health care helps people 
function as close to normal as possible (given their talents and skills), persons are entitled 
to a fair allocation of health care resources to preserve the range opportunities closed off 
to them as a result of disease or disability.84 There are, however, some concerns regarding 
Daniels’ argument.  
One concern is that Daniels’ notion of a normal opportunity range makes it hard 
to asses what sorts of essential health care goods services ought to be included under the 
principle of increased access. On one hand, Daniels claims that a “normal opportunity 
range” is that which allows persons to pursue reasonable life-plans. However there are a 
number of reasonable life plans available to persons within our society that, if we 
provided the health care resources necessary for all persons to pursue them as part of a 
                                                 
82 Daniels, “Is There a Right to Health Care and, If So, What Does It Encompass?,” 316. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 319-320. Also see, Daniels, “Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice.” 
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normal opportunity range, would theoretically lead to a massive depletion of those 
resources.85 Basing a right to health care on a right to a normal opportunity range also 
runs the risk of being circular. While the goal of health care under Daniels’ argument is 
to ensure a normal opportunity range, what constitutes a normal opportunity range within 
society is partly determined by the quality of health care available within that society. 
This is problematic is because, as Buchanan notes, 
[A] principle which requires only that resources be allocated so as to 
assure that everyone attains the normal opportunity range would be 
inadequate in situations in which the normal opportunity range was 
unacceptably narrow due to a failure to allocate sufficient resources for 
health care.86 
 
Buchanan then claims that Daniels’ argument must be supplemented with a principle 
requiring the maximization of the normal opportunity range.87 So, on the other hand, this 
latter point regarding Daniels’ notion of the normal opportunity range could consequently 
result in having to be too narrow or strict about the kinds of health care goods and 
services included under the principle of increased access.  
Another concern about Daniels’ view is that its scope is objectionable. Preserving 
one’s ability to attain a normal opportunity range is undoubtedly a good reason why there 
ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services. However, as we 
shall see in the next section, there are other, more primary reasons why we should be 
concerned about the attainment of health care. That is, the attainment of health care is 
                                                 
85 This objection to Daniels is originally given by Buchanan, in which he criticizes Daniels’ claim of a 
“normal opportunity range” being too ambiguous. See; Buchanan, “The Right to a Decent Minimum of 
Health Care,” 63.  
86 Buchanan, “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care,” 64. 
87 Ibid. 
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good even when it does not necessarily preserve or increase one’s range of 
opportunities.88 
Partly in response to the general concerns of Daniels’ view, Buchanan develops 
an alternative argument that does not look to justify a prima facie universal right to health 
care, but, instead, aims to show how a pluralistic strategy is enough to do the work of 
supposed a universal right to health care. For the sake of space, I only briefly summarize 
the main points of Buchanan’s argument. Also, the full purpose of Buchanan’s argument 
is to develop an obligation of state enforced beneficence regarding the right to a decent 
minimum of health care. He does this primarily to counter-argue the libertarian view that 
persons are not entitled to health care because such a right would be tantamount to an 
unjust distribution of resources. However I abstain from discussing this aspect of 
Buchanan’s argument because merely establishing the plausibility of a right to a decent 
minimum of health care does not also require showing how enforcing that right is fair or 
just. 
First Buchanan argues that, at the least, there three ways we can defend a 
specialized right to health care – i.e., a right that only applies to certain individuals or 
groups. These ways are: 1) arguing that groups like Native Americans or African 
Americans are due core health care benefits to rectify past injustices that either directly or 
indirectly resulted in health detriments within those groups; 2) by arguing that those who, 
through some form of employment, have been either unjustly harmed or unjustly exposed 
to health risks, are entitled to core health care benefits as a matter of just compensation; 
and 3) by arguing that core health care benefits are due to those whose exceptional 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 63. 
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sacrifices for society have resulted in adverse health, such as when military personnel are 
wounded during combat.89 Second, Buchanan argues that our society already accepts 
expending public resources to attain public health measures such as sanitation and 
immunization from potentially harmful, communicable diseases, and that because of this, 
there is an extended moral obligation, “to achieve some standard of equal protection from 
the harms these measures are designed to prevent.”90 Third, Buchanan argues that a right 
to health care can also be defended via non-moral, prudential reasoning. For example, 
basic health care measures not only help protect persons from various health related 
harms, but they also improve the health of some persons, thereby potentially improving 
the overall quality of society, such as by helping to create a stronger workforce.91  
 Buchanan’s argument for a right to health care is more practical than theoretical. 
This helps him avoid the same kinds of ambiguities that can arise from using concepts 
like “normal opportunity range.” The point, however, is not to debate the strength of 
Buchanan’s and Daniels’ arguments compared to each other. Whether or not Buchanan’s 
argument or Daniels’ argument is ultimately more justifiable than the other, both provide 
seemingly plausible ways for understanding how there can be a right to health care. 
Furthermore, the combined weight of these arguments for a right to health care is enough 
to lay the groundwork for why, apart from wealth creation, there ought to be increased 
access to essential health care goods and services.  
The underlying force of Daniels’ argument for a right to health care is the 
preservation of normal species functioning to ensure a normal opportunity range. Based 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 66-67.  
90 Ibid., 67-68. Quote on 68. 
91 Ibid., 68.  
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on this, there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services 
whenever a lack of access to these things inhibits persons’ functioning in a way that 
threatens or jeopardizes their ability to be within the normal opportunity range. However, 
even if we reject this conclusion because of the ambiguity of the normal opportunity 
range, Buchanan’s understanding of a right to health care gives us other reasons why 
there should still be increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
Buchanan’s argument for a right to health care focuses on the attainment of basic health 
care either as some form of restitution to particular groups or individuals, or as something 
that serves the overall benefit of the general public. So based on this view, there are at 
least two reasons why there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods 
and services. First, increasing access to essential health care goods and services would be 
necessary whenever a lack of access resulted in a failure to provide particular groups or 
individuals some basic form of health care due to them as a matter of just compensation. 
Second, there ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services 
when a lack of access fails to protect particular groups or individuals from health 
detriments that our society already expends resources to prevent among the general 
public.  
 This approach toward justifying the principle of increased access to essential 
health care goods and services works so long as we accept the validity of arguments for a 
right to health care. Yet there are some who may reject such arguments on the grounds 
that fulfilling a universal right to health care would involve the collection and 
redistribution of resources that is intuitively unfair either to those who are better off and 
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can afford paying for private health care measures, or for those who are relatively healthy 
and who may contribute much more to fund basic public health care measures than they 
will realistically use. So it is likely that those who reject arguments for a right to health 
care will remain unconvinced that this approach is able to legitimately ground the 
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services. As I argue next, 
though, it is possible to justify the principle of increased access to essential health care 
goods and services even if there is no right to health care.  
3. A Common-View Approach for Increased Access 
I argue in chapter 1 that health care goods and services are not properly valued 
merely as commodities. In making this argument, there is an unstated presumption that 
health care should be used for the betterment of society because it is common to all 
persons within society. This is particularly evident on Satz’s view when I merely take as 
given her claim that healthcare is a need of citizens to effectively participate in 
democratic institutions. But I have yet to address what it means, or may mean, for health 
care to be a common good of all persons within society. That is my goal in this section. 
Specifically, I aim to provide two possible explanations for how health care is common to 
all persons within our society, and why this helps justify increased access to essential 
health care goods and services as a result.  
A. Health Care as Common based on its Development and Distribution 
One way that health care can be understood as common to all persons within our 
society is that its development and distribution is fundamentally social. As Pellegrino 
argues, medical knowledge develops and is transmitted via the participation and sanction 
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of the general public, making it a good to which the members of society have a 
substantial claim. First, medical knowledge has developed over centuries of clinical 
observations and controlled experiments that often respond to previous medical research, 
is widely accessible to health care professionals and the public, and has frequently relied 
on the participation of the general public as human research subjects. Moreover, medical 
knowledge that comes from research and experimentation is largely paid for via public 
agencies and institutions or private philanthropies to which most of the general public 
contributes either by paying taxes or donating funds.92 
Second, the acquisition and transmission of medical knowledge “is ethically 
possible only with society’s sanction.”93 Often the kinds of activities that are legally 
permitted within medical communities are punishable crimes outside of them. Such 
activities are permitted within medical communities, however, because they intend to 
provide a broad social benefit. There are several examples of this. Our society has laws 
governing the treatment of deceased bodies, and maintains a standard that we ought to 
revere and show respect for deceased persons. Yet our society also allows for medical 
practioners to perform autopsies, dissections, and other kinds of experiments on cadavers 
to help advance medical knowledge of human bodies. We also have laws that aim to 
protect individuals’ privacy and private information. However, for the sake of providing 
students advanced “hands-on” medical training, medical teaching hospitals grant students 
the right to ask patients and their families private and often personal questions about 
patients’ health. Students in these settings are also given a wide range of open access to 
                                                 
92 Pellegrino, “The Commodification of Medical and Health Care,” 250. 
93 Ibid. 
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patients’ medical records. Our society also has laws that prevent the production and 
distribution of various kinds of drugs; yet we permit pharmaceutical companies to 
conduct controlled experiments in which human subjects are given various doses of drugs 
that, at that stage, still present a high level of known and unknown risk to them.  
Furthermore, most persons – even those with medical knowledge and training – 
are incapable of meeting their medical needs without the assistance of others. As 
Galarneau explains, the attainment of health care has many complex interpersonal and 
institutional dimensions. Care giving typically involves some sort of face-to-face 
interaction between medical professionals and patients. These interactions often occur in 
community based clinics, offices, or hospitals, each with unique procedures or protocols. 
They can be shaped or influenced by the personal relationships (or lackthereof) between 
medical professionals and patients, or be subject to institutional influences stemming 
from organizations such as pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, or local 
community groups. The interactions between medical professionals and patients are also 
governed by professional and legal standards, and may also require according with 
specific local community practices.94  
However there is a problem regarding this latter point for showing how health 
care is common to all persons within our society. Although the distribution of health care 
is fundamentally social, involving multiple, dynamic relationships between individuals, 
communities, and institutions, this particular line of reasoning falls short of showing how 
health care is common to all persons within our society because the argument fails to 
                                                 
94 Galarneau, “Health as a Community Good,” 36. 
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establish how health care generally constitutes a need of all persons. However, as I show 
next, essential forms of health care can be seen as needs of all persons.  
B. Health Care as Common based on Shared Human Nature 
Another way to understand health care as common to all persons is that it is 
thought to be an integral part of our shared human nature both practically and 
symbolically or emotionally. In a symbolic or emotional sense, there are particular life-
events involving health care that all persons experience and that have deep social 
significance both on individual and community levels. As noted in the 1983 report of the 
President’s Commission on Bioethics, 
Beyond its practical importance, the involvement of health care with the 
most significant and awesome events of life – birth, illness, and death – 
adds a symbolic aspect to health care: it is special because it signifies not 
only mutual empathy and caring but the mysterious aspects of curing and 
healing.95 
 
In a practical sense, humans are finite, relatively fragile, and susceptible to 
disease, illness, and injury. Regardless of the numerous ways that individuals can be 
distinct from one another, such as in educational or socioeconomic status, all persons will 
eventually suffer the effects of poor or declining health, directly and also indirectly when 
ill health affects our loved ones.96 Particularly for individuals and families, ill health is a 
disruptive force that inhibits flourishing. According to Pellegrino, for example, 
Chronic illness, pain, discomfort, or disability can constrain the most 
determined and best-adjusted person. For most people, it is difficult or 
impossible to do the things they want to do or enjoy when they are 
affected by illness. Health is a fundamental requirement for the fulfillment 
of the human potential and freedom to act and direct one’s life. To lack 
                                                 
95 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, Securing Access to Health Care, 11.  
96 See for example; The Hastings Center Report, “The Goals of Medicine,” S6 
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health and to need treatment is to be in a diminished state of human 
existence – a state quite unlike other deprivations [that] can be borne if 
one is healthy.97 
 
This is not to say either that a diminished state of health (brought about by 
conditions such as chronic pain, illness, or disability) prevents human flourishing, or that 
health care is the only good necessary for human flourishing. We can imagine how some 
persons may reassess their life goals in light of ill health to set and accomplish new life 
goals they may not have otherwise considered or tried to accomplish. For example, some 
persons who are terminally ill will use their illness as a reason to travel, write their 
memoirs, participate in community health projects, or work to amend or deepen their 
personal relationships with others. There are also other goods besides health that are 
closely tied with being human such as happiness, wealth, friendship, or work. 
Pellegrino’s point, though, is that ill health makes the fulfillment of one’s goals more 
difficult to achieve, and either compromises or makes impossible one’s ability to attain 
other goods also associated with human flourishing.98 
C. How the Common-View Approach Further Justifies Increased Access to Essential 
Health Care Goods and Services 
 
 Based on these two ways for how health care is common to all persons, there are 
at least three moral reasons why there ought to be increased access to essential health 
care goods and services. First, we ought increase access to essential health care goods and 
services as a matter of respect for persons. Within a Kantian framework, for example, 
persons ought to be respected because they have dignity stemming from their capacity to 
                                                 
97 Pellegrino, “The Commodification of Medical and Health Care,” 248.  
98 Ibid., 248 and 259.  
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rationally govern their actions.99 Yet it is reasonable to think that when one’s basic needs 
are not met, one’s ability to self-govern is not only more difficult but can also be 
compromised – a point that will become more evident in the next chapter when I examine 
the principle of respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care markets. In a 
Kantian sense, then, showing proper respect for persons requires working to make sure 
that individuals’ basic needs are met. Again, health care constitutes a basic need of 
persons both in that all persons are susceptible to the effects of ill health, and also 
because a lack of health care can impede the attainment of others goods we consider 
necessary for human flourishing. So at a minimum, respect for persons also justifies 
increased access to essential health care goods and services for persons who lack access 
to basic health care needs.  
Second, we ought to also increase access to health care goods and services as a 
matter of fairness. Since all persons within society can claim to have a stake in the 
development and distribution of health care, it would be unfair to prevent any person 
within our society access to essential health care goods and services. Although this reason 
is not without exception, because health constitutes a need of all persons any counter 
arguments to this point would seemingly have to demonstrate how prima facie unfair or 
unjust distributions of essential health care goods and services – in which some persons 
are guaranteed access while others are required to forgo access – would be ethically 
permissible. 
                                                 
99 See for example; Guyer, The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy; Hill, Dignity and 
Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory; Hill, “Humanity as an End in Itself;” Kant, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals; Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Kerstein, Kant’s Search for the Supreme 
Principle of Morality; Koresgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends; Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics; 
O’Neill, Acting on Principle; Wood, Kant’s Ethics Thought; and Wood, “What is Kantian Ethics?” 
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Third, we ought to increase access to essential health care goods and services as a 
matter of utility. All the members of society contribute to and benefit from the advances 
in medical knowledge. By increasing access to essential health care goods and services 
we can expand on the intended benefits of medical knowledge by helping society’s 
individual members better meet their health care needs and presumably improve their 
overall health. Furthermore, increasing access to health care goods and services can 
provide additional benefits to society as a whole. For example, increasing access to 
essential health care goods and services will likely require developing new or expanding 
currently existing health care institutions that, as Galarneau explains, 
[A]re integral to the institutional fabric of local community life and thus 
have the potential to improve community infrastructure by providing 
employment, training, and leadership opportunities. They also support 
other social institutions by helping to keep individual community 
members healthy and capable of participating in them as workers, 
students, and political citizens.100 
 
Lastly, beyond these moral reasons, there is a practical reason to justify increased 
access to essential health care goods and services. Health care is part of many basic 
human life events. Our society in particular has grown accustom to associating the 
provision(s) of health care with events at the beginning and end of life, and also for a 
wide array of injuries and illnesses. I take as uncontroversial the idea health care goods 
and services are the primary means by which individuals meet their health care needs 
during these events.  In this sense, then, there ought to be increased access to essential 
health care goods and services to ensure that persons experiencing these kinds of basic 
life events are able to meet their health care needs. 
                                                 
100 Galarneau, “Health as a Community Good,” 37. 
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Up to this point, I have examined three approaches for why there ought to be 
increased access to essential health care goods and services. I now turn to clarify what 
qualities should define essential health care goods and services. 
4. Clarifying “Essential Health Care Goods and Services” 
In this section I do not attempt to argue for what specific health care goods or 
services are, or should be, included under this principle of increased access. There are 
two reasons for this. First, attempting to specify which particular goods and services we 
should increase access to is not something we can infer simply by showing why there 
ought to be increased access to essential health care goods and services. Second, 
attempting to argue for which specific health care goods and services fall under this 
principle would be too laborious for this work. What I attempt instead is to clarify some 
of the qualities of essential health care goods and services. To do this, we first need to 
solidify our understanding of what these three approaches tell us about the goal for the 
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services. 
A. Solidifying the Goal of Increased Access 
From the three approaches I discuss, the goal for the principle of increased access 
to essential health care goods and services becomes clearer: to balance (although not 
necessarily equally) wealth creation and limited health care resources against the just 
distribution of those resources. Wealth creation can justify enormous increases in access 
to any health care resource so long as there is a demand for it. Furthermore wealth 
creation, or at least the promise of profit, can spur medical breakthroughs or 
improvements to currently existing health care goods and services. However, if wealth 
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creation were to be the primary motive for increasing access to essential health care 
goods and services, we could then claim that when applied as an ethical limit of health 
care markets, any health care market that increases its profits is functioning ethically even 
if it does not actually increase access to essential health care goods and services. An 
example of this that I discuss more thoroughly in the chapter on pharmaceutical drugs is 
Azidothymidine (AZT). When the Food and Drug Administration approved AZT for 
market distribution, it was the first and only anti-HIV drug. This allowed the drug’s 
developer, Burroughs Wellcome, to corner the market in anti-HIV drugs even though 
many people who needed AZT were denied access to it because they could not afford its 
high price. So a problem with focusing too much on wealth creation is the counter-
intuitive nature that this might not actually ensure access to essential health care goods 
and services. We also have reasons why we should increase access to essential health 
care goods and services apart from wealth creation. 
 Understanding health care as common to all persons within our society as well as 
arguments for a right to health care also justify increasing access to essential health care 
goods and services. Furthermore, based on these reasons, we see that we should increase 
access to essential health care goods and services when persons lack access to these 
things. These reasons thusly appear able to counter-balance the potential problem of 
wealth creation such that when this principle of increased access is applied to health care 
markets, we can claim that these markets function ethically when they increase profits 
and do not prevent or inhibit persons from access to needed health care goods or services.  
  
 
75
However we must also be careful regarding these other reasons for justifying this 
principle of increased access. If we give too much weight to these other reasons without 
further qualifying “essential health care goods and services,” we run the risk of 
potentially overextending this principle when applied to health care markets. For 
example, someone could take a strong interpretation of this principle to say that it 
justifies increasing access to all health care goods or services that are capable of meeting 
persons’ health care needs. Not only is it widely understood that we have limited health 
care resources that would make fulfilling such a strong interpretation of this principle 
impractical, but it would also be unjust to use our limited public funds to try to increase 
access to this degree, since this would result in diverting those funds from other 
important public resources like education or our transportation infrastructure.  
So keeping in mind that the goal of increased access to essential health care goods 
and services is to balance wealth creation and limited resources against the just 
distribution of those resources, we can now begin to see some of the qualities that should 
define our understanding of essential health care goods and services. 
B. Characteristics of Essential Health Care Goods and Services 
 Based on the three approaches I have used to show why there ought to be 
increased access to essential health care goods and services, there are at least three 
qualities that should characterize these goods and services. First and foremost, we should 
consider essential health care goods and services to be goods and services that help 
individuals address their medical needs. Admittedly this is somewhat redundant given 
that from the onset I narrowed my understand of health care goods and services as those 
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things that help individuals meet their medical needs in preventing or combating disease, 
illness, or injury. From Daniels’ argument for a right to health care, we can also 
understand medical need as something that prohibits us from a normal state of 
functioning relative to social standards.  
 While this quality for understanding essential health care goods and services is 
fairly uncontroversial this does not mean, however, that health care goods and services 
that do not help address a medical need should necessarily be inaccessible for persons 
who want them. For example, cosmetic plastic surgery (as opposed to reconstructive 
plastic surgery) does not typically provide a medical benefit to patients. So in general it 
should not be considered essential health care that falls within the purview of this 
principle for increased access. However, as long as providing a non-essential health care 
good or services does not create an overall inability for persons to attain health care 
goods and services that are primarily used to meet persons’ medical needs, those goods 
and services should also remain available. If we were to try further justifying this latter 
point, we could either argue for the legitimate interests of businesses – which in this case 
would include the providers of these non-essential goods and services – to meet the 
demand for these goods and services as a matter of wealth creation, or by arguing that as 
a matter of self-determination, health care providers should be free to provide non-
essential health care goods and services to willing patients so long as this neither resulted 
in gross negligence on the part of the health care provider, nor any foreseeable long-term 
harm to patients.  
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 A second quality of essential health care goods and services is that they should be 
cost-effective. Specifically, from the aspect of balancing wealth creation against just 
distribution of health care resources, cost-effectiveness is the ability of markets in the 
essential health care goods and services to remain profitable, while working to ensure that 
persons who need those goods and services can afford access to them. Determining how 
best to establish the cost-effectiveness of essential health care goods and services falls 
outside the scope of this work. However there are some strategies currently employed 
within our society – usually with high, but still varying degrees of success – to maintain 
both the profitability of and access to essential health care goods and services, such as 
both public and privately funded health insurance programs, or manufacturer discounts 
(particularly for pharmaceutical drugs).  
 Third, because we are talking about goods and services that we should increase 
access to and that ought to meet a medical need, what we consider to be essential health 
care goods and services should also be system relative. The idea of system relativity is 
frequently used in discussions about health care rights, with Daniels using this particular 
term to delimit entitlements under a right to health care.101 However the term generally 
refers to our ability to help individuals meet their medical needs in connection with the 
availability of resources within our current health care system. System relativity therefore 
has a wider range of applicability than just health care entitlements.  
Since the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services 
must account for limited health care resources, it is reasonable to assume that the goods 
and services in question should be as efficacious as possible. So when medical needs are 
                                                 
101 Daniels, “Is There a Right to Health Care and, If So, What Does It Encompass?,” 320.  
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fairly common and have widely-used, standardized treatments, what qualifies as 
“essential” in those cases will not include experimental or unproven treatments whose 
efficacious nature is questionable. If, however, the medical need is relatively uncommon, 
the scope of what is considered “essential” for treating that need might have to be wider 
and possibly include treatments with questionable effectiveness. Understanding what 
qualifies as essential health care goods and services under the notion of system relativity 
should also consider the consequences of non-treatment for a medical need. It may be the 
case, for example, that initially disqualifying non-standard, highly costly health care 
goods or services from being considered “essential” could result in a greater, long-term 
drain on health care resources such that we may want to consider them “essential” 
nonetheless. For instance, gastric bypass surgery is more effective for helping morbidly 
obese persons lose weight than either drug therapy or life style changes in one’s diet and 
exercise.102 But it is also an expensive treatment that raises some safety concerns, and 
that a number of insurance companies do not cover.103 However, given the increasing 
rates of obesity in the United States104 and the annual health care expenditures for 
                                                 
102 Mitka, “Surgery Useful for Morbid Obesity, but Safety and Efficacy Questions Linger,” 1575.  
103 Ibid., 1576. The average cost for gastric bypass surgery is $25,000, not including any pre-operative 
consultation costs or post-operative costs associated with long-term care.  
104 Although obesity rates among men in the United States for age groups 20-59 dropped slightly from 
2005-2006 to 2007-2008, the overall obesity rates from 1999-2000 to 2007-2008 increased for the 20 
and under age group from 27.5% to 32.3%, and from 23.7% to 27.5% for the 20-39 age group, and 
from 28.8% to 34.3% for the 40-59 age group. Obesity rates among United States woman saw similar 
trends, except for the 20-39 age group, which has seen a steady increase in obesity rates from 1999-
2000 to 2007-2008. The obesity rates for United States women from 1999-2000 to 2007-2008 
increased for the 20 and under age group from 33.4% to 35.5%, 28.4% to 34% for the 20-39 age group, 
and 37.8% to 38.2% for the 40-59 age group. 
See; Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, and Curtin, “Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999-
2008,” 238-239.  
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medical costs associated with treating obese persons105, it might be that we will 
eventually want to consider increasing access to gastric bypass surgery as an essential 
health care good for helping reduce obesity in the United States. 
5. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter we have seen why there ought to be increased access to 
essential health care goods and services, as well as some of the qualities necessary for 
this principle to be effective in practice. At this point we can begin to see what it means, 
or may mean, for this principle to be an ethical limit of health care markets. Claiming that 
the principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services is an ethical 
limit of health care markets refers to the requirement of these markets to provide fairly 
distributed, cost-effective access to essential health care goods and services. Health care 
markets are within this limit when they function in ways that do not prevent persons from 
accessing health care goods and services necessary to effectively treat their medical 
needs. They violate this limit when some sort of unfair distribution of essential health 
care goods or services prevents persons from being able to effectively treat their medical 
needs.  
 It is important to note, though, that the principle of increased access to essential 
health care goods and services would not apply to all health care markets. The force of 
this limit largely stems from how we understand essential health care goods and services 
as those things that are effective in treating a medical need. So for markets in health care 
                                                 
105 According to data collected from 2000-2005, it is estimated that the annual health care expenditures 
related to obesity for children and youth ages 6-18 is $11 to $14 billion, and $73 to $93 billion for 
adults ages 19-85. 
See; Bell, Zimmerman, Arterburn, and Maciejewski, “Health-Care Expenditures of Overweight and Obese 
Males and Females in the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey by Age Cohort.” 
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goods or services that do not aim to treat an underlying medical need, such as with 
cosmetic plastic surgery, concerns about increasing access to these goods or services in 
fair or cost-effective ways would not apply. Furthermore, it is also possible that the 
approaches used to justify this principle could be modified to apply to other markets in 
essential goods, like food. 
 Lastly, based on the notion of system relativity, what we consider to be essential 
health care goods and services will fluctuate according to multiple, variable factors. For 
example, new epidemics and other natural events will change our individual and 
community health care needs; new medical technologies or improvements to currently 
existing medical technologies will change the standards for how we treat our medical 
needs; changes in our social and political spectrum will affect the production and 
distribution of whatever we consider to be essential health care goods and services. As 
these factors become known, they will have a foreseeable effect on how this principle 
limits health care markets. 
Next, I move beyond showing why there ought to be increased access to essential 
health care goods and services to argue for why health care markets should also be 
limited according to the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.  
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Chapter Three: Arguing for the Principles of Honesty and 
Respect for Autonomy 
 
While I have shown why there should be increased access to essential health care 
goods and services, ethically treating health care goods and services as commodities 
requires more than just this. One of the underlying reasons addressed in chapter 1 for why 
health care goods and services are not properly valued merely as commodities is that their 
distribution occurs via health care relationships that are not strictly governed by market 
norms. Even though the principle of increased access is partly justified on the basis of the 
relationships between health care providers and patients, this principle does not tell us 
anything about the character of those relationships. Since the relationships matter in how 
we value health care goods and services, we should, in order to ethically treat them as 
commodities, account for the relationships by which they are primarily exchanged, 
namely the relationships between health care professionals and patients.  
My aim in this chapter is to establish additional ethical limits for health care 
markets that accord with the market distribution of commodities and are based on the 
relationships between health care professionals and patients. Specifically I argue that 
health care markets should be limited according to the principles of honesty and respect 
for autonomy. As I show in this chapter, these two principles ideally govern both the 
market transactions between buyers and sellers, and the interactions between health care 
professionals and patients. For each principle, I first provide a theoretical framework and 
then argue for how each applies to the relationships between health care professionals 
and patients and market transactions between buyers and sellers. I then conclude my 
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discussion of each principle by addressing what it means for these principles to be ethical 
limits of health care markets. 
1. Honesty 
 Initially it is somewhat difficult to see why honesty should be considered an 
ethical limit of health care markets. There are at least two reasons for this. First, although 
honesty is now considered an important aspect of the relationship between health care 
professionals, patients, and a patient’s family or surrogate(s), it is not always clear how 
far this principle extends within these relationships. For example, do physicians violate 
the principle of honesty if they do not disclose to patients how often they entertain 
pharmaceutical representatives who often provide physicians with biased information 
about new drugs on the market? Second, deception within business is fairly common as a 
means of securing an economic advantage over competitors, thereby making my claim 
that honesty is an important principle for governing market transactions appear 
oxymoronic, or worse, simply false. Furthermore, deception can sometimes be considered 
morally permissible within business, such as when replying to certain questions during a 
negotiation.  
An example of business related deception in health care is the marketing of the 
well-known antihistamine, Claritin. In Hooked, Brody notes how Claritin is, “the most 
profitable antihistamine of all time, with annual sales of more than two billion dollars”106 
(p. 18). Part of what makes Claritin so popular is that direct-to-consumer advertisements 
for the drug claim it is a non-sedating medication – something many other antihistamines 
cannot claim. But according to Brody, 30-40% of those taking prescription Claritin fail to 
                                                 
106 Brody, Hooked, 108. 
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receive any benefit from the drug. This is troubling considering that, in addition to this 
relatively high percentage, the cost of prescription Claritin (in 2001) was about eighty to 
eighty-five dollars a month (compared to less than ten dollars a month for the generic 
form, Chlor-Trimeton).107 
The initial data on Claritin submitted to the FDA in 1987 shows that in small, 10-
milligram doses, Claritin is non-sedating. Yet this data also shows that the reported 
effectiveness for test subjects taking the 10-milligram doses of Claritin is only about 10% 
higher then the reported effectiveness for test subjects taking just placebos. However in 
other data sets where larger doses of Claritin were taken by test subjects, Claritin is 
shown to be highly effective but also much more likely to cause drowsiness.108 
Hoping to get Claritin approved as a “non-sedating” drug, the company that 
produces Claritin, Schering-Plough, made sure no data was submitted to the FDA for 
amounts more than 10 milligrams – meaning that prescription Claritin could not actually 
be sold in the higher, more effective doses. But in its direct-to-consumer advertisements 
for Claritin, Schering-Plough has used both data sets to justify the dual claims that 
Claritin is non-sedating and highly effective, and that, because of this unique 
combination, Claritin is a special antihistamine.109 
To argue for honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets, I thusly need to 
provide a thorough yet succinct defense of the principle of honesty. 
 
 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 18. 
108 Ibid., 19. 
109 Ibid. 
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A. A Theoretical Account of Honesty 
I begin with the basic and widely accepted assumption that honesty involves 
telling the truth while avoiding intentional lying, deceiving, or promise breaking in our 
communications with others. Note that this is an unqualified assumption that has not been 
molded or shaped to fit any particular view of honesty. As I will argue shortly, how we 
understand the ethical nature of honesty should require us to consider the context of the 
situation in which questions of honesty arise. Later I will argue that even within health 
care relationships, there are some kinds of information disclosures that health care 
professionals and patients do not need to be fully honest about with each other. At this 
point, though, I merely wish to briefly address the question: why should we be honest, 
especially in light of examples like Claritin in which dishonesty can be quite profitable 
and goes unpunished?   
 Kant, whose views on lying are regularly interpreted as being quite rigid, gives us 
two primary reasons why we should not lie. First, he argues that we are obligated to act in 
ways that could apply universally, and that we are obligated not to act in ways that cannot 
apply universally. For Kant, persons cannot be morally obligated to lie because if lying 
were universally permitted, our abilities to effectively engage in meaningful 
communication with others would cease since we would have no reason to trust one 
another.110 Second, Kant also argues that we should always treat all persons as ends and 
never merely as means to an end, and that the reason for this is because all persons have 
inherent moral worth. According to this argument, we can never be morally obligated to 
                                                 
110 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:402-4:403, and 4:421-4:423; and Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals, 6:221-6:227.  
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lie because if we were, this would permit us to use others solely for our benefit in a way 
that fails to appreciate their dignity as moral beings. Kant extends this point further by 
also arguing that even if it intends to benefit another person, an intentional lie would still 
be immoral because the person committing the lie knows the truth, and so uses himself or 
herself merely as a means bring about some discretionary end.111 
However even if we reject the moral foundation of these arguments, there is an 
underlying practicality to Kant’s view that remains for why we should be honest. On 
Kant’s view, we should be honest lest we run the risk of not being able to trust one 
another. While Kant uses to this notion to argue that acting morally involves developing 
maxims for action that apply universally, the idea that we should be honest as means of 
fostering trust between persons is also a prudential reason, since a lack of trust would 
render communication between persons worthless. This reasoning holds true even for the 
egoist who may believe that acts of lying, deception, or promise breaking are morally 
permissible in order to advance one’s self-interests, as acting in one’s self-interest also 
requires being able to consistently trust others.  
Still arguing for why we should be honest does not seem to get us very far. Most 
persons prima facie accept that we should be honest. But arguing that we should be 
honest does not necessarily tell us what it means to be honest. So before turning to 
address how the principle of honesty specifically applies to both health care and business, 
more should be said about the context in which questions of honesty arise.  
                                                 
111 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:429-4:431; and Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 
6:386-6:388, 6:393-6:394, and 6:429-6:431. Since Kant uses lying as a primary example in developing 
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a. Limits of Honesty 
Part of the reason that I focus on Kant’s arguments against lying is because they 
establish what is often considered an inflexible moral requirement. For Kant, lying is 
never moral. Some of Kant’s statements about the wrongness of lying seem so strict and 
excessive that, according to noted Kant scholar Alan Wood, “most Kantians who have 
dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them, usually claiming that 
they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own principles.”112  
If the prohibition against lying is as strict as Kant presumably argues it is, this 
might not only mean we are morally obligated to always tell the truth without any further 
qualifications, but this would also seemingly conflict with other widely-held morals of 
the medical profession such as the moral and legal obligation to maintain patient privacy. 
Under standard interpretations of Kant’s views on lying, a doctor, for example, would be 
morally obligated to honestly disclose a patient’s medical information to anybody who 
asked for it – a clear violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996. These kinds of examples are perhaps why many Kantians presumably distance 
themselves from Kant’s views on lying – on the face of it his stance against lying seems 
too strict to be practical.  
However Wood argues that such interpretations of Kant’s views on lying are 
wrong. According to Wood, Kant recognizes at least two distinguishable limits for when 
making intentionally false statements is not immoral. First, Wood argues, the duty not to 
lie only extends to falsifications that would undermine the rights of others when applied 
universally. But if a falsification does not undermine the rights of others when applied 
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universally, then the falsification does not violate Kant’s duty not to lie (here the term 
“right” refers to duties of right, which is Kant’s notion of obligations we have toward 
others).113 Second, in dealing with the view that lying is also immoral because it violates 
a duty to oneself (by treating oneself as a mere means), Wood argues that for Kant, the 
purpose of duties to oneself is to maintain self-respect. Making a falsification that aims to 
protect one’s self-respect does not, Wood therefore argues, violate the intent of duties to 
oneself (even though, Wood also notes, making falsifications prima facie violates what 
Kant explicitly says about why we should not lie in regard to the obligation to treat 
ourselves as ends).114  
Presuming Wood is correct, his analysis of Kant’s views on lying shows that even 
for Kant honesty is not absolute; false statements can be permitted under certain 
conditions. Alan Strudler makes similar points in his recent analysis of the relationship 
                                                 
113 Ibid., 240-251. Wood’s argument for this point relies on a detailed examination of numerous statements 
Kant makes in multiple works about lying, as well as his written replies to others, namely French 
writer Benjamin Constant (who Wood credits with challenging Kant’s views on lying with the 
famously difficult and paradigmatic example of the “murdered at the door” (i.e. a murderer comes to 
your door and asks where your friend is so that he may kill him; which is meant to show the 
impracticality of Kant’s views on lying, since it is presumed on Kant’s view that you would be morally 
required to honestly disclose the location of your friend)). Also in making this argument, Wood argues 
that much of the inaccuracy regarding the standard interpretations of Kant’s views against lying stem 
from a common misunderstanding regarding a analytical aspect of Kant’s terminology. For Kant, the 
term “lie” is a technical term meaning, “an intentionally untruthful statement that is contrary to duty, 
especially contrary to a duty of right,” where as a falsification is an untruth that does not necessarily 
violate a duty of right (p. 240).  
114 Ibid., 251-258. In making this argument, Wood reiterates the technical difference Kant makes between a 
falsification and a lie. He also argues that Kant states his argument against lying so strictly regarding 
duties to ourselves because, “Kant thinks people tend to make exceptions to rules in their own interests 
when they should not, and this often makes the speech act of asserting the unexceptionableness of 
moral rules morally justified even when it is an error theoretically” (p. 253-254). Also, Wood notes, 
Kant recognizes something special in moral issues involved with truthfulness, further justifying his 
[Kant’s] exaggeration of the immorality of lying; he considers deception and duplicity a vice of human 
nature for engaging civilly with others (p. 254). As we have already seen, if lying were morally 
permissible, it would inhibit our abilities to engage in civil discourse.  
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between deception, manipulation, and trust. For Strudler, there are times when making 
false or deceptive statements can be considered moral.  
Strudler argues for two basic kinds of deception: deception that does and does not 
result in breeches of trust. In making this argument, he carefully shows that all that is 
needed to deceive or manipulate someone is for the deceiver to establish credibility that 
the persons being deceived then appeal to in their decision to believe the deceiver. There 
is no necessary connection between creditability and trust; we can distrust persons and 
still believe the information they tell us is credible because they either have external 
evidence to substantiate their claims, or we rationalize that if they are lying to us they 
will suffer negative consequences.115 Deception that results in breeches of trust occurs 
when the deceiver solicits the trust of the person(s) being deceived and uses that trust to 
manipulate them. This is because, Strudler further argues, soliciting one’s trust conveys, 
[T]hat you can rely on my goodwill, that is, my intention to act for your 
sake and not simply for my advantage. I manipulate you, because in ways 
that I willfully hide from you, I cause you to have a false belief about 
whether I have goodwill toward you, and then exploit that belief in order 
to get you to behave as I wish.116 
 
For Strudler, simple deception – i.e., deception not resulting in breeches of trust – 
can be morally permissible if the person being deceived has no discernable right to the 
information he or she is being deceived about. What determines if deception in such 
cases is morally permissible is whether or not it is a matter of self-defense, that is, when 
the deception is the only means to prevent an otherwise unavoidable harm to the 
                                                 
115 Strudler, “Deception Unraveled,” 459-461. Since this aspect of Strudler’s argument is only to 
deconstruct the notion that deception and breeches of trust are inextricably tied, I abstain from further 
detailing it here. 
116 Ibid., 460.  
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deceiver. Strudler illustrates this point using a standard negotiation process in which 
being fully honest would undermine the deceiver’s ability to remain competitive in the 
negotiation, thereby compromising the underlying fairness of the process and constituting 
an economic harm for the deceiver. However Strudler also notes that if the perceived 
harm is avoidable, the self-defense argument does not hold.117 The self-defense argument 
also would not work in cases of deception involving breeches of trust. I could not, for 
example, solicit your trust with the intent of manipulating you while also maintaining that 
the deception is necessary to prevent a perceived harm to myself (on Strudler’s account 
this would amount to engaging in an avoidable preemptive attack rather than unavoidable 
self-defense). 
 Strudler then argues deception that involves breeches of trust is always wrong 
when used for any kind of economic gain. This is because of how a solicitation of trust 
invites persons to rely on the truth of the information they receive. There is, however, an 
exception to this in which deception that involves a breech of trust can be morally 
permissible. Deception that involves a breech of trust can be moral if and only if it is used 
against a substantial wrong.118 However while it is possible for cases like this to occur in 
a medical setting, this particular exception to honesty in which breeches of trust are 
morally justified to prevent some other moral wrong is not presumably applicable to 
establishing honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets.  
                                                 
117 Ibid., 462-465.  
118 Ibid., 465-470. Imagine, for example, a police officer posing as a member of a criminal organization to 
gain their trust so that the police officer may expose the organization’s criminal activities and 
ultimately bring them to justice. In this case, the police officer deceives the criminal organization with 
the intent to both gain and manipulate their trust. Yet, because this is done to stop the organization’s 
criminal activities, this, presumably, would not be an immoral breech of trust. 
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From both the arguments of Wood and Strudler, it is reasonable to conclude that 
we should amend our initial assumption about honesty. Originally I claimed that honesty 
involves telling the truth while avoiding intentional lying, deception, or promise 
breaking. This is still true for most kinds of communication between persons. However, 
there are times when it is necessary, or at least when it is permissible, for us not to be 
fully honest. We do not have to be fully honest when persons’ rights are not violated, or 
when telling the truth would leave us susceptible to some sort of unavoidable harm. This 
is an important qualification that will become more apparent particularly in the next 
section regarding honesty in health care relationships. As I argue next, patients have a 
legitimate expectation they will be told the truth about information pertinent to their 
medical care, but not to information that is irrelevant to their care. 
B. Honesty in Health Care Relationships 
One reason that we should consider honesty an ethical limit of health care markets     
nnnmnnm ,,jj,,j,ujpatients. O’Neill, for example, discusses how honesty is necessary for 
establishing trustworthiness in health care relationships, while the lack of honesty (which 
she also discusses primarily in terms of deception) creates an aura of 
untrustworthiness.119 Beauchamp and Childress also view honesty as an important aspect 
of health care relationships. While they do not consider honesty to be one of the four 
main principles of biomedical ethics, they treat it as an essential rule for professional-
patient relationships to act in accord with those moral principles.120 For them honesty 
                                                 
119 O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 118-140.  
120 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 288. As Beauchamp and Childress famously 
argue, the four main principles of biomedical ethics are respect for autonomy, nonmalficence, 
beneficence, and justice. 
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within health care, “refers to comprehensive, accurate, and objective transmission of 
information, as well as to the way the professional fosters the patient’s or subject’s 
understanding.”121 Furthermore, the arguments they give in support of honesty as a 
principle of health care relationships mirror the arguments I noted in the previous section 
for why we should be honest. Specifically, they argue, 
[O]bligations of veracity are based on respect owed to others. Even if 
consent is not at issue, the obligation to respect others’ autonomy supports 
obligations of veracity in many contexts. Second, obligations of veracity 
are connected to obligations of fidelity, promise-keeping, and contract. 
When we communicate with others, we implicitly promise that we will 
speak truthfully and that we will not deceive listeners . . . Third, 
relationships between health professionals and patients and subjects 
depends on trust, and adherence to rules of veracity is essential to foster 
trust.122 
  
These two views of honesty help us gain a better idea of its importance within 
health care relationships. Honesty is necessary for health care professionals and patients 
to establish and maintain fiduciary relationships with one another. However, even if we 
were to reject the idea health care relationships require trust between health care 
professionals and patients we can still claim that because of the nature of their 
relationship they should, at the very least, be truthful with one another as a matter of 
mutual respect. Yet even though honesty plays an essential role in health care 
relationships, there is still an open question about what kinds of information health care 
professionals and patients should be honest about and to what degree? 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 289. Beauchamp and Childress actually use the term “veracity” instead of “honesty.” Literally the 
term refers to the truthfulness or accuracy of facts. Although there are nuanced distinctions we could 
tease-out between “honesty” and “veracity,” I regard them as synonymous since both involve 
providing truthful disclosures about medical information used in the treatment decision-making 
process. 
122 Ibid. 
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When patients and health care professionals enter into a relationship with one 
another it is usually because patients have a medical need they want health care 
professionals to help treat. Generally the reason for this is that health care professionals 
have medical knowledge and training the patient presumably does not. By entering into 
this relationship patients therefore rely on health care professionals to use their medical 
expertise in caring for the patient(s). Because of the nature of the relationship between 
health care professionals and patients, in which the health care professional is charged 
with caring for the well being of the patient and the patient relies on the medical expertise 
of the health care professional, they owe it to each other to provide truthful disclosures 
regarding medical information about the patient’s treatment. Furthermore, when patients 
receive treatment from medical professionals, this does not typically occur via a standard 
negotiation process: physicians do not try to discern what patients are willing to pay for 
treatment and then offer their services based on that amount, and patients do not try to 
find what medical goods or services physicians are willing to offer for a particular price 
and then try use that knowledge to try to gain a certain level of medical care. So it is not 
the case that health care professionals and patients could morally deceive one another 
about medical information relevant to patient care on the basis of either Wood’s 
interpretation of when Kant believes making false statements is permissible under duties 
or right, or Strudler’s notion of simple deception that is permissible with regard to self-
defense. However, even though patients and health care professionals should be honest 
with each other about information relevant to the patients’ care, and are not permitted to 
deceive one another about this information, this does not mean that patients and health 
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care professionals are therefore morally obligated to be honest and not deceive each other 
about all informational disclosures.  
Nothing about the relationship between health care professionals and patients 
implies that either one is entitled to honest disclosures about information that is irrelevant 
to patient treatment. Although what specifically qualifies as relevant versus irrelevant 
information regarding patient treatment is context dependent – needing to account for 
patients’ medical needs, what the standard treatments are for addressing those needs, and 
the availability of those treatments – Beauchamp and Childress give us an idea of the 
general sorts of information relevant to patient treatment. For them, relevant information 
is information about a patient’s diagnosis, prognosis, and available treatment options.123 
Reasonably, then, we can imagine that irrelevant information is information that does not 
knowingly impact the quality of patient care, such as personal information unrelated to 
the patients’ underlying medical condition or treatment options. Since disclosures of 
irrelevant information fall outside the range health care relationships, there is no reason to 
think that patients or health care professionals have a right to know that information, and 
so it would be permissible for them not to be fully honest about information that is 
irrelevant to the medical care of the patient.  
Admittedly, there are still tough cases regarding honesty in health care 
relationships that may eventually need to be settled. However I am unsure at this point 
what effect these cases might have on honesty as an ethical limit of health care markets. 
For instance, nothing here accounts for the role of families in health care relationships. 
Yet they are often an important aspect of patient treatment. Are they “owed” anything 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
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regarding honest disclosures by either health care professionals or patients? We may be 
tempted to say ‘yes,’ but if so, are there differences in degree, that is, are there things we 
expect health care professionals and patients to be fully honest about with each other, but 
perhaps less honest about, maybe even slightly deceptive, with families? There seems to 
be at least one case in this concern might occur. Imagine a person who has been 
noticeably ill. After completing several medical tests, a physician tells the person that he 
or she has an inoperable and untreatable illness. Soon after receiving this information, 
one of the person’s family members ask what the doctors think is wrong. Surely the 
person could tell the family member he or she has an inoperable and untreatable illness; 
we might even wish to argue the person is morally obligated to tell the family the truth 
based on the account of honesty I have given here. Yet, I can also image the person 
wanting to deflect the family member’s question or simply lie about the seriousness of 
the illness. Here an appeal to the family member’s right to know the truth as someone 
vested in the care of the sick person might not suffice since this seems to conflict with the 
sick person’s right to privacy. This case might even be further complicated if we know 
the family is paying for the person’s medical care, since they presumably have a right to 
know the truth about what they are paying. However debating about the degree to which 
honesty should occur within health care relationships does not usurp my argument 
honesty helps buttress successful health care relationships and that honesty should thusly 
be considered an ethical limit of health care markets. 
 Here we have seen how honesty is an important aspect of health care 
relationships. Yet I have also tried to show that, while health care professionals and 
  
 
95
patients should be honest with one another about medically relevant information and 
should not deceive each other about that information, they are not required to be honest 
about all kinds of information disclosures – particularly regarding information that is 
medically irrelevant. As I argue next, we should also consider honesty an ethical limit of 
health care markets based on it role within business.  
C. Honesty in Business 
As I noted at the beginning of my analysis on honesty, Schering-Plough’s use of 
conflicting test data to advertise Claritin helped the drug become the most profitable 
antihistamines on the market. This and other similar examples in which intentional acts of 
lying or deception are used to maximize profits seem to debunk my attempt to show how 
honesty is a governing principle of ideal market transactions and why honesty should 
therefore be an ethical limit of health care markets. The idea that business ought to 
primarily be concerned with maximizing profits is perhaps best epitomized in the 
writings of economist Milton Friedman. According to Friedman, the only [social] 
responsibility of a business is to use its resources to maximize profits so long as the 
business acts “within the rules of the game.”124 This seems to imply that if the overall 
culture of business accepts violating ethical principles for the sake of maximizing profits, 
then such acts are permissible.  
However there are good reasons to reject the idea that honesty, and ethical 
principles in general, fall outside the realm of business. First, while Friedman claims 
businesses must operate “within the rules of the game,” he further stipulates that this 
                                                 
124 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 133. See also; Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is 
to Increase Its Profits.” 
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means business must engage, “in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud”125 So even if Friedman is correct that the only obligation of business is to 
maximize profits, there is an understanding that this obligation still requires adhering to 
the principle of honesty because it is via this principle that those engaged in market 
transactions are able to consistently trust one another. This point is similar to that of 
Donaldson and Dunfee who, in laying the foundations of Integrative Social Contracts 
Theory, state that, 
Rational contractors will understand that successful economic 
communities and systems require a foundation of ethical behavior. At a 
minimum, business done efficiently often requires a certain level of 
trustworthiness… in order for capital markets to operate efficiently, many 
transactions must be done on the basis of oral promises buttressed by 
fundamental honesty.126 
 
Note that Donaldson and Dunfee claim the minimum standard for successful economies 
is trust established through honesty.  
Yet, like with honesty in health care relationships, we do not need to accept the 
link between trust and honesty to argue for why there should be honesty within business. 
Bowie, for example, argues that there should be honesty in business based on Kant’s 
notion of treating others as ends and never merely as means. Bowie considers trust an 
essential for business relationships if a business is to achieve its various ends.127 Still, 
Bowie argues, businesses should be honest with each other not simply to develop trust, 
but also because this what is morally required of businesses to show respect for the 
                                                 
125 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 133. 
126 Donaldson and Dunfee, Ties That Bind, 33. Emphasis added. 
127 Bowie, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective, 30-37. 
  
 
97
dignity of their stakeholders, namely their employees.128 This point about showing 
respect for stakeholders segues into my next reason for why we ought to reject the idea 
that business operates outside the realm of ethics, a reason that applies not just to 
honesty, but ethical principles in general.   
 In his recent work on Stakeholder theory, Freeman describes how the Dominate 
model of business – in which business is a hierarchy that works toward creating as much 
monetary value as possible for shareholders – is ethically problematic because of how it 
appears to authorize any action that benefits shareholders whether that action is ethical or 
not. The Dominate model, Freeman argues, relies on the Separation fallacy that claims 
business decisions have no ethical content while ethical considerations are inapplicable to 
business. After giving several open ended questions that illustrate how business decisions 
are tied to ethical considerations, Freeman then argues that a better business model is one 
that centers on the Integration thesis, which is the idea that most business decisions 
involve some ethical considerations, and that most ethical considerations are applicable to 
business in some way (this is consistent with my view that other ethical principles could 
also possibly limit health care markets).129 Ultimately Freeman’s point is that because a 
business relies on multiple individuals and groups that affect and can be affected by the 
business (i.e. stakeholders), the ability and the right of a business to create monetary 
value is not something that can occur in ignorance or isolation of ethical principles or 
guidelines.  
                                                 
128 Ibid., 41-60. 
129 Freeman, “Managing for Stakeholders,” 56-60.  
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Stakeholder theory, and particularly Freeman’s point about business decisions 
being integrally tied to ethical considerations, represents a shift in thinking about ethics 
and business that has not traditionally existed. When discussing the principle of honesty 
with respect to health care, I argued that honesty is considered a necessary component for 
fostering fiduciary health care relationships. Traditionally, though, the reason for honesty 
in business has not been to establish or maintain fiduciary relationships in market 
transactions, but to try to overcome the essence of distrust that often exists between 
market transactors to help sustain efficient, successful economies. That is, honesty in 
business has primarily been used as a practical and convenient tool to conduct successful 
market transactions, and not as a normative basis for how people and businesses ought to 
interact with one another. Yet assuming the ethical justifications for Stakeholder theory 
show how this shift in thinking about the relationship between ethics and business is bona 
fide130, honesty in business should not be seen as merely serving a practical or utilitarian 
function, but also as a guiding principle for ideal market transactions.  
There is, however, an apparent problem with tying the principle of honesty to 
business. On one hand I am arguing that honesty, although not to any specified degree, is 
a necessary component of business. On the other hand we have seen in the example of 
Schering-Plough and Claritin how acting dishonestly in business can be very profitable. 
Furthermore, Schering-Plough has yet to be held accountable for their deceptive 
marketing of Claritin.  
                                                 
130 Freeman, for example, shows how Stakeholder theory can be ethically justified according to 
Utilitarianism, rights theories, virtue ethics, and Pragmatism. See; Freeman, “Managing for 
Stakeholders,” 65-67. 
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Donaldson and Dunfee offer one reply to this problem. Accord to them, those 
who fail to be honest and trustworthy will, over time, likely be identified, exposed, and 
with respect to market transactions, “thus lose out on attractive opportunities.”131 Despite 
that this reply makes those who engage in dishonest business practices appear naïve to 
the wrongness of their actions, examples such as Enron executives being charged with 
fraud and the company filing for bankruptcy, Martha Stewart being accused and found 
guilty of insider trading and, most recently, Bernard Madoff pleading guilty to and 
receiving a 150-year prison sentence for orchestrating an elaborate, multi-billion dollar 
Ponzi scheme all illustrate Donaldson’s and Dunfee’s point. So the problem seemingly 
becomes less paradoxical if we recognize and accept the idea that dishonesty in business 
could end up costing companies like Schering-Plough billions of dollars – much in the 
same way that in December, 2004, after minimizing potential cardiovascular risks in its 
marketing of Vioxx (an anti-arthritis, Cox-2 inhibitor drug), Merck lost $33 billion (33% 
of the company’s total market capitalization) and had a 60% drop in the value of its 
shares following its recall of Vioxx for increasing the incidence of heart attack in those 
taking the drug.132  
                                                 
131 Donaldson and Dunfee, Ties That Bind, 154. 
132 Beauchamp, Bowie, and Arnold, Ethical Theory and Business, 345-349. While it is difficult to 
determine the exact number of people who suffered adverse cardiac reactions from taking Vioxx, 
especially the number of those who may not have needed the drug but took it anyway after getting 
prescriptions for it, Merck was found culpable in May, 2008, of deceptive advertising leading to 
increased incidence of heart attack by Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts. In the $58 
million settlement between Merck and 29 other states Coakley claims, “Merck’s aggressive advertising 
of Vioxx drove hundreds of thousands of consumers to seek prescriptions before Vioxx’s risks were 
fully understood.” Moreover, Coakley further states, “Merck heavily promoted Vioxx in [direct-to-
consumer] television and print ads from the time of the drug’s launch. Merck eventually acknowledged 
the significant risk of heart attacks associated with Vioxx, a fact not disclosed in Merck’s promotions.” 
See, Coakley, “Attorney General Martha Coakley Files Judgment against Merck Pharmaceutical for 
the Company’s Deceptive Marketing of Vioxx.” 
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Still, it is unlikely that any reply can sufficiently resolve this problem in its 
entirety. This is because there is no way to guarantee that deceptive or fraudulent 
business practices will ever be exposed or punished in a way that is either significant or 
will dissuade those who are willing to commit such acts.133 Yet while we may not be able 
to fully resolve this paradoxical problem, how we culturally respond to dishonesty in 
business by publicly vilifying such acts, by trying to protect whistle-blowers who expose 
corporate dishonesty from unfair retaliation, and by creating and enforcing laws or 
regulations against dishonest business practices shows that, even though dishonesty 
occurs in business and acting dishonestly can be quite profitable, culturally we continue 
repudiate dishonesty in business as unethical. 
D. Honesty as an Ethical Limit of Health Care Markets 
We can now begin to tease out what it means for honesty to be an ethical limit of 
health care markets. Based on the foregoing arguments for why we should be honest, the 
limits of honesty, and for how honesty is an essential feature of both health care and 
business relationships, honesty should be regarded as an ethical limit on actors in health 
care markets in at least two ways. First, honesty should be an ethical limit of health care 
markets with respect to either establishing and maintaining fiduciary health care 
relationships between health care professionals and patients or, at the least, being able to 
provide honest disclosures about medically relevant information necessary to provide 
                                                 
133 Regarding this latter point, consider for example that when Martha Stewart was found guilty of insider 
trading she received a relatively paltry sentence of 5 months in prison and a $30,000 fine, and that 
according to Forbes her net worth, although falling as a result of her conviction, was still $85 million. 
Moreover, when she was released from prison she used her experience to further promote her company 
and new television show (which she hosted). Her net worth has since rebounded, and is now rumored 
to be approximately $680 million. 
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patients appropriate care in treating their medical needs. Second, honesty should be 
considered an ethical limit of health care markets because it is a necessary component for 
establishing efficient and effective markets in commodified health care goods or services. 
From the arguments I made in this section, it appears that for health care markets to 
operate within this limit there must be an expectation (likely backed by enforceable 
guidelines) for all participants to provide honest disclosures about pertinent medical 
information that could impact the care provided to patients, or could have a potential 
negative effect on the ability of those markets to efficaciously or efficiently provide 
health care goods or services to patients. Concomitantly, health care markets can be 
thought of as violating this limit if participants are pervasively permitted to engage in 
intentionally dishonest or deceptive behavior regarding medically relevant information 
that is either not meant to serve patients’ best interests or could potentially cause harm to 
patients by providing them with inappropriate or unnecessary health care goods or 
services – either because those markets have no regulations against intentionally 
dishonest or deceptive behavior, or that regulations within those markets against such 
behavior are, for whatever reason, un-enforced. 
2. Respect for Autonomy134 
 Like with the principle of honesty, arguing for why the principle of respect for 
autonomy should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets first requires 
giving an account of autonomy as a framework. There are two accounts of autonomy that 
I provide here. The first is Dworkin’s in Theory and Practice of Autonomy. I provide 
                                                 
134 Parts of this section, namely Dworkin’s account of autonomy, derive primarily from my work on 
autonomy with respect mandatory organ conscription. See; Harter, “Overcoming the Organ Shortage: 
Failing Means and Radical Reform,” 157-158. 
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Dworkin’s account of autonomy because it is widely used in ethical debates regarding the 
ability and right of individuals to govern their actions. Taylor, for example, uses 
Dworkin’s account of autonomy to justify his arguments for a legal organ market – which 
I reference throughout chapter 5. However, because of their criticism against Dworkin’s 
view, as well as how they apply their view to health care relationships, the account of 
autonomy I use when defending respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care 
markets is that of Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics.  
In philosophical and moral discussions, the concept of autonomy generally 
denotes a type of self-governing or –rule free from authoritative influences. However, 
Dworkin argues that there is a problem with understanding and using the concept of 
autonomy in this way. For Dworkin, understanding autonomy only as a type of self-
governing or –rule free from authoritative influences tends to wrongly depict autonomy 
as being equivalent to the concept of liberty, while at the same time failing to clarify that 
autonomy seemingly requires more than just acting in accord with one’s wishes or 
desires.135  
Dworkin argues that for individuals to be autonomous, they must be able to 
develop and act upon preferences for how they want to identify themselves in relation to 
their wishes or desires. This means that in addition to being free of another’s control, 
acting autonomously requires, “a second-order capacity to reflect critically upon one’s 
first-order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these or to 
change them in light of higher-order preferences and values.”136 In other words, acting 
                                                 
135 Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 14-15 and 105-106. 
136 Ibid., 108.  
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autonomously is not just the ability for individuals to freely choose the things they want 
and desire (i.e. first-order preferences), but to also freely choose how they identify with 
those wants and desires (i.e. second-order preferences).137 Moreover, Dworkin is clear 
that limiting choices is still compatible with an individual’s ability to exercise his or her 
autonomy.138 
Beauchamp and Childress give a two-headed critique of this view. First, they 
argue that simply identifying and acting in accord with a second-order preference does 
not necessarily make the act autonomous.139 This is because there is no clear 
understanding for how second-order preferences are unique from first-order preferences – 
that is, this account of autonomy does not clarify how second-order preferences either 
develop independently of, or are not influenced by, the same sorts of things that affect 
our first-order preferences such as one’s addictions, beliefs, or values. As Beauchamp 
and Childress further explain, “If second-order desires (decisions, violations, etc.) are 
generated by prior desires or commitments, then the process of identifying with one 
desire rather than another does not distinguish autonomy from nonautonomy. The 
second-order desires would not significantly differ from first-order desires.”140  
Second, Beauchamp and Childress argue that this account of autonomy is too 
idealistic to be practical because it takes reflective deliberation as the benchmark by 
                                                 
137 In her article “A Coherence Theory of Autonomy,” Ekstrom adds to this discussion by further 
addressing the technical distinction between preference and desire. According to Ekstrom, 
autonomously developing a higher (or second) order preference about a desire means developing an 
authoritative preference about a desire such that the desire leads one to act in coherence with one’s 
character system. For a detailed explanation of this view see, Ekstrom, “A Coherence Theory of 
Autonomy.” 
138 Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 65-81. 
139 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 100.  
140 Ibid., 101. 
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which our choices are autonomous or not. In this regard, the problem Beauchamp and 
Childress see is that this account of autonomy needs, but does not have, 
[A] way for ordinary persons to qualify as deserving respect for their 
autonomy even when they have not reflected on their preferences at a 
higher level. Few choosers and few choices would be autonomous if held 
to the standards of higher order reflection in this theory, which presents an 
aspirational ideal of autonomy . . . No theory of autonomy is acceptable if 
it presents an ideal beyond the reach of normal agents and choosers.141 
 
 As an alternative to this view, Beauchamp and Childress provide an account of 
autonomy that focuses on the nonideal conditions that, as we shall see, fit with they 
consider are the moral requirements of “respect for autonomy.” According to Beauchamp 
and Childress, individuals are autonomous if they: 1) act intentionally, 2) act of their own 
free accord, and 3) act with understanding (which they claim is having pertinent 
information that allows individuals to form relevant beliefs about the nature and 
consequences of their choices142).143 They note that while the first condition is not a 
matter of degree (acts are either intentional or not), to act with understanding and without 
undue constraints are matters of degree. Consequently, it is not only possible that 
individuals may be more or less autonomous at different times, but also that at any one 
time, a particular choice could be more or less autonomous than another depending on 
one’s understanding and the influence others have on that choice.  
Beauchamp and Childress then argue that for an action to be autonomous on this 
account, “it needs only a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from 
                                                 
141 Ibid.  
142 Ibid., 127.  
143 Ibid., 101 
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constraint, not a full understanding or a complete absence of influence.”144 This is 
because to require a complete understanding or total freedom from influence would set 
the bar so high for acting autonomously that no person could reasonably or practically 
meet it. To assert that individuals could even have complete understanding or total 
freedom from influence is, Beauchamp and Childress claim, a mythical ideal.145  
 This understanding of autonomy makes the concept appear somewhat arbitrary 
because it places the ability to act autonomously on a continuously sliding scale that 
involves varying degrees of understanding and influence. Beauchamp and Childress 
acknowledge this. However, they further contend that even though the ability act 
autonomously depends on one’s understanding and freedom from undue constraint, it is 
possible to have standards that help determine the degree to which a choice or action is 
autonomous. As they claim, “thresholds marking substantially autonomous decisions can 
be carefully fixed in light of specific objectives such as meaningful decision making . . . 
The appropriate criteria for substantial autonomy are best addressed in a particular 
context.”146 
 Next I show how respect for autonomy is a guiding principle of both the 
interactions between health care professionals and patients and of market transactions, 
and argue for why, therefore, is should be considered an ethical limit of health care 
markets. 
 
 
                                                 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 102.  
146 Ibid. 
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A. Respect for Autonomy as a Principle of Health Care Relationships 
Within health care, respect for autonomy has been increasingly emphasized over 
approximately the last fifty years. Traditionally, health care relationships have been 
characterized in terms of medical paternalism – that is, patients being given little or no 
opportunity to provide input regarding their treatment and overall medical care, while 
trusting health care professionals to know and act in patients’ best interests. Now, 
however, the nature of health care relationships have shifted to allow patients more 
freedom to choose medical practices and treatments that better accord with their values 
and lifestyles.147 For example, patients can now refuse what are otherwise considered 
standard medical treatments, such as a Jehovah’s Witness refusing non-artificial blood 
products because he or she believes using these products violates important religious 
doctrines of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.  
From this it appears as though respect for autonomy in health care relationships is 
really a principle of noninterference toward patients’ treatment decisions. While 
noninterference regarding (many) patient choices is certainly an aspect of showing proper 
respect for autonomy, understanding respect for autonomy as a principle of health care 
relationships requires more than just noninterference. Respect for autonomy as a principle 
of health care relationships also involves acting in ways to empower persons to make 
choices that best accord with their values and lifestyles. As Beauchamp and Childress 
note, respect for autonomy includes,  
                                                 
147 See for example; Buchanan, “Medical Paternalism;” Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, 102-111; Husak, “Paternalism and Autonomy;” Clark, Sorenson, and Hare, 
“Ethical Problems in Clinical Practice;” and O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 34-37. 
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building up or maintaining others’ capacities for autonomous choice while 
helping to ally fears and other conditions that destroy or disrupt 
autonomous action. Respect, in this account, involves acknowledging the 
value and decision-making rights of persons and enabling them to act 
autonomously, whereas disrespect for autonomy involves attitudes and 
actions that ignore, insult, demean, or are inattentive to others’ rights of 
autonomous action.148 
 
Often discussions of respect for autonomy in health care relationships focus on 
patient autonomy. This is likely because patients’ needs leave them particularly 
vulnerable to having their autonomy usurped throughout the course of treatment, as they 
are the ones who, in most cases, must rely on health care professionals to help them make 
treatment decisions that best accord with their values and lifestyles. But what Beauchamp 
and Childress are implying here is that the principle of respect for autonomy requires 
mutual respect in both attitude and action for the meaningful contributions of both 
patients and health care professionals in the treatment decision-making process. It would 
be contradictory to this principle if either party in a health care relationship was unduly 
pressured by the other to provide or accept treatment decisions that did not accord with 
their values or lifestyles; although in order to meet this principle it may still be necessary 
in certain cases for health care professionals to at least inform patients of various 
treatment options, even if they are unwilling to directly provide them. Regarding this 
latter point, for example, obstetricians opposed to abortion have the right not to provide 
them in non-emergency situations, but are also required as a matter of respect for 
autonomy not to impede the right of patients to get accurate information about the 
procedure or take steps to prevent patients from having the procedure done elsewhere.   
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Furthermore, like with the principle of honesty in health care relationships, the 
principle of respect for autonomy is not absolute. As Beauchamp and Childress also note, 
“Respect for autonomy has only prima facie standing, and competing moral 
considerations sometimes can override this principle.”149 For example, basic tenets of the 
medical profession would disallow health care professionals from honoring a patient’s 
request to sell his or her heart to a transplant patient, even if the request appears 
autonomous. However, clarifying which moral considerations could override this 
principle, and whether or not such moral considerations should be permitted to override 
this principle in all instances are concerns beyond the scope of this particular project.  
B. Respect for Autonomy in Business 
In business, respect for autonomy is the core of economic life. As both Freeman 
and Donaldson and Dunfee discuss, respect for autonomy is necessary for individuals to 
freely enter into, fulfill, and exit from contracts with one another.150 Yet, while it is 
generally recognized that there should be respect for autonomy in most aspects of 
business, there is a debate over whether or not the commonly accepted practice of direct-
to-consumer advertising violates respect for autonomy.  
Direct-to-consumer advertising tells consumers of different products on the 
market. On one hand, this form of advertising could therefore be autonomy enhancing by 
possibly helping consumers become more aware of the set of product choices available to 
them. At the very least, direct-to-consumer advertising does not violate autonomy per se 
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because it cannot force individuals to purchase products against their wills. However 
many direct-to-consumer advertisements either fail to clearly present product information 
or use misinformation in ways that potentially create misunderstanding for consumers 
about the advertised products. So on the other hand, much direct-to-consumer advertising 
seems to hinder autonomous action by frustrating the ability of consumers to make 
informed product choices.  
With respect to health care, this debate is most frequently associated with the 
direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs. While this is an issue I 
thoroughly address in the next chapter, we already see with the example of Claritin how 
direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs can deceive patients into 
believing they are better informed about a drug than they really are. As I argue in the next 
chapter, direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs actually weakens patient 
autonomy in ways that violate this principle. 
C. Respect for Autonomy as an Ethical Limit of Health Care Markets 
From what I have shown here about how respect for autonomy applies to both 
health care relationships and business, there are at least two ways that this principle 
should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets. First, respect for autonomy 
should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets in that persons must have 
access to whatever information they need in order to make autonomous choices regarding 
the sale or purchase of health care goods or services. In the sense that Beauchamp and 
Childress discuss respect for autonomy, this requirement can be thought of as including 
an obligation for health care professionals or institutions (such as hospitals or insurance 
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companies) not only to provide to the best of their abilities the information patients need 
to properly exercise their autonomy, but to also provide means to help patients 
understand that information (even if those health care professionals or institutions are 
unwilling or unable to directly provide the goods or services patients may want). This 
obligation on the part of health care professionals or institutions is perhaps especially 
strong when health care relationships are contrived due to things like insurance or health 
care policy restrictions – restrictions that in some ways pose barriers to respect for 
autonomy in health care relationships because the relationships that result from such 
restrictions may not have a solid enough foundation of communication or trust to 
generate the kind of understanding expected for patients to autonomously engage in the 
treatment-decision making process.   
Second, respect for autonomy should be considered an ethical limit of health care 
markets in that persons must be free of undue influence to make autonomous choices 
regarding the sale or purchase of health care goods or services. This does not mean, 
though, that making autonomous choices regarding the sale or purchase of health care 
goods or services requires total freedom from influence. Not only is it impractical to try 
to maintain that autonomous health care or market-based choices can be free from 
influence, but, particularly with respect to health care markets, there could also be times 
when not trying to influence patients’ choices seemingly contradicts the principle of 
respect for autonomy. For example, many patients rely on the advice of health care 
professionals about certain health care goods or services to make better-informed choices. 
Respect for autonomy also seems to require influencing patients’ health care choices 
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when they have not fully considered the consequences of those choice(s), such as, for 
example, if insured patients are unaware that the health care goods or services they want 
are not covered by their insurance – in such cases, appropriately expressing respect for 
autonomy would, at the very least, involve informing patients of what goods and services 
could meet their needs that are also covered by their insurance. The difference between 
when influence adheres to the principle of respect for autonomy and when influence 
violates this principle is that the former attempts to enable persons to make better 
informed decisions, while the latter constrains or pressures persons in ways that 
intentionally prevent or hinder their abilities to make autonomous decisions.  
These two ways for how respect for autonomy shold be considered an ethical 
limit of health care markets also indicate at least two ways that health care markets could 
violate this limit. First, health care markets could violate this limit by not having 
provisions to provide participants the information they need to make well-informed 
treatment decisions. Second, health care markets could violate this limit by failing to 
have regulations that aim to prevent participants from making decisions about the sale or 
purchase of health care goods or services that result from undue constraint or influence.  
3. Conclusion 
 Properly valuing health care goods and services requires properly valuing the 
primary relationships by which they are acquired. This is why ethically treating health 
care goods and services as commodities cannot rest just upon the principle of increased 
access. Throughout this chapter I have argued that ethically treating health care goods 
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and services as commodities also requires limiting health care markets according to at 
least the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy.  
Over the next two chapters I apply my argument for the ethical limits of health 
care markets to both the pharmaceutical industry and a hypothetical legal organ market in 
the United States. The general reason why I focus on these two markets is because of the 
public and academic interest both have recently garnered: the pharmaceutical industry 
because of its high profitability and the ethically contentious ways it generates those 
profits; a potential legal organ market because it represents an alternative means of organ 
procurement that could help lessen the growing gap between the numbers of needed 
transplant organs and organ donors, and because organ selling is currently illegal in the 
United States. As we shall see next, the current modus operandi of the pharmaceutical 
industry in the United States violates each of the ethical limits of health care markets for 
which I have argued.  
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Chapter Four:  Analyzing the Ethical Limits of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
 
This chapter applies my argument for ethically treating health care goods and 
services as commodities to the pharmaceutical industry in the United States. I focus on 
the pharmaceutical industry for two primary reasons. First, as Callahan and Wasunna 
note, the pharmaceutical industry plays a crucial role in health care and so warrants 
serious moral and ethical scrutiny.151 Second, unlike most other industrialized nations, the 
United States government takes a laissez-faire approach to drug pricing. One result of this 
is that approximately half of the industry’s global sales of pharmaceutical drugs come 
from the United States alone.152  
My aim in this chapter is to analyze five industry practices according to what I 
argue should be considered the base ethical limits of health care markets. In my analysis I 
show how each practice violates one or more of these limits. With respect to how 
pharmaceutical companies interact with physicians, I analyze: the use of pharmaceutical 
representatives to promote “medical education,” the use of industry-sponsored research to 
market to physicians, and gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians. Next 
I analyze the practice of direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical drugs. Lastly, I 
analyze the industry pricing of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States. I conclude by 
providing several suggestions for how the pharmaceutical industry can reform itself in 
order to ethically treat pharmaceutical drugs as commodities.  
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1. Analyzing the Industry’s Interaction with Physicians 
Physicians play a key role in prescription drug sales. Convince them that a 
prescription drug is valuable to patients, and they are more likely to prescribe that drug. 
Fail to convince them that a prescription drug is valuable to patients, and a 
pharmaceutical company may not only lose out on profits from lost prescription drug 
sales, but also runs the risk of a physician prescribing a competitor’s drug. 
Pharmaceutical companies know this, and do what they can to convince physicians to 
prescribe their drugs over those of their competitors.  
It is not inherently unethical for pharmaceutical companies to try and convince 
physicians that their drugs are better than those of their competitors. For example, if there 
is supporting data that shows how a particular prescription drug is more effective at 
treating a certain condition than another drug, and the pharmaceutical company attempts 
to present this data in a clear, unbiased way, then it is difficult to see how this type of 
action is unethical. Assuming that a particular prescription drug is more effective at 
treating a certain condition than another drug, than it may actually be unethical not to try 
to convince physicians that this drug should be the one they prescribe to patients. What 
makes the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and physicians ethically 
problematic, though, is not that pharmaceutical companies try to convince physicians 
their drugs are better than their competitors, but how pharmaceutical companies attempt 
to influence the prescribing practices of physicians.  
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA), who 
represent the leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies in the United 
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States, claim that a critical part of their mission is having ethical relationships with 
healthcare professionals.153 However, the primary practices used by pharmaceutical 
companies when interacting with physicians do not appear to exemplify attempts at 
having ethical relationships with them. These practices are: A) using pharmaceutical 
representatives to promote “medical education,” B) the use of industry-sponsored 
research to market to physicians, and C) gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians. In what follows, I first provide and description of each practice, then after 
each description I address how that practice violates the principles of honesty and respect 
for autonomy.  
A. Pharmaceutical Representatives and “medical education” 
As Brody discusses in Hooked, drug wholesalers began employing drug salesmen 
as early as the 1850s. Between 1900 and 1945, the role of drug salesmen expanded to 
include “detailing” – drug salesmen were no longer expected just to pitch the drugs they 
were selling, but to also provide all the details of a medication for physicians who wrote 
prescriptions instead of directly making drug purchases. Then in the years between 1945 
and 1955, there were three events that resulted in the special role that pharmaceutical 
representatives now play within health care: “[1] The explosion in new drugs. [2] The 
failure of medical education to address the drug explosion. [3] The retreat of the 
[American Medical Association] from objective drug assessment.”154 These events, 
                                                 
153 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America, Code on Interactions With Healthcare 
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Brody shows, established the platform for using pharmaceutical representatives to market 
prescription drugs to physicians in terms of “medical education.”155  
The problem with characterizing drug presentations by pharmaceutical 
representatives as “medical education” is that they are not. The term “education” 
typically denotes a form of systematic instruction that many believe should be unbiased 
and objective. However, pharmaceutical representatives often give presentations that are 
mixed with varying degrees of fact and bias, and that are one-sided in favor of the drug 
being pitched.156 As Carl Elliott discusses, the distinction between pharmaceutical 
medical education and pharmaceutical public relations is now so slender that 
pharmaceutical representatives even have trouble distinguishing between the two. Citing 
Neil Kendle, chief executive officer of Lowe Fusion Healthcare, Elliott writes, “[T]he 
broad distinction between healthcare PR and medical education is becoming obsolete . . . 
Sometimes I describe Lowe Fusion as a ‘PR consultancy’, sometimes as a ‘healthcare 
communications agency’, sometimes I just cop out and list the things we do.”157  
Evidence suggests a pervasive use of pharmaceutical representatives providing 
drug presentations to physicians. As Blumenthal notes, in 2001, the number of 
pharmaceutical representative employed by the industry topped 90,000 in the United 
States – approximately 1 representative for every 5 office-based physicians.158 Moreover, 
according to a 1995 survey conducted by the Department of Medicine at the University of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the AMA gave up the objective testing requirements needed to get the “Seal of Acceptance.” As a 
result, Brody notes, the advertising revenues now represent more than half the entire income of the 
AMA. Ibid., 145.  
155 Ibid., 145-149. 
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California at San Diego School of Medicine, from 106 drug statements made during 13 
presentations by pharmaceutical representatives to physicians, only 12 (11%) were 
inaccurate or false. Yet all 12 statements favored the drugs being pitched, while no 
statement made during the presentations favored competitors drugs. What is perhaps also 
troubling about these findings is that of the 27 physicians who attended these 
presentations, only 7 of them (26%) recognized the false statements, while 10 of the 
physicians (37%) said the information provided influenced their prescribing practices.159 
However, given that latter survey is relatively small, and the lack of results regarding 
what sort of relevance these misleading statements had on the physicians’ prescribing 
practices, it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions about the overall effects of drug 
presentations to physicians. 
a. How Pharmaceutical Drug Presentations Violate the Principle of Honesty 
 As I discuss in chapter 3, the principle of honesty is violated when health care 
markets permit market participants to engage in dishonest or deceptive behavior not 
intended to serve patients’ best interests, or that could potentially harm patients. This 
practice of using pharmaceutical representatives to give drug presentations under the 
guise of “medical education” seemingly fails to be forthright and truthful because they 
include some inaccurate or false information. However, giving drug presentations that 
include some inaccurate or false information does not necessarily mean that this practice 
violates the principle of honesty. It may be possible that the inaccurate or false 
information is somehow derived accidentally in a way that neither a pharmaceutical 
company nor a representative recognizes as inaccurate or false. If this is the case, then 
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even though pharmaceutical representatives are presenting some bad information to 
physicians, this practice may not violate the principle of honesty because neither a 
pharmaceutical company nor a representative could be charged with intentionally trying 
to deceive physicians in a way that would be unethical regarding the patient-physician 
relationship. Yet, as Elliott tells us, pharmaceutical representatives understanding that the 
goal of drug presentations is to generate good public relations as much as it is to 
“educate” physicians. So there is good reason to think that, because drug presentations 
are intentionally slanted, the possibility of deriving some bad drug information by 
accident is likely false. 
 This leads us to two possible conclusions regarding how this practice relates to 
the principle of honesty. First, at the least, this practice may violate the principle of 
honesty because some of the drug information may accidentally be inaccurate or false, 
while still being presented with the intent of favoring the drug being pitched. Second, at 
the worst, this practice explicitly violates the principle of honesty because the 
presentations use inaccurate or false information to bias physicians prescribing practices 
in ways not necessarily intended to serve patients’ best interests and that could 
potentially harm patients. 
b. How Pharmaceutical Drug Presentations Violate Respect for Autonomy 
In chapter 3 I argue that respect for autonomy as an ethical limit of health care 
markets requires providing patients with information that helps them make treatment 
choices that best accord with their values and lifestyles. I also note how respect for 
autonomy is violated when a lack of information hinders the ability of patients to exercise 
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their autonomy in the treatment decision-making process. When pharmaceutical 
companies have representatives give drug presentations to physicians that include some 
inaccurate or false information, they violate the principle of respect for autonomy by 
impeding the accurate transfer of information between physicians and patients, thereby 
limiting the ability of patients to work with physicians to make well-informed treatment 
decisions. There are two reasons how this is the case. First, as we have already seen, 
pharmaceutical representatives can influence the prescribing practices of some physicians 
despite presenting them with some inaccurate or false drug information. When this 
occurs, pharmaceutical representatives effectively manipulate the ability of physicians to 
provide information patients may need to make well-informed treatment decisions. 
Second, as Hubbard argues, patients lack the proper medical training and knowledge to 
make treatment decisions on their own, and so rely on the expertise of physicians to help 
them make treatment decisions that are in their best interests.160 When pharmaceutical 
representatives present inaccurate or false drug information to physicians, they also 
effectively constrain the ability of patients to have access to information in a way 
seemingly hinders their abilities to more freely participate in the treatment decision-
making process.   
B. Industry-Sponsored Research 
Pharmaceutical companies will also use industry-sponsored research to market 
prescription drugs to physicians. Similar to how we typically understand the term 
“education,” the term “research” denotes information that we typically assume has been 
obtained and presented in an objectively unbiased way. Yet there are numerous reasons to 
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question the objectivity and bias of industry-sponsored research. Brody, for example, 
discusses how some industry-sponsored research papers will use the abstract, contrary to 
its intended purpose as a brief summary of key research findings, to highlight only the 
positives of a study while leaving out any undesirable findings. In particularly egregious 
examples, some of these research papers will even use the abstract to audaciously suggest 
that physicians prescribe the researched drug as their first-choice. Pharmaceutical 
companies do this because they know many physicians will read just the abstract instead 
of the entire study.161  
Physicians, however, are getting better at recognizing the one-sidedness of 
industry-sponsored research. As Brody states, 
Many physicians are starting to get the message that research conducted 
by drug firms may be biased in favor of the company’s drugs. Numerous 
reviews have shown that the likelihood of an industry-sponsored study 
showing the superiority of the drug in question is substantially greater than 
in studies paid for by neutral sources.162  
 
Brody further suggests that pharmaceutical companies therefore attempt to conceal 
themselves as research sponsors by simultaneously conducting multiple drug trials at 
different universities and medical institutions, and by using several intermediaries to 
administer the studies.163 This works to hide which studies are funded by pharmaceutical 
companies while still allowing them to control the flow of information being presented to 
physicians.  
Pharmaceutical companies will also attempt to influence physicians by paying 
their colleagues to take part in presenting industry-sponsored research. Brody and Elliott 
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give several examples in which pharmaceutical companies will pay physicians large sums 
of money, anywhere from $1,500 to $300,000, to attach their names to ghostwritten 
research papers, give prewritten lectures to colleagues at medical conferences that tout 
the virtues of a particular drug over others, or even write textbooks about diseases for 
which the sponsoring company has just created a drug treatment.164  
a. How Industry-Sponsored Research Violates the Principle of Honesty 
Each of these examples shows how using industry-sponsored research to market 
to physicians violates the principle of honesty by being intentionally deceitful. These 
examples show that pharmaceutical companies attempt to influence the prescribing 
practices of physicians by either presenting only favorable research data for the drug in 
question, by hiding themselves as the sources of research funding knowing that some 
physicians are aware that the data may be biased, or by paying physicians to market 
industry-sponsored research to other physicians in ways that seemingly violate the 
collegial trust that typically exists between members of a profession. While some kinds of 
deceit can be ethically permissible, this is not the case here. Attempting to manipulate 
research data so that physicians favor particular prescription drugs over others is a self-
serving act that could consequently prevent physicians from being able to honestly 
disclose information to patients that patients presumably have a right to know given its 
relevancy to their medical care. Using industry-sponsored research to market to 
physicians can also be considered to violate the principle of honesty because of how 
attempts to suppress unfavorable research data may otherwise cause physicians not to 
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prescribe the drug in question, especially if the missing research data shows that the drug 
in question is potentially harmful to patients. 
One example of this is GlaxoSmithKline’s suppression of research data regarding 
the use of the anti-depressant drug, Paxil, in children and adolescents. Studies on Paxil 
and other similar anti-depressant drugs show how using those drugs to treat childhood 
depression can have serious adverse effects on children and adolescents, including 
worsening their depression, increasing their hostility and aggressiveness, and increasing 
thoughts or attempts of suicide.165 The evidence from these studies is strong enough that 
on June 10th, 2003, Gordon Duff, chairman of the Committee on Safety in Medicines in 
Great Britain, ruled that Paxil should not be used to treat childhood depression because 
cases of suicide were more frequent in patients under 18, and that on October 27th, 2003, 
the United States Food and Drug Administration made a similar recommendation.166 
However, as Brody notes, GlaxoSmithKline quickly published and has given 
considerable publicity to a research study that apparently shows how Paxil is effective in 
treating childhood depression, while doing its best to conceal the contrary data from the 
medical community.167 These actions not only appear to be unethically deceptive and 
fraudulent, but have also prompted legal ramifications. In June 2004, then-Attorney 
General of the State of New York, Eliot Spitzer, filed legal charges of fraud against 
GlaxoSmithKline for, “withholding negative information and misrepresenting data on 
prescribing its antidepressant Paxil to children . . . [and that] an internal 1999 Glaxo 
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document showed that the company intended to “manage the dissemination of data in 
order to minimize any potential negative commercial impact.””168 
b. How Industry-Sponsored Research Violates Respect for Autonomy 
These examples regarding the use and promotion of industry-sponsored research 
also show how this practice violates the principle of respect for autonomy. Similar to 
pharmaceutical representatives giving drug presentations under the guise of “medical 
education,” the current use and promotion of industry-sponsored research disrupts the 
medical decision making process between patients and physicians and effectively 
manipulates the ability of physicians to fully act in their patients’ best interests. This is 
for two reasons. First, physicians who accept money to be voiceboxes for industry-
sponsored research may fail to act fully autonomously because they may feel pressured to 
make treatment assessments and decisions that concur with the research findings they 
have been paid to promote. Second, pharmaceutical companies that promote only 
favorable research data while suppressing unfavorable research data, can be considered 
an undue influence that constrains the abilities of patients and physicians from being 
aware of information that might otherwise cause them to make different treatment 
decisions. 
C. Gift Giving 
 Another way pharmaceutical companies try influence the prescribing practices of 
physicians is to provide them and their staffs with gifts. Standard gifts include branded 
office items like pens and notepads that are inscribed with the company’s logo, free 
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lunches for physicians and staffs, and drug samples. The latter is particularly convenient 
for physicians and patients, as patients get to try brand name drugs that they may not 
otherwise be able to afford, and without physicians having to write prescriptions that 
patients must then spend extra time getting filled.  
Pharmaceutical companies also give physicians what can be deemed 
“entertainment gifts.” These include items such as free dinners, bottles of alcohol, cigars, 
or golf outings (and perhaps for a particularly good client, a new set of golf clubs). While 
$100 is typically the upper limit for a gift, the type of gift and the actual amount spent is 
often times arbitrarily left to discretion of a pharmaceutical representative. As Brody 
notes, so long as sales in a particular territory are good, money is not an issue.169 
Gift giving is often a way of expressing one’s valued appreciation for another, and 
so is not typically considered unethical. Furthermore, many medical professionals – 
namely medical residents and physicians – do not consider accepting pharmaceutical gifts 
to be very ethically problematic. For example a survey conducted in 2003 by Drs. Allen 
Brett, Wayne Burr, and Jamaluddin Moloo of the Department of Medicine at the 
University of South Carolina School of Medicine, asked 37 of 42 faculty physicians 
(73%) and 39 of 42 medical residents (93%) with at least three years of training to judge 
the ethical appropriateness of 18 different pharmaceutical gifts. On a scale of 0-3 – in 
which 0 indicates “not problematic,” 1 is “mildly problematic,” 2 is “moderately 
problematic,” and 3 is “very problematic” – no gift was rated at 2 or higher.170 Gift giving 
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from pharmaceutical companies to physicians, though, does violate the principles of 
honesty and respect for autonomy.  
a. How Gift Giving Violates the Principle of Honesty 
Initially one might try to argue that gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians violates the principle of honesty either because patients are unaware of the 
practice, or because patients are unaware of the influence pharmaceutical gifts can have 
on physicians’ prescribing practices. In both cases, the influence of gift giving on the 
prescribing practices of physicians could be seen as undermining the essence of trust that, 
as I argue in chapter 3, ought to exist between patients and physicians. There is some 
justification for this argument. According to a 1994 survey conducted by Dr. Robert 
Blake and Elizabeth Early of the University of Missouri at Columbia, patient awareness 
of certain kinds of gifts from pharmaceutical companies to physicians is low. For 
example, of the 486 participants, just 22.4% and 13.8% respectively were aware that gifts 
to physicians include free dinners and coffee makers. Moreover, nearly half of the 
participants did not approve of these gifts (48.4% and 40.7% respectively).171  
However this argument ultimately fails for two reasons. First, the study by Blake 
and Early also shows that 87% and 55.3% of participants respectively were aware that 
physicians receive free drug samples and office supplies from pharmaceutical companies. 
Moreover, 82.1% of participants approved of physicians receiving drug samples, while 
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67.3% approved of physicians and their staffs receiving office supplies. Second, 70% of 
participants in this study believe that pharmaceutical gifts to physicians sometimes or 
frequently influence a physician’s prescribing practices.172 So, on one hand, it is true that 
a majority of patients are unaware of the full range of gifts pharmaceutical companies 
give to physicians. But, on the other hand, it is not the case that a majority of patients are 
completely unaware that physicians receive gifts from pharmaceutical companies, or that 
they unaware about the influence of these gifts have on physicians’ prescribing practices.  
Still it is possible to show that gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians violates the principle of honesty because, in this case, it is a deceitful practice 
that intends to unethically influence physicians’ prescribing practices. Part of our general 
understanding of gift giving is that the gift is intended to benefit the recipient in some 
way. Certainly many pharmaceutical gifts like notepads, pens, and free drug samples, can 
benefit physicians, their staffs, and patients. One can even argue that gifts like free 
lunches with an accompanying drug presentation, trips to a resort for a drug conference, 
or paid-for golf outings with pharmaceutical representatives, professionally benefit 
physicians by providing them with a relaxing break in their daily routines while still 
getting drug information in the process. Yet we have good reason to believe that the 
intent of pharmaceutical gifts is not necessarily to benefit physicians, their staffs, or 
patients, but to solely help pharmaceutical companies boost their profits by successfully 
market their products to physicians.  
In 1955, a group calling itself the Pharmaceutical Advertising Club sponsored and 
published a study conducted by the Institute of Motivational Research titled, A Research 
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Study on Pharmaceutical Advertising. Also known as the “Dichter study,” after head 
researcher Ernest Dichter, the study examined the influence of pharmaceutical 
advertising on physicians. As Brody notes,  
The Dichter study broke new ground by identifying how important the 
process of rationalization was in successful pharmaceutical marketing. 
The company had to treat the physician in one way yet be perceived as if 
they were treating him in a very different way . . . For example, a visit 
from the rep might really be a break in a busy afternoon of seeing patients, 
a chance to talk with an old buddy about a hobby, or an exchange of 
gossip about other physicians in town. But just enough scientific 
information had to be exchanged – even a brochure that would never be 
read – so that the physician could rationalize the visit as “education.”173 
 
The Dichter study indicates why gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to 
physicians is deceiving in a way that seemingly violates the principle of honesty. 
Pharmaceutical gifts are primarily used as tools by the industry to get physicians to 
rationalize their exposure to pharmaceutical marketing as something that personally or 
professionally benefits them instead of as something that is really designed just to benefit 
a company’s drug sales. The problem is that by giving these gifts, pharmaceutical 
companies are inviting physicians to trust that they have the physicians’ best interests in 
mind while using that trust to manipulate physicians’ prescribing practices for the sake of 
economic gain (something, again, that Strudler argues is an unethical use of deception).  
b. How Gift Giving Violates the Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
Before examining how gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians 
prima facie violates the principle of respect for autonomy, it is interesting to note another 
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finding of the Dichter study. According to the study, physicians will attempt to portray 
themselves as independent thinkers who are not influenced by pharmaceutical 
marketing.174 This still seems to be the case today. In the study by Brett, Burr, and 
Moloo, for example, the average response by faculty physicians about how influential 
free drug samples are on their prescribing practices was 1.54, or “mildly influential.” This 
again is on a scale of 0-3, in which 0 indicates “not influential,” and 3 indicates “very 
influential.”175 The reason this is interesting is because it indicates how well the process 
of rationalization has worked in pharmaceutical marketing. If physicians were to believe 
that pharmaceutical gifts were largely influential on their prescribing practices, they may 
be unwilling to accept them. But because physicians often believe that they are not and 
cannot be influenced by these gifts, they willingly accept them without much ethical 
concern. The problem with rationalizing pharmaceutical gifts in this way, and the reason 
for why this practice violates the principle of respect for autonomy, is that gift giving is 
psychologically tied to the rule for reciprocation.  
According to Robert Cialdini, a psychologist at Arizona State University and 
author of Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, humans are conditioned to react to 
receiving gifts with a sense of obligation because of the rule for reciprocation.176 The rule 
says that, “we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”177 As 
Cialdini further notes, the rule for reciprocation and the sense of obligation associated 
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with it is so pervasive that, “[A]fter intensive study, sociologists such as Alvin Gouldner 
can report that there is no human society that does not subscribe to the rule. And within 
each society it seems pervasive also; it permeates exchanges of every kind.”178 A common 
explanation for why this rule is so pervasive, and why it is psychologically tied to gift 
giving, is that a fundamental component of social survival for individuals and societies is 
the ability to share resources in a cooperative manner. As Brody further explains, it is 
important to the social system that, “the person who initiates a gift exchange can be 
confident that his cooperative gesture will be replied to with a similarly cooperative 
gesture.”179  
The rule for reciprocation tells us that the act of receiving a gift is itself 
influential, and explains why gift giving from pharmaceutical companies to physicians 
unethically violates the principle of respect for autonomy. This is because gift giving 
from pharmaceutical companies to physicians creates a potential undue influence on the 
ability of physicians to act on their patients’ behalf. Even if pharmaceutical gifts are not 
intended to influence the prescribing practices of physicians, we can, in this case, view 
the psychological response for reciprocation to receiving a gift as a manipulative force 
that leaves physicians vulnerable to making biased prescription choices that may not be 
the best or most appropriate way to help patients meet their medical needs.  
2. Analyzing the Industry’s use of Direct-to-Consumer-Advertising 
 Although physicians play a key role in prescription drug sales, it is the continuous 
needs and wants of patients for prescription drugs that sustain the pharmaceutical 
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industry’s profits. It makes sense, then, for pharmaceutical companies to also want to 
market prescription drugs directly to consumers. Often pharmaceutical direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA) takes the form of television commercials, Internet 
advertisements, printed advertisements, and general public advertisements such as 
billboards and flyers.180  
Pharmaceutical DTCA can be separated into two kinds: branded and non-branded. 
Branded DTCA market particular pharmaceutical drugs by naming them in the 
advertisement. Non-branded DTCA does not attempt to market particular 
pharmaceuticals drugs and do not mention specific drugs by name.181 As Arnold notes, 
distinguishing between branded and non-branded DTCA is necessary because the 
arguments for and against pharmaceutical DTCA do not apply equally to both kinds.182 
Branded DTCA, because it aims to market specific drugs to consumers, is typically 
considered more ethically controversial than non-branded. For example, Arnold argues 
that the branded DTCA is unethical, while non-branded DTCA is not. Since this chapter 
addresses how the pharmaceutical industry violates the ethical limits of health care 
markets in the United States, this section focuses exclusively on branded DTCA.  
 The pharmaceutical industry promotes the practice of DTCA as a valuable service 
to consumers. In 2005, PhRMA’s Chief Medical Officer, Paul Antony, submitted a 
written testimony to Congress about the industry’s use of DTCA. According to Antony’s 
testimony, 
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DTC advertising has been proven beneficial to American patients. And, 
continuing regulatory oversight by the FDA helps ensure that the content 
of DTC advertising informs and educates consumers about medical 
conditions and treatment options . . . DTC advertising can be a powerful 
tool in educating millions of people and improving health. Because of 
DTC advertising, large numbers of Americans are prompted to discuss 
illness with their doctors for the first time. Because of DTC advertising, 
patients become more involved in their own health care decisions, and are 
proactive in their patient – doctor dialogue. Because of DTC advertising, 
patients are more likely to take their prescribed medications.183 
 
Although DTCA may have this effect on American patients, Antony’s testimony 
provides no empirical data justifying these claims. Moreover, the degree to which the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) actually provides effective 
regulatory oversight of DTCA is questionable. As Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal 
show, from 1996 to 2005 the industry’s expenditures on DTCA have increased 330%, 
from $985 million to $4.2 billion. This increase also represents an increase in the 
percentage of total promotional spending used on DTCA during that time, from 
approximately 9% to 14%. However from 1997 to 2006, while the number of noted 
problems of DTCA complying with FDA regulations increased from 15.5% to 33.3%, the 
number of letters sent by the FDA to pharmaceutical companies informing them they had 
violated DTCA regulations went from 142 in 1997 to approximately 160 in 1998, but 
steadily decreased each year since to a low of 21 in 2006.184 This data shows that 
pharmaceutical companies are increasing their use of DTCA, that pharmaceutical 
companies are increasingly violating the FDA’s regulations for DTCA, and that the FDA 
is effectively failing to communicate those violations back to the offending 
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pharmaceutical company(-ies). Yet it is the ways DTCA violates FDA regulations that 
highlight how DTCA also violates the base ethical principles of health care markets for 
which I argue. As Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal also note, from 1997 to 2006, 84% 
of DTCA that violated FDA regulations was, “for either minimizing risks (e.g., 
minimizing or omitting information on side effects), exaggerating effectiveness (e.g., 
portraying the indication too broadly or making unsubstantiated claims of superiority 
over other drugs), or both.”185 
A. How DTCA Violates the Principle of Honesty 
There are three ways I show that DTCA violates the principle of honesty: 1) in 
how DTCA is promoted by PhRMA, 2) in how broadcasted pharmaceutical 
advertisements have been deregulated by the FDA, and 3) with respect to the perceived 
accuracy of the information in DTCA. The underlying concern with each of these ways is 
that the transmission of false, inaccurate, or incomplete information may cause some 
persons to seek drug prescriptions that may be medically inappropriate for them, or that 
they simply do not need. I do not, however, attempt to argue that DTCA is unethical 
based on the idea that, similar to other kinds of non-pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer 
advertisements, it may contain clearly false images. Clearly false images are those that 
show an advertised product doing impossible things, like a vehicle vertically scaling a 
building unassisted. The reason I do not argue this point is that it is difficult to show how 
using false images in advertisements violates the principle of honesty, as most rational 
persons do not accept clearly false images as being true in the first place.  
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 One way that DTCA violates the principle of honesty is because of how PhRMA 
promotes the practice as a service that helps inform and educate consumers. We know 
from the example of Schering-Plough using dual claims to dubiously market Claritin to 
consumers as an effective, non-drowsy antihistamine, that PhRMA’s claim about DTCA 
informing and educating consumers is not true in all cases. Moreover, as John Abramson 
perceptively notes in Overdosed America, assuming the purpose of DTCA is to inform 
and educate consumers, it is disingenuous to use ad agencies instead of health educators 
to create pharmaceutical advertisements that heavily rely on emotional appeals instead of 
clearly stated facts.186  
 Another way DTCA is unethically deceptive is because, despite PhRMA’s claim 
that DTCA aims to inform consumers, broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements, 
namely television commercials, are not required to disclose detailed risk information. 
Detailed risk information, however, is something most persons consider medically 
relevant information to know prior to taking a prescription drug. Prior to 1997, the FDA 
required all broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements to have a brief summary of risk 
information that included the drug’s effectiveness, side effects, major risks, and 
contraindications.187 According to Rosenthal and Donohue, “These rules served as a de 
facto barrier to broadcast advertisements . . . because it was costly to air the entire brief 
summary on television.”188  
                                                 
186 Abramson, Overdosed America, 155.  
187 Rosenthal and Donohue, “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,” 171; Brody, Hooked, 
231.  
188 Rosenthal and Donohue, “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,” 171.  
  
 
134
In August 1997, the FDA clarified and subsequently loosened its restrictions on 
DTCA. The FDA’s new requirements allow broadcasted pharmaceutical advertisements 
to simply include information referrals for risk disclosure. That is, instead of being 
required to summarize risk information in the advertisement itself, pharmaceutical 
companies could now adequately fulfill their obligation of risk disclosure by providing 
consumers with a toll-free number, a Website address, or by suggesting that individuals 
speak with a physician if they have questions about the advertised drug.189 However the 
force behind this objection is not just that pharmaceutical companies no longer have to 
disclose risk information in their broadcasted advertisements, but also that since the 
FDA’s policy change, television commercials have gone from not playing a major role in 
DTCA to becoming the primary source it.  
As Rosenthal and Donohue show, pharmaceutical companies spent almost no 
money on television commercials in 1994 and 1995, while industry expenditures on 
DTCA for television commercials in 1996 and 1997 was approximately $250 million 
(about 25% of total DTCA expenditures). In 1998, just after the FDA’s deregulation of 
broadcasted DTCA, industry expenditures on DTCA for television commercials rose to 
approximately $600 million (about 50% of total DTCA expenditures). In 2001, just four 
years after the FDA’s policy change, industry expenditures on DTCA for television 
commercials jumped to approximately $1.75 billion (about 64% of total DTCA 
expenditures).190  
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DTCA can also be considered to violate the principle of honesty because of how 
the information presented in DTCA often causes patients to misperceive the accuracy of 
the advertisements, while largely believing they are educational and informative. In April 
2008, the Kaiser Family Foundation published a report on public and physician 
perceptions of DTCA. According to this report, 91% of the sample population from the 
general public claimed to have seen a drug advertisement in 2008, with 67% believing 
that DTCA is educational, and 52% claiming to at least somewhat rely on DTCA for 
information about prescription drugs.191  
However, according to a 2002 FDA sponsored survey, the accuracy of the 
information patients receive from DTCA is questionable. The survey asked 500 
physicians – 250 general practioners, and 250 specialists – to evaluate the effects of 
DTCA on patient-physician relationships. According to the results, 65% of physicians 
surveyed believe that DTCA either somewhat or greatly confuses patients about the risks 
and benefits of the advertised drug. Moreover, 75% of physicians somewhat or greatly 
believe that DTCA causes patients to overestimate the benefits of the advertised drug.192  
B. How DTCA Violates the Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
 On one hand, DTCA appears to promote patient autonomy. There are two primary 
reasons for this. First, despite its accuracy, DTCA informs consumers of various 
prescription drugs for particular medical conditions that they might not have known about 
otherwise. Second, DTCA encourages patients to actively participate in treatment 
discussions with physicians; thus seemingly help curb paternalistic prescribing 
                                                 
191 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Kaiser Public Opinion Spotlight: Public and Physician Views of Direct-to-
Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising,” 7.  
192 Aikin, “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Physician Survey Preliminary Results.” 
  
 
136
practices.193 Moreover, as Rosenthal and Donohue also show, consumer surveys suggest 
DTCA makes patients more compliant with medication therapy, while physician surveys 
suggest that, “DTCA encourages patients to follow the treatments recommended by their 
physicians.”194 Assuming this latter point is correct, DTCA also appears to help promote 
patient autonomy by encouraging patients to be more responsible in adhering to their 
drug treatments. 
 On the other hand, despite how it may appear to potentially promote patient 
autonomy, DTCA violates the principle of respect for autonomy in at least two ways. 
First, DTCA manipulates the ability of physicians to act autonomously in their treatment 
of patients. Second, because it gives insufficient information about the risk-benefit ratio 
of the advertised drugs, DTCA actually weakens patient autonomy by causing patients to 
believe they are better informed about advertised drugs than they actually are, and by 
potentially increasing medical paternalism.195 
 Regarding the first reason, Rosenthal and Donohue state that in a 2002 survey on 
DTCA and consumer drug choices, 32% of consumers who saw a drug advertisement 
asked their physicians about it. Of those consumers, 27% asked for a prescription.196 
However nothing in my argument about the principle of respect for autonomy shows how 
creating or expressing a want or desire for a product violates one’s autonomy. The 
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problem, though, is that many physicians feel pressured to comply with patients’ requests 
for advertised drugs they do not need. As Rosenthal and Donohue further note, “four out 
of five physicians think DTCA encourages patients to seek treatments they do not need,” 
and that approximately 70% of patient requests for advertised drugs are honored.197 This 
influence of DTCA over physicians’ prescribing practices is unethical in light of the 
principle of respect for autonomy because of how it manipulates their prescribing 
practices in ways they recognize are not necessarily in the best interests of their patients.  
 I already discussed how the quality of the information in DTCA violates the 
principle of honesty. Again this is because of how DTCA does not require risk 
disclosures in the ads, while presenting information to patients that can be confusing and 
cause them to overestimate the benefit of the advertised drugs. These points also show 
how DTCA violates the principle of respect for autonomy by weakening patient 
autonomy. 
 The quality of information in DTCA weakens patient autonomy in two ways. 
First, DTCA may cause patients to believe they are better informed about the advertised 
drugs then they really are. When consumers request and press for advertised drugs based 
on this information, they not only fail act autonomously because they are acting based on 
misinformation, but they also devalue their physicians’ professional abilities to make 
knowledgeable treatment decisions. Second, the lack of forthright and truthful 
information in DTCA about the risks and benefits of the advertised drugs seems to have 
the opposite effect of their original intent. Instead of promoting patient autonomy, DTCA 
appears to cause retrogression toward medical paternalism. This is because when patients 
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request and press for advertised drugs based on the information in DTCA, physicians 
may feel obligated to deny these requests, as directed by their professional obligation to 
act in their patients’ best interests, which may again lead consumers and patients to 
believe these physicians are acting overly and unjustly paternalistic. 
 Before turning to analyze the ethics the industry’s pricing of life-saving 
pharmaceutical drugs, I first briefly explain why I do not argue that the use of DTCA 
violates the desire to increase access to essential goods and services. 
C. Why DTCA does not appear to Violate the Principle of Increased Access to Essential 
Health Goods and Services 
 
There is a general concern that DTCA raises the costs of pharmaceutical drugs 
within the United States, and thus raises the overall costs of health care. This might 
appear to be the case given that from 1996 to 2005, total expenditures on pharmaceutical 
marketing to physicians and consumers increased from approximately $11.5 billion to 
nearly $30 billion. This represents a 4% increase in the percentage of annual 
pharmaceutical sales used on marketing (from 14.2% to 18.2%).198 At the same time, the 
average price of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States is approximately one-third to a 
half more than other countries with national health care systems.199  
However, in order to show how DTCA violates the principle of increased access 
to essential health care goods and services, there would need to be clear evidence 
showing how this practice actually prevents people from receiving needed 
pharmaceutical drugs. While high drug prices prevent some people from accessing 
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needed drugs – a point I discuss more in the next section – there is no substantial 
evidence that these high prices result directly from DTCA. As PhRMA representative 
Alan Holmer claims, “Direct-to-consumer advertising does not affect the prices of drugs: 
price increases of drugs are the least important factor contributing to the increase in 
pharmaceutical spending.”200 Being a representative of the pharmaceutical industry, 
Holmer’s statement is likely biased. However Donohue, Cevasco, and Rosenthal echo 
this view in their analysis of the data on DTCA expenditures. They claim: 
Driven by increases in direct-to-consumer advertising, total promotion as a 
percentage of sales has increased substantially . . . leading some observers 
to worry that consumers must bear these increased costs in the form of 
higher prices. Economic theory and evidence suggest that changes in 
marketing costs are unlikely to have a direct effect on pharmaceutical 
prices.201  
 
At most any evidence linking DTCA expenditures to prohibitive increases in drug costs 
are mixed.202 Brody also acknowledges the lack of evidence linking DTCA expenditures 
to higher drug costs. According to Brody, “The fact is that we do not know very much 
about the impact of DTC ads, for good or ill. The question of whether DTC ads lead to 
increased costs of drugs as more consumers demand a high-priced product, or as 
consumers seek drug therapy for a condition they previously willing to live with, is very 
difficult to determine.”203 
It may be that DTCA violates the principle of increased access to essential health 
care goods and services because it prompts individuals without genuine medical needs to 
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seek medical consultations, thereby possibly delaying access to essential health care 
goods and services for those with genuine medical needs. In addition to the findings of 
Rosenthal and Donohue, a national survey conducted by Weissman, et. al., found that of 
the 643 physicians who responded, 78.6% either somewhat agree or strongly agree that 
DTCA encourages patients to seek unneeded treatments.204 However, even though DTCA 
could be responsible for causing delays in treatment for persons with genuine medical 
needs, there is no quantifying data that allows us to claim with any certainty that DTCA 
actually prevents persons with genuine medical needs from gaining access to essential 
treatment.  
3. Analyzing the Industry’s Pricing of Pharmaceutical Drugs 
 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently 
concluded a study of pharmaceutical pricing policies among member nations.205 The 
study aimed to create a framework for comparing international drug pricing policies, and 
analyze the impacts of differing drug prices on OECD nations and on pharmaceutical 
research and development.206 Two results of this project with respect to pharmaceutical 
drug pricing in the United States are clear. First, the United States has the highest per 
capita spending on pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation. In 2005, the per 
capita spending on pharmaceutical drugs in the United States was $792. This is $203 
more than second ranked Canada, and $388 more than the OECD average.207 Second, of 
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OECD member nations, the United States accounts for 45% of global pharmaceutical 
drug sales.208 These two statistics imply that the United States both pays a higher price 
for and purchases a higher quantity of pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation.  
 There are two general explanations for why the United States annually spends so 
much on pharmaceutical drugs: research and development, and the free market. First, the 
pharmaceutical industry often claims that drug spending in the United States is justified 
because it fuels future research and development. As Brody further explains, 
Most other nations have a national health system and negotiate discounted 
drug prices, paying usually half or two-thirds what American’s typically 
pay. According to spokespersons for the industry, Americans’ willingness 
to pay top dollar for drugs is subsidizing the rest of the world’s 
pharmaceutical research. If the United States . . . [ever brought] the cost of 
drugs down to the average level in other developed countries, the bottom 
would fall out of research on new pharmaceuticals.209 
 
Whether or not the industry is correct to link drug spending in the United States to 
funding for research and development is a debatable point that I return to momentarily. 
 Second, pharmaceutical drug spending in the United States is also the result of the 
free market. One conclusion of the OECD’s pharmaceutical pricing project is that drug 
prices are often defined by a willingness to pay for a particular drug and not based on the 
medicinal value of the drug.210 Free market systems that allow pharmaceutical companies 
to set the prices of drugs based on the willingness to pay is particularly effective in the 
United States for three reasons. First, the United States employs a patent system that is 
meant to generate innovation by protecting proprietary knowledge. Consequently this 
system allows pharmaceutical companies to earn exclusive profits on the drugs (and the 
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composite chemical combinations of those drugs) for 17 years after the initial patent 
approval.211 Second, United States law prohibits drug reseal. This prevents individuals 
from buying and re-importing drugs that were produced in the United States from foreign 
countries where those drugs may be available at a cheaper cost.212 Lastly, as discussed in 
the previous section, the pervasive use of DTCA has increased the number of people in 
the United States seeking and receiving pharmaceutical drug prescriptions.   
A. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of 
Honesty 
 
There are two ways that pharmaceutical drug pricing in the United States violates 
the principle of honesty: by pharmaceutical companies deceptively masking how drug 
prices are set, and by pharmaceutical companies making a false connection between drug 
prices and the funding of future research and development. Regarding the first point, 
consider the example of world’s first anti-HIV drug, Azidothymidine (AZT). In the late 
1980s the FDA approved AZT, which at the time was also the only available anti-HIV 
drug. Although the company that produced the drug, Burroughs Wellcome, had 
substantial support from government funding and university scientists, they retained the 
rights to sell AZT. Using various market mechanisms, Burroughs Wellcome priced AZT 
at $10,000 for a year’s treatment (approximately $833 per month). While many argued 
this price was too expensive for many persons infected with HIV, Burroughs Wellcome 
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attempted to justify their pricing of AZT by claiming that they had invested about $86 
million into the drug’s development and, as Brody notes, “feared either that the epidemic 
would wane or that competing drugs would soon eat into their market share.”213 As 
Brody further notes, Burroughs Wellcome “made one hundred million dollars on the drug 
in its first year of sales . . . [and] recouped their investment many times over within a few 
years.”214 
The case of Burroughs Wellcome’s and AZT exemplifies a standard criticism of 
pharmaceutical drug pricing. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies are criticized for 
failing to detail or disclose how they determine drug prices, keeping the process closed 
from external evaluation. Like Burroughs Wellcome, many pharmaceutical companies 
claim that a drug’s price reflects, or should reflect, the monies spent developing the drug. 
In his detailed examination of the relationship between AIDS activism and the 
pharmaceutical industry, Martin Delaney discusses how this claim is dubious. According 
to Delaney, 
The actual cost [of drug development] is difficult, if not impossible, to 
calculate because there is no agreed-upon standard of accounting for the 
determining cost . . . At the very least, the manufacturers believe that the 
cost of every successful drug must also reflect a portion of the costs of all 
the drugs that failed during development. Just how much was spent on 
failed drugs is impossible to calculate without complete access to a 
company’s books and a complex auditing process . . . The real cost of drug 
development largely remains a “black box” of indeterminate proportions . 
. .215 
 
Whether or not pharmaceutical companies correctly assess the cost of drug 
development as reflected in the drug’s price is not at issue. It is possible that 
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pharmaceutical companies determine drug prices in ways that are both accurate and fair. 
My particular criticism with respect to how drug pricing violates the principle of honesty 
is that, by being unwilling to openly justify drug prices with empirical support, 
pharmaceutical companies act deceptively in a way that does seemingly intend to serve 
patients’ best interests. 
One could try to refute this criticism by noting that within free market systems, 
there seems to be no reason for companies to disclose how they determine product prices. 
This is because, as I discussed toward the beginning of chapter 2, the ideal goal of the 
market is for supply and demand to exist in equilibrium. Product prices will therefore 
partly adjust in accord with demand for that product. So for example, if the cost of a drug 
prevents patients from purchasing it, thereby causing a drop in demand, the price of the 
drug will come down to try to increase sales, thereby helping to reestablish demand. 
Whether or not this is a fair way to determine drug prices is not a question of honesty, but 
rather a question of whether or not this accords with the principle of increased access to 
essential health care goods and services.  
This refutation may work for some non-heath care commodities, but fails with 
respect to pharmaceutical drugs. To claim that it is unnecessary for pharmaceutical 
companies to show how they set drug prices because drug prices will adjust according to 
market demand is to claim that they can be valued merely as commodities. However, 
despite the fact that some patients seek and receive prescriptions for drugs they do not 
need, pharmaceutical drugs are often necessary for people to combat or prevent disease or 
illness. As such, based on my arguments for why health care goods and services are not 
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properly valued merely as commodities, this refutation fails because it attempts to 
characterize the value of pharmaceutical drugs as properly being subject to market forces.  
Pharmaceutical companies in the United States will also attempt to set drug prices 
based on the argument that pharmaceutical profits are necessary to fund future drug 
research and development.216 Yet this argument falsely equates revenue with profit. We 
can think of the difference between revenue and profit as a difference in total income 
versus excess monetary or financial gain after paying for all other operating costs. 
Revenue is necessary to fund future research and development. Excess financial gain, 
however, is not. Brody helps clarify this point by comparing the 2002 financial data of 
the top-ten performing pharmaceutical companies to that of the average Fortune 500 
company. Although all pharmaceutical companies in the Fortune 500 for that year 
reported profit increases that were higher than the average for all Fortune 500 companies, 
the top-ten performers earned profits that, on the most conservative scale, were 2.7 times 
higher than this average (equaling a total profit of $35.9 billion). What Brody shows is 
that if the top-ten pharmaceutical performers for 2002 were to maintain the same revenue 
but allocate 26% of their profits to research and development, they would still have been 
twice as profitable as the average Fortune 500 company and would have been able to 
increase their research and development funding by 32% - from $30.7 billion to $40.3 
billion.217  
                                                 
216 As Brody notes, this is a common argument given by pharmaceutical companies to justify drug prices. 
See Brody, Hooked, 86.  
217 Ibid., 86-87. Brody further notes that this increase to research and development would occur without 
decreasing any funds allocated to operating costs or marketing.  
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This argument does not necessarily justify decreasing pharmaceutical prices. It is 
possible that decreasing drug prices could result in lost revenue that would prevent a 
pharmaceutical company from meeting its operating costs while still being profitable and 
able to fund research and development. What this argument shows, however, is that it is 
pharmaceutical companies trying to justify high pharmaceutical prices on the grounds 
that future research and development exclusively relies on the industry’s profitability is 
deceptive in a way that appears to violate the principle of honesty. By keeping the 
process for how drug prices are determined secretive, the pharmaceutical industry has 
authorized itself as the primary source of information we have about how they set drug 
prices. This is tantamount to a solicitation of trust that is therefore breeched when 
pharmaceutical companies provide consumers false information about drug pricing for 
the purpose of ensuring their continue financial gains.  
B. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of 
Respect for Autonomy 
 
When pharmaceutical drugs are first introduced to the market, they provide 
patients a new treatment option that did not previously exist. So even when 
pharmaceutical drugs are too expensive for patients to afford, simply introducing them to 
the market seems to accord with respect for autonomy by adding to the overall number of 
available treatment options. Although this seems to be a plausible conclusion, it is 
incorrect for two reasons. First, when pharmaceutical drugs are too expensive for patients 
to afford, they cannot be considered bona fide treatment options because their purchase is 
impractical. Second, as I discuss in chapter 3, it is not the range of choices available that 
make a choice autonomous or not, and so it is false to claim that simply bringing a drug 
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to the market accords with respect for autonomy by increasing treatment options for those 
who can afford them.  
However, it is possible that pharmaceutical drug pricing can violate the principle 
of respect for autonomy. Pharmaceutical drug pricing violates this principle when the 
costs of pharmaceutical drugs manipulates or influences patients’ treatment choices in 
ways that do not adequately meet their health care needs. For example, when AZT was 
first introduced to the market, many HIV infected persons had to choose between either 
paying the high cost of AZT or forgo treatment. The former choice was impractical for 
many HIV infected persons because they could not afford AZT, while the latter choice 
was, perhaps except for cases in which HIV infected persons accepted the consequences 
of forgoing treatment, contrary to the aims of health care.  
C. How Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing in the United States Violates the Principle of 
Increased Access to Essential Health Care Goods and Services 
  
It is not enough to claim that because the United States has the highest per capita 
spending on pharmaceutical drugs than any other OECD nation, and that because the 
United States accounts for nearly half of global pharmaceutical sales, that drug pricing in 
the United States therefore violates the principle of increased access to essential health 
care goods and services. This is because, as I argue in chapter 2, violations of this 
principle occur in health care markets when individuals are prevented from attaining 
access to health care goods or services necessary to effectively treat their medical needs. 
Assuming patients in the United States are able and willing to pay the out-of-pocket 
expenses for needed pharmaceutical drugs, no violation of this principle seems to occur. 
When, however, the cost of needed pharmaceutical drugs is more than what patients can 
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afford out-of-pocket, and they are thusly forced to forgo drug treatment as a result, we 
can conclude that in those particular cases drug pricing has violated the principle of 
increased access to essential health care goods and services. For example, when AZT was 
first introduced to the market, it was the only drug available to help treat HIV, but cost 
too much for many HIV infected persons to afford. In this case the pricing of AZT 
violated the principle of increased access because, while some HIV infected persons were 
likely able and willing to pay for the drug, the cost prevented many others from having 
access to the drug. There are, though, two possible refutations to this argument.  
One refutation is that the pharmaceutical industry relies on the willingness of the 
United States to pay top dollar for pharmaceutical drugs to maintain funding for research 
and development of new drugs. The inference is that as the industry develops more 
market-ready drugs for particular conditions, the cost of drugs for those conditions will 
drop as a matter of competition, thereby helping to increase rather than prohibit 
affordable access to drug treatment. Moreover, as Burroughs Wellcome claimed 
regarding the initial market price of AZT, a drug’s price partly aims to recover the 
company’s investment costs before generic versions of that drug cut into the market 
share. Regarding this latter point, even if the costs of an essential drug initially prevent 
some persons from having access to it, presumably cheaper versions of that drug will 
soon be available, thereby ultimately increasing access to needed drug treatment.  
 A second possible refutation is that because the United States allows 
pharmaceutical companies to operate under its free market system, drug prices are set via 
market mechanisms. As a result, the price of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States 
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should account for the demand for those drugs. This idea reflects the other reason given 
for the cost of AZT. In addition to their concern about generic versions of AZT cutting 
into their profits, Burroughs Wellcome was also concerned that new AIDS and HIV drug 
research would soon make AZT obsolete, cutting demand for the drug. Further justifying 
this point is the fact that the price of AZT has dropped since it was first introduced to the 
market. Data from the World Bank shows that less than decade after AZT was introduced 
to the market, the yearly cost of AZT fell to $2,738 (approximately $288 per month).218 
So drug pricing in the United States should never actually prevent access to needed drugs 
as their prices are partly determined by demand, and should reflect what patients are 
willing to pay for those drugs. Still, while these two refutations seem to debunk the 
notion that pharmaceutical drug pricing in the United States sometimes violates the 
principle of increased access to essential health care goods and services, there are several 
reasons why we ought to reject them.  
First, as we have already seen, there is no necessary connection between the 
industry’s profitability and the funding for research and development of new drugs. So it 
is possible that decreasing costs for needed drugs as a means of increasing access to them 
for those who cannot afford their costs could result in lost profits, but not necessarily 
resulting in cuts to funding for future research and development.  
Second, the concern that companies must set drug prices to help them recover 
their investment costs before other “me-too” drugs cut into the market share is 
unsubstantiated. This is for two reasons. First, as I already noted from Delaney, there is 
                                                 
218 Floyd, and Gilks, “Costs and Financing Aspects of Providing Anti-Retroviral Therapy: A Background 
Paper,” Table 1. 
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no clearly agreed to way for determining a company’s actual investment costs for 
introducing a new drug to the market. Second, there is no way to determine the actual 
effect of “me-too” drugs on the market. For example, in the three and half years from 
March, 1987 – when the FDA first approved AZT for market sale – until December 1990, 
there were only two other anti-HIV drugs approved by the FDA: Dideoxyinosine and 
Retrovir. Dideoxyinosine is a milder form of AZT and is for patients who cannot tolerate 
the latter, while Retrovir is a syrup form of AZT. Both were approved on the same day, 
September 28th, 1989, and were developed by Burroughs Wellcome. So not only was 
Burroughs Wellcome wrong about the “me-too” drug effect on their profits from AZT, 
through the production of Dideoxyinosine and Retrovir they were able to increase their 
market share of anti-HIV drug treatments.219 
Third, as we see with both the current patent system and the government 
regulations banning drug re-sale, the United States protects the financial interests of 
pharmaceutical companies. This has two major effects on drug pricing in the United 
States. Again it allows pharmaceutical companies to earn exclusive profits on patented 
materials for a substantial period of time. Second, it slows the process of cheaper, generic 
drugs from being introduced to the market. Both points seemingly counter the idea that 
pharmaceutical companies must set higher drug prices to reflect potential market 
overcrowding.  
Fourth, setting and adjusting drug prices according to market mechanisms can be 
inappropriate for patients needing drug treatment. This is for two reasons. Again, this 
                                                 
219 United States Department of Health and Human Services, and the United States Food and Drug 
Administration, “HIV/AIDS Historical Timeline 1981-1990.” 
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practice inaccurately assumes that pharmaceutical drugs can be properly valued merely as 
commodities, while failing to account for the non-commodifiable value(s) drug treatment 
has in helping persons regain or sustain their health. Second, setting and adjusting 
pharmaceutical drug prices according to market mechanisms can be too slow for patients 
needing those drugs. This is because the process requires gathering market data and 
analyzing the correlations between prices, demand, and profits. So even if a drug’s price 
affects demand for that drug, adjusting the price accordingly will only occur after a 
pharmaceutical company knows the effect this has on its profits. The problem is that this 
can be a timely process that does account for patients who may initially be denied access 
to a drug treatment because of its cost.  
4. Conclusion and Suggestions for Reforming the Pharmaceutical Industry in the 
United States 
 
Throughout this chapter I have shown many ways that the pharmaceutical 
industry in the United States violates what I argue are the base ethical limits of health 
care markets. From these arguments, it appears that in order to ethically treat 
pharmaceutical drugs as commodities, the pharmaceutical industry in the United States 
requires reform. I conclude this chapter by offering six suggestions that the 
pharmaceutical industry should adopt to help resolve the ways it violates these limits 
regarding its interactions with physicians, its use of DTCA, and drug pricing.  
Suggesting reforms that the pharmaceutical industry ought to adopt is not the only 
means to help the industry comply with these ethical limits of health care markets. 
Arguing for government enforced regulatory reforms is also a fairly common strategy for 
those who criticize the current status quo of the pharmaceutical industry in the United 
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States. The primary reason I employ the former over the latter strategy is because I wish 
to place the onus of responsibility and accountability on the pharmaceutical industry for 
its own actions in violating these ethical limits of health care markets.  
- Suggestion #1: Ban all industry-sponsored gift giving and financial 
support to health care professionals and medical institutions.  
 
Effective as of January 1st, 2009, PhRMA’s updated Code on Interactions with 
Health Care Professionals is a semi-detailed guide that attempts to address the frequent 
criticisms directed at the industry’s interactions with physicians. It appears to be a step in 
the right direction by banning what PhRMA sees as either extravagant or non-essential 
forms of compensation to all health care professionals or medical institutions. Still, the 
Code permits pharmaceutical companies to provide physicians and medical students with 
gifts that they consider educational for either patients or health care professionals, such as 
medical textbooks or subscriptions to scientific journals.220 The Code also allows 
pharmaceutical companies to help fund educational events so long as they do not direct 
how those funds are used and do not promote the events for their own financial gain.221  
However even this level of industry-sponsored gift giving and financial support 
for health care professionals and medical institutions can be ethically problematic. This is 
because any gift or financial support from a pharmaceutical company, regardless of 
whether or not the industry considers it modest or fair, still leaves open the possibility 
that health care professionals or medical institutions, via the rule for reciprocation, may 
feel obliged to speak or act favorably on behalf of that company in ways that do not serve 
                                                 
220 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Code on Interactions with Health Care 
Professionals, 19. 
221 Ibid., 28.  
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the best interests of patients. A total ban on industry-sponsored gift giving or financial 
support to physicians or medical institutions may therefore be necessary to avoid the 
potential ways this can violate the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. 
- Suggestion #2: Ensure the promotion of all industry-sponsored research 
complies with professional standards. 
 
The main problem with industry-sponsored research comes from the intentional 
bias that is often present in the promotion of that research. Paying physicians to publish 
articles or textbooks that advertise or unfairly favor particular drugs over others, 
suppressing contradictory research data, or disguising the source of funding for a research 
program are all ways that industry-sponsored research violates the principles of honesty 
and respect for autonomy. To avoid this, pharmaceutical companies ought to comply with 
professional standards for promoting research. For example: authors should not be paid 
simply to attach their names to ghostwritten articles, all research data that can affect a 
health care professional’s understanding of the effectiveness and side-effects of a drug 
ought to be completely and clearly presented, and all published research ought to fully 
and clearly disclose the primary sources of financial funding for a research program.  
- Suggestion #3: Discontinue employing pharmaceutical representatives to 
provide drug presentations. 
 
Whether or not we should consider pharmaceutical representatives “educators” or 
public relation officers, they can unduly influence a physician’s prescribing practices in 
ways that violate the principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. Yet the industry 
maintains that pharmaceutical representatives help inform health care professionals about 
new pharmaceutical products. However it is possible to educate and promote new 
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pharmaceutical products to health care professionals without using pharmaceutical 
representatives. A pharmaceutical company could, for example, create and send a 
promotional video and supplemental information sheet to medical offices and hospitals 
that health care professionals could watch during their lunch breaks. This would result in 
at least two foreseeable benefits. First, physicians could still avoid having to spend time 
researching new pharmaceutical products while still getting the same type of information 
they could get from a pharmaceutical representative. Second, a promotional video would 
presumably be checked for accuracy prior to mass distribution, and so could help 
minimize possibly communicating any inaccurate or false information.  
There is at least one problem with this suggestion. The industry uses 
pharmaceutical representatives because they are successful at helping increase 
pharmaceutical sales. Using some other means, like videos, to educate health care 
professionals may not be as successful. So discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical 
representatives could decrease pharmaceutical sales, while potentially driving up the cost 
of pharmaceutical drugs. However, there really is no way to know for certain how 
pharmaceutical sales would be affected by discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical 
representatives. For example, we know that physicians often feel inclined to write 
prescriptions for drugs that patients’ request while believing the prescription is 
unnecessary. So it is possible that, because of consumer demand, pharmaceutical sales 
would not diminish at all. Yet even if pharmaceutical sales were to diminish as a result of 
discontinuing the use of pharmaceutical representatives, this would not necessarily drive 
up the costs of pharmaceutical drugs. A decline in pharmaceutical sales would result in 
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lost profits. But, as we have seen, the concern over lost profits does not by itself justify 
increasing drug costs.  
- Suggestion #4: Require all DTCA to provide sources of objective 
information about the advertised diseases or conditions, the risks and 
benefits of the advertised drugs, proven alternate therapies to advertised 
diseases or conditions, while refraining from directing individuals seek 
this information from health care professionals.  
 
Effective as of March 2nd, 2009, the updated PhRMA Guiding Principles: Direct 
to Consumer Advertisements About Prescription Medicines outlines the information 
pharmaceutical companies ought to include in DTCA.222 The Guiding Principles 
maintain the industry’s stance that DTCA aids public health by providing accurate and 
balanced information about diseases and different therapeutic options.223 Furthermore, 
the Guiding Principles urge pharmaceutical companies to work with the FDA, health care 
professionals, and patients to obtain feedback about the content of a DTCA and, when 
changes need to be made to a specific piece of DTCA, either alter or discontinue it. 
Assuming pharmaceutical companies follow these recommendations, it seems likely that 
DTCA could avoid some of the problems that cause it to be unethically deceitful, while 
helping patients and health care professionals make better informed, and thus more 
autonomous, treatment decisions.  
However, despite the information the Guiding Principles state DTCA ought to 
include, they actually exacerbate one of the more serious ethical problems with DTCA. A 
common theme in all pharmaceutical DTCA – and one that is encouraged in the Guiding 
Principles – is that individuals wanting information about the advertised drug should 
                                                 
222 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA Guiding Principles: Direct to 
Consumer Advertisements About Prescription Medicines. See Appendix 2. 
223 Ibid., 3-4.  
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consult with health care professionals (namely physicians). Yet, as we have seen, when 
individuals seek information about advertised drugs from physicians, this can increase 
medical paternalism, thereby weakening patient autonomy in ways that can violate the 
principle of respect for autonomy.  
One may counter that in addition to health care professionals, the Guiding 
Principles also encourage DTCA to include the website and toll-free phone number for 
the FDA’s MedWatch, and for DTCA to direct individuals to print advertisements and 
websites where they can find additional risk-benefit information about the specific drug 
in question. The problem with FDA’s MedWatch is that it is only for obtaining safety 
information and medical reporting of safety concerns. It does not provide individuals 
with detailed information about pharmaceutical drugs.  
Directing individuals to print advertisements and drug websites are also 
problematic. Print advertisements are often placed in specialized magazines that require 
subscriptions and whose audience tends to be affluent (e.g., Golf Digest). So directing 
individuals to print advertisements limits who will see that information to those who 
pharmaceutical companies believe will likely purchase the advertised drug. Drug 
websites are typically created by the drug manufacturer and so frequently conceal factual 
claims amid biased marketing messages. Moreover, both print advertisements and drug 
websites will claim that persons wanting more information should consult with health 
care professionals. 
Those who want an advertised drug as a result of DTCA will still have to consult 
a physician prior to getting a prescription for it. Physicians, having a professional 
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obligation to act in patients’ best interests, should help determine the appropriateness of 
patient requests for advertised drugs. So the purpose of this suggestion is not to remove 
health care professionals from being a source of information for patients who request 
advertised drugs. Instead the purpose of this suggestion to prevent health care 
professionals from being the one’s who are primarily responsible for providing drug 
information to patients, and place that responsibility directly on drug manufactures. 
- Suggestion 5: Create an agreed upon, empirically based industry standard 
for determining drug prices that is easily open to public scrutiny.  
 
Pharmaceutical companies operating in the United States should retain some right 
to price drugs in accord with free market principles. However, as we have seen, the 
argument that drug prices must reflect the costs of development is deceiving because 
there is no way to account for all such costs. Creating an agreed to industry standard for 
determining drug prices that is empirically based and open to public scrutiny would 
remove questions about how drug prices are set with respect to the development costs for 
those drugs, while still allowing pharmaceutical companies to price drugs according to 
what patients are willing to pay. 
- Suggestion 6: Assume responsibility for when free market pricing limits or 
prevents access to needed drug treatment, and work toward developing 
industry-orientated solutions for increasing access to needed drug 
treatment.  
 
Using the market to set drug prices can limit or prevent patients from accessing 
needed drug treatment in ways that violate the principles of respect for autonomy and 
increased access to essential health care goods and services. However, because the 
industry believes that drug prices are justified to recoup drug development costs and help 
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fund new drugs, the industry-wide attitude is that improving access to drug treatment 
requires improving access to affordable health care coverage, and not to lower the cost of 
pharmaceutical drugs per se. PhRMA, for example, has issued a platform urging health 
care coverage for all United States citizens through private insurers.224 PhRMA has also 
founded the Partnership for Prescription Assistance – a cooperative between PhRMA, 
health care providers, and patient advocacy and community organizations that helps low-
income patients search for public and private programs to subsidize some or all of their 
drug treatment costs.  
Not many people will deny that trying to improve access to affordable health care 
coverage is a good thing. Still it is frustrating that the industry presses for affordable 
health care coverage as the solution to some patients being prohibited from access to 
needed drug treatment because of its cost. This is for two reasons. First, the industry’s 
drug pricing policies is a primary reason why some patients in the United States lack 
affordable access to needed drug treatment. Second, this solution shifts the focus of 
responsibility for providing affordable access to drug treatment from the pharmaceutical 
industry to patients and policy-makers. What this suggestion implies, therefore, is that 
because the industry is the primary party responsible for producing and pricing 
pharmaceutical drugs, it ought to adjust its own pricing policies to ensure that all persons 
can have appropriate access to needed drug treatment.  
Next I apply my argument to a hypothetical legal organ market in the United 
States. Since the United States currently does not have a legal organ market, this analysis 
faces the challenge of being without the kind of empirical data I examined in this chapter.  
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Chapter Five:  Is An Ethical Organ Market Possible? 
In this chapter I apply my argument for ethically treating health care goods and 
services as commodities to a hypothetical legal organ market in the United States. There 
are two primary reasons why I address this market. First, as I discuss in “Overcoming the 
Organ Shortage,” organ donation has been consistently failing to meet the demand for 
transplant organs in the United States.225 This continues to be the case. Recent data from 
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) shows that the current 
number of people in the United States on organ transplant waiting lists is approximately 
105,000, while the total number of transplants performed from January to November 
2009 is 26,082; 20,139 from deceased donors, 5,943 from living donors.226 Furthermore, 
from 1995-2009, 97,235 persons died while waiting for transplant organs (6,344 in 
2009).227 A legal organ market would theoretically assuage this problem by providing 
those needing transplant organs with an additional means to procure them.  
 Second, the practice of organ selling is morally controversial and is illegal in the 
United States.228 On one hand, some, like James Taylor, argue that respect for personal 
                                                 
225 Harter, “Overcoming the Organ Shortage,” 155-156.  
226 OPTN Transplants by Donor Type Database, http://www.optn.transplants.hrsa.gov/lastestData/ 
(accessed February 15, 2010). The reason I estimate the current number of people on transplant 
waiting lists is because OPTN constantly updates their transplant data information.  
227 OPTN Waitlist Removals: Removal Year by Removal Reason Database, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp (accessed February 15, 2010). It is perhaps also 
important to note that this particular statistic only includes those who were medically suitable and well 
enough to receive an organ transplant, and who had not refused to receive an organ transplant. 
Although OPTN does not record the cause of death for these persons, it is implied that these persons 
died as a result of not receiving a transplant organ.  
228 Specifically, Title III, section 301(a), of the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits acts 
affecting interstate commerce involving the acquisition or transfer of human organs for “valuable 
consideration” for transplantation, and is punishable by up to 5 years in prison and a $50,000 fine. Title 
III, section 301(a) further claims that “interstate commerce” has the same meaning as in section 201(b) 
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, in which “interstate commerce” is commerce that occurs 
between any state or territory. Using the term “interstate commerce” in this context is interesting for 
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autonomy and concern for human well-being support the view that organ selling is moral 
and should be legal.229 On the other hand there appears to be, as Cherry notes, a global 
consensus regarding public policies that transplant organs should be treated as gifts, not 
commodities, and that they ought to be viewed as public-interest resources, not as goods 
for private profit or gain.230  
My aim in this chapter is to analyze five practical concerns that would likely 
accompany the establishment of a legal organ market to see the extent to which this kind 
of market may violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care 
markets. However, as I previously noted, I do not intend to argue about the morality of a 
hypothetical legal organ market. This is because we can still imagine a legal organ 
market existing even if it is immoral – much in the same way that there continues to be a 
substantial market in pornography despite a variety of arguments for why it is immoral. 
Moreover, my arguments in this chapter only focus on a legal organ market in which 
“would-be sellers” are living persons, and in which the organs removed could be taken 
without killing the seller. My reason for this is so that I can narrow the arguments in this 
chapter to would-be sellers who are the decision makers regarding their willingness to 
sell an organ, and who are the primary beneficiaries of the sale, without having to also 
consider the role of surrogates or alternative beneficiaries (such as family members). The 
                                                                                                                                                 
two reasons. First, the wording implies that the intent of prohibiting organ sales is to prevent the 
creation of large-scale organ markets. Second, organ sales that do not affect interstate commerce are 
presumably permitted. However as Taylor notes regarding this second point, “interstate commerce” 
has, “very broad construal after the United States Supreme Court ruling in the 1942 case Wickard v. 
Filburn (317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82) that a farmer growing wheat on his own land for use by his own 
family was affecting interstate commerce” (Taylor, States and Kidneys, 26, n.45).  
See; United States Congress, National Organ Transplant Act, 98th Congress, 1st session, October 19, 1984 
42 USC 274e, http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL98-507.pdf (accessed October 24, 2009).  
229 Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 201.  
230 Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner, 4. 
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five concerns I analyze in this chapter are: 1) that would-be sellers may lie about their 
health status to avoid jeopardizing an organ sale, 2) that a legal organ market would pose 
a health-risk to sellers, 3) that economically desperate sellers are only willing to sell their 
organs because of their economic desperation, 4) that economically desperate sellers may 
not receive a fair price for their organs, and 5) that a legal organ market would decrease 
organ donation rates. I conclude that while the occurrence of these concerns would make 
a legal organ market unethical, it is questionable whether or not the United States should 
continue to ban organ sales.  
I now turn to analyze each of these concerns to assess the ethics of a legal organ 
market in the United States.  
1. Lying to Secure an Organ Sale 
 One concern of a legal organ market is that the promise of profit could tempt 
some would-be sellers whose organs are of questionable health, to lie about their health 
status to avoid jeopardizing the sale. This concern is based on a point by Titmuss in The 
Gift Relationship, in which he argues that voluntary donation is superior to markets for 
procuring transfusable blood.231 As Titmuss notes, tainted or diseased transfusable blood 
can be lethal to the recipient and so requires those giving blood to provide truthful health 
and social histories. He further argues that markets for procuring transfusable blood have 
much higher rates than voluntary donation systems of persons with potentially tainted or 
                                                 
231 Although Titmuss focuses his arguments on the transfusable blood, he clearly sees a link between the 
commodification of transfusable blood and the commodification of transplant organs. According to 
Titmuss, “If blood [as a living tissue] is considered in theory, in law and is treated in practice as a 
trading commodity, then ultimately human hearts, kidneys, eyes, and other organs of the body may 
also come to be treated as commodities to be bought and sold in the marketplace.” See; Titmuss, The 
Gift Relationship, 219. 
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diseased blood attempting to deceptively mask their poor health. Titmuss concludes that 
markets in transfusable blood are less desirable than voluntary blood donation because 
the former fails to maximize the conditions that encourage persons to be honest about 
their health and social histories.232 
 Tainted or diseased transplant organs can severely damage the health of the 
recipient. It is also possible that tainted or diseased transplant organs may go undetected 
by those who assess the quality of the organ(s) or those who perform the transplant 
operation(s). For example, a recent article in The Journal of the American Medical 
Association detailed how Viral Encephalitis – a disease causing inflammation of the brain 
– was transmitted from a single, deceased donor to four transplant patients, eventually 
causing their deaths. The diseased organs were the result of the donor being bitten by a 
rabid bat (which was later determined to have caused the donor’s death, but was initially 
misdiagnosed).233 What this shows is that despite the apparent health of transplant organs, 
tainted or diseased organs can go undetected, and so it is crucial to the health of would-be 
organ buyers that would-be sellers be as honest as possible about their health.  
Another aspect of this concern – one that I discuss in more detail later in the 
chapter – is the presumption that individuals willing to sell their organs are likely to be 
economically impoverished. Within the United States, empirical data demonstrates a 
correlation between one’s economic status and one’s health. According to a recent report 
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, in conjunction with the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Center for Health Statistics, 
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those who are economically impoverished suffer worse physical health compared to those 
who are not economically impoverished.234 For example, those who live in poverty are 
more limited in their physical activity as a result of chronic health conditions, and less 
often engage in leisurely physical activity (the latter being a factor typically considered to 
promote good physical health).235 Those who live in poverty also suffer from 
hypertension and elevated blood levels more often than those who do not live in 
poverty.236 Young children between the ages of 19-35 months who live in impoverished 
homes are also not vaccinated from standard diseases as often as young children who do 
not live in impoverished homes, making the former more susceptible to conditions that 
can negatively impact their health as they age.237   
A. How Might lying to secure an Organ Sale Violate the Ethical Limits of Health Care 
Markets? 
  
                                                 
234 As noted in the report, “poverty” is not an absolute term. “Poverty” refers to household income 
thresholds that are annually updated by the United States Census Bureau to reflect the current 
Consumer Price Index for urban consumers, in relation to the size and composition of the household. 
“For example, the average poverty threshold for a family of four was $20,614 in 2006, $17,603 in 
2000, and $13,359 in 1990.” See; United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United 
States, 2008, 562-563. Quote on 562. 
235 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
and the National Center for Health Statistics, “Table 58: Limitation of activity caused by chronic 
conditions, by selected characteristics: United States, selected years 1997-2006;” and United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the 
National Center for Health Statistics, “Table 74: Leisure-time physical activity among adults 18 years 
of age and over, by selected characteristics: United States, 1998, 2005, and 2006.” 
236 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
and the National Center for Health Statistics, “Table 71: Hypertension and elevated blood pressure 
among persons 20 years of age and over by selected characteristics: United States, 1988-1994, 1999-
2002, and 2003-2006;” and United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Center for Health Statistics, “Table 72: Serum total 
cholesterol levels among persons 20 years of age and over, by sex, race, and Hispanic origin, and 
poverty level: United States, selected years 1960-1962 through 2003-2006.” 
237 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
and the National Center for Health Statistics, “Table 85: Vaccination coverage among children 19-35 
months of age for selected diseases, by race, Hispanic origin, poverty level, and location of residence 
in metropolitan statistical area (MSA): United States, selected years 1995-2006.” 
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There are two ways in which would-be organ sellers lying about their health 
status to secure an organ sale could result in a legal organ market violating what I argue 
should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. First, lying to secure an organ 
sale may violate the principle of respect for autonomy, particularly toward would-be 
organ buyers. This is because the ability of would-be organ buyers to autonomously 
choose whether or not to engage in an organ sale would partly depend on the extent, and 
their understanding, of the information they have about the health of the organ(s) they 
receive. So, if we assume that would-be organ buyers had to solely rely on the 
truthfulness of would-be sellers who lie about their health status, would-be buyers would 
therefore be prevented from having access to information that would have a foreseeable 
impact on their choice to continue with the sale.  
Second, lying to secure an organ sale may also violate the principle of honesty. 
There are two ways in which this violation might occur based on my argument for why 
the principle of honesty should be considered an ethical limit of health care markets. 
First, would-be organ sellers who lie about their health status to secure an organ sale pass 
along false information that could result in would-be buyers making decisions about the 
organ sale, and subsequent transplant operation, that either fail to be in their best interest 
(presuming they are trying to procure the best quality organ possible), or could 
potentially increase the risk of harm to them in ways they did not initially understand or 
agree to. Presumably, because the health of would-be buyers relies on the information 
they get from would-be sellers, they have a right to expect would-be sellers provide 
honest disclosures about their health status. 
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Another way that would-be organ sellers lying to secure an organ sale could 
violate the principle of honesty is by having a foreseeable negative impact on the 
functionality of the organ market. As I argue in chapter 3, honesty is a necessary 
component for markets to function efficaciously and efficiently. When organ sellers try to 
lie about their health status, the organ market, which is already considered to be morally 
contentious, becomes more susceptible to a tarnished reputation for involving dishonesty 
and deception. This idea, coupled with the health risks to persons who receive unhealthy 
transplant organs, could ultimately cause potential would-be buyers to forgo using an 
organ market as a means to procure transplant organs.  
Whether or not would-be organ sellers lying about their health status to secure an 
organ sale would violate the principle of increased access to essential health care goods 
and services depends on both the effect lying about one’s health status may have on 
market demand for transplant organs, and the market response to a potential change in 
demand. If, on one hand, lying to secure an organ sale resulted in fewer persons willing 
to purchase transplant organs, and the market failed to respond, thereby ultimately 
decreasing the profitability of the market, then lying to secure an organ sale could be 
thought of as violating the principle of increased access, since this would presumably 
decrease access rather than be a viable means of helping increase access to transplant 
organs. On the other hand, if the market were to avoid any potential loss in demand 
resulting from would-be sellers lying about their health status due to a drop in the cost of 
transplant organs (which may also have the effect of helping to increase demand), then, 
so long as the market were able to maintain profitability, lying to secure an organ sale 
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would not violate this principle, since the market would still be effectively functioning to 
increase access to transplant organs.  
Despite these potential ways in which would-be sellers lying about their health 
status to secure an organ sale could violate the principles I have argued for, I am skeptical 
about the degree to which this would be a concern of legal organ markets. This concern 
seems more applicable to black markets in transplant organs, in which there are no laws 
or regulations to either help ensure the quality of transplant organs or to prevent lying 
about one’s health from becoming a pervasive problem. Yet the essence of a legal organ 
market is the idea that the market would be regulated to try to prevent concerns such as 
lying to secure an organ sale from becoming a pervasive problem, and to prevent would-
be buyers from purchasing unhealthy transplant organs. This is not to say that lying to 
secure an organ sale would never occur within a legal organ market. However, as I 
discussed in chapter 3, even though lying occurs in regulated markets, the overall culture 
of markets – at least those within the United States – remain committed to the view that 
lying is generally unethical and ought to be repudiated.  
2. A Legal Organ Market Poses a Health-risk to Would-be Organ Sellers 
Another concern of a legal organ market is that it would pose a health-risk to 
organ sellers. This concern primarily stems from the debate over whether or not kidney 
sales constitute an immoral form of dangerous employment. In Stakes and Kidneys, 
Taylor, who argues for the moral permissibility of regulated markets in human organs, 
extensively addresses both the anti-market and pro-market sides of this debate. On one 
hand, some argue that kidney sales exhibit unique characteristics that make them morally 
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distinct (and thus immoral) from other kinds of (morally permissible) dangerous 
employment, like firefighting or military service. On the other hand, some argue that 
kidney sales are not morally distinct from other kinds of dangerous employment, and that 
a commitment to respect for autonomy justifies allowing persons to sell their kidneys in a 
regulated kidney market (some take this view even farther by arguing that a commitment 
to respect for autonomy also justifies unregulated kidney sales). Since I do not aim to 
discuss the morality of a legal organ market, further elaborating on the particular points 
of this debate is unnecessary. It is important to note, though, that Taylor does not attempt 
to defend regulated kidney sales by trying to refute claims that they are dangerous to the 
health would-be sellers. Instead, Taylor tries to show how kidney sales are of comparable 
danger to other kinds of morally permissible dangerous employment.238 
Presuming a legal organ market would be regulated to try to minimize known 
health-risks to both sellers and buyers, a legal organ market would pose a similar level of 
health-risk to sellers as organ donation does to living donors. Particularly with respect to 
kidneys, there does not appear to be any correlating long-term health risks for persons 
with one functioning kidney compared to persons with two functioning kidneys. For 
example, Taylor argues that there is no difference in long-term mortality rates as a result 
of having one functioning kidney as opposed to having two functioning kidneys.239 
Moreover, while kidney functioning typically declines with age, this age-related decline 
is consistent between persons with one functioning kidney and those with two 
functioning kidneys (although a small population of kidney donors (56 of more than 
                                                 
238 Taylor, “Kidney Sales and Dangerous Employment,” in Stakes and Kidneys, 117-143.  
239 Ibid., 126. 
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50,000) ultimately require transplants themselves).240 However, there are several short-
term health risks to living organ donors of all types. These include: a morality rate of 
approximately .03 percent (similar to most operations involving general anesthesia); 
bleeding during or after the operation; and potential for post-operative infection.241 
Although these potential health-risks of organ transplantation are similar to the risks that 
accompany other kinds of medical operations, my concern is not a question of the degree 
of severity these risk pose for would-be organ sellers, but what the existence of these 
kinds of health-risks may mean for a legal organ market to operate with respect to what I 
argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets.  
A. Would the Health-risks to Would-be Organ Sellers Violate the Ethical Limits of Health 
Care Markets? 
  
 Whether or not the health-risks to would-be organ sellers would violate the 
principles I have argued for depends on the information given to would-be sellers about 
those risks, and how well they understand that information. There are two cases I 
consider here: a) would-be organ sellers who are not given information about the known 
health-risks of organ transplantation, and b) would-be organ sellers who are informed of 
the known health-risks of organ transplantation but are not provided the means to help 
them understand this information.242 
                                                 
240 Ingelfinger, “Risks and Benefits to the Living Donor,” 448.  
241 Ibid. Taylor further shows how the .03 mortality rate associated with organ donation is actually less than 
other kinds of morally permissible dangerous employment such as: being a commercial fisherman or 
merchant seaman (.103 and .05 respectively), or scaffolding, steel erecting, and roofing (.02, .04, and 
.02 respectively) (The latter category, Taylor claims, is work that is considered undesirable, and so in 
that respect is analogous to selling one’s kidney). See; Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 126-127. 
242 There is a potential third case we may need to consider in future analysis of this topic: would-be organ 
sellers who are informed about and understand the health-risks of organ transplantation. In this case, 
because would-be sellers are informed of and understand the health-risks of organ transplantation, 
there is no apparent violation of what I argue are the base ethical limits of health care markets. What is 
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a. Failure to Inform Would-be Sellers of Known Health-risks of Organ 
Transplantation 
 
If would-be sellers within a legal organ market were not informed of the known 
risks associated with organ transplantation, then the market would violate both the 
principles of honesty and respect for autonomy. Failure to inform would-be sellers of the 
known health-risks associated with organ transplantation would violate the principle of 
honesty for two reasons. First, failure to provide information to those undergoing a 
medical operation about the known risks of that operation deprives them of information 
they have a legitimate right to know as the individuals being operated on by those whom 
they have entrusted to perform the operation. Second, from how I argue for honesty as an 
ethical limit of health care markets, the failure to provide would-be sellers information 
about the health-risks associated with organ transplantation may also violate the principle 
of honesty because of the potential harm that could befall would-sellers if those risks 
were to occur. This is because even though they are the seller of a health care good, they 
are also patients during the operation who entrust those performing the operation with 
their well being. 
                                                                                                                                                 
unique about this case, and why I say it is one that we may need to consider further, is that not having a 
legal organ market seemingly violates the principle of respect for autonomy because would-be sellers 
who know of and understand the risks of organ transplantation would therefore paternalistically be 
prevented from selling their organs. The reason I do not fully discuss this case here is because it is still 
unclear to me whether or not the absence of a legal organ market that has provisions to inform and help 
persons understand the health-risks of organ transplantation would violate the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Simply having and understanding the health-risks of organ transplantation does not by itself 
guarantee persons who sell their organs are therefore acting autonomously. For example, I may fully 
understand the risks of organ transplantation, but am otherwise coerced to sell my organs. In such a 
case, my understanding of the health-risks of organ transplantation is not sufficient to claim I am 
thusly acting autonomously because I am selling my organs against my will. However, if would-be 
sellers are un-coerced, informed of the health-risks of organ transplantation, and have the means 
available to help them understand that information, yet are still prevented from being allowed to sell 
their organs via a legal organ market, then the absence of a legal organ market would likely constitute 
a violation of respect for autonomy. 
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 Failing to provide would-be sellers information about the known health-risks of 
organ transplantation would also violate the principle of respect for autonomy. In chapter 
3 I argue how respect for autonomy requires persons to have appropriate access and 
understanding of information regarding the purchase of health care goods and services. 
Although I discuss this limit with respect to the purchase and not the sale of health care 
goods or services because, in the case of a legal organ market, sellers are also undergoing 
a medical procedure (and are thus also under the care of those performing the transplant), 
it is appropriate to include would-be sellers under the scope of this limit. If would-be 
organ sellers are not given information about the health-risks associated with organ 
transplantation, then the sale does not accord with the principle of respect for autonomy 
because would-be organ sellers would be missing information that could significantly 
impact their willingness to continue with the organ sale.  
 It is also possible that failing to inform would-be sellers about the known health-
risks associated with organ transplantation could violate the principles of increased 
access to essential health care goods and services. This would be the case if, as a result of 
consistently failing to inform would-be sellers about the known health-risks of organ 
transplantation, fewer persons were willing to sell their organs, which then led to an 
overall decline in the numbers of organs being sold. However, if persons were to still 
willing to sell their organs despite not being fully informed about the health-risks of 
organ transplantation, and the market was able to meet the demand for transplant organs, 
then a legal organ market would not seem to violate this principle.  
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b. Informed but Lack Aid for Understanding 
From how I argue that honesty is an ethical limit of health care markets, merely 
providing honest information to would-be organ sellers about the potential health-risks of 
organ transplantation is sufficient to meet this principle. This does not mean, though, that 
by informing would-be sellers of the risks of organ transplantation, a legal organ market 
therefore absolutely avoids violating the principle of honesty. It is certainly possible that, 
even though a legal organ market may be within the limit of honesty regarding the 
information provided to would-be sellers about the health-risks of organ transplantation, a 
legal organ market could still violate the limit of honesty because of some other feature 
present in the market such as not having provisions to help curb the potential for would-
be sellers to lie about their health status, that ultimately would allow would-be buyers or 
sellers to deceive one another about information relevant to the sale of the transplant 
organ. 
If, however, would-be organ sellers were informed of the known health-risks of 
organ transplantation but were not provided additional means to help them understand 
this information, a legal organ market would violate the principle of respect for 
autonomy. As I noted in chapter 3, one’s ability to properly exercise his or her autonomy 
does not just depend the information one has about the choice-at-hand, but also on one’s 
ability to understand and incorporate that information into one’s decision-making 
process. A legal organ market that did not provide the means to help would-be organ 
sellers understand the health-risks of organ transplantation, or one that allowed persons to 
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sell their organs when they have not considered this information, would fail to actualize 
this necessary element for would-be sellers to act autonomously. 
3. Economic Desperation as the Motive for Selling an Organ 
 A third concern about the creation of a legal organ market is that economically 
desperate sellers would only be willing to sell their organs because of their economic 
desperation. This concern stems from the moral debate over whether or not economic 
desperation coerces persons to sell their organs. It is typically agreed that coercion is 
immoral in most cases because of how it is considered to unfairly usurp one’s autonomy. 
On one hand, those opposed to organ selling commonly argue that, all things considered, 
organ sellers who are economically desperate are willing to sell their organs only because 
they are trying to assuage the bad effects of their economic desperation, but otherwise 
genuinely oppose selling their organs. Often they conclude that because would-be organ 
sellers do not really want to sell their organs, economic desperation is therefore coercive 
as the primary motivator of the sale.243 Taylor, on the hand, argues in Stakes and Kidneys 
that economic desperation cannot coerce individuals to sell their organs because it is not 
an intentionally acting agent capable of controlling the actions of others. He concludes 
that because economic desperation is not coercive, those who are motivated to sell their 
organs because of their economic desperation still act autonomously.244 
 Since my analysis is on a hypothetical organ market, there is no empirical data 
within the United States showing how far reaching this concern might be. Yet we can 
                                                 
243 See for example; Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner, 5-6 and 92; DeJong, et. al., “Options for Increasing 
Organ Donation,” 468; Duxbury, “Do Markets Degrade?,” 345; Harter, Overcoming the Organ 
Shortage, 160; Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 33 and 51-52; and Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, 307-
308. 
244 Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 58-61. Also see; Harter, “Overcoming the Organ Shortage,” 161. 
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glimpse the probable socioeconomic breakdown of would-be organ sellers by examining 
statistical data from Iran. In 1988, Iran developed a government-funded, government–
regulated, and government–compensated program for paying living unrelated organ 
donors (LUDs). A recent study of this program shows that of 500 randomly chosen 
LUDs, 84% were poor, 16% were middle class, and none were wealthy. According to the 
study, those who could afford only average housing, food, and college training for their 
children were included in the “middle class.” Those who could afford less or more than 
those things were respectively classified “poor” and “wealthy.”245 Although we do not 
know how these numbers might vary for a legal organ market in the United States, the 
overwhelming percentage of paid LUDs in Iran who are poor versus those who are 
middle class and wealthy gives us a reason to assume that the majority of organ sellers 
within the United States would also be economically poor.  
A. How Would Selling an Organ from Economic Desperation Violate the Ethical Limits 
of Health Care Markets? 
  
This concern is farther reaching than just a legal organ market. Since the basis of 
this concern is that economic desperation may force some persons to sell their organs, 
and not that a legal organ market would force them to sell, it applies to any type of organ 
sale. However, presuming the motive of economic desperation violates any of the ethical 
limits I argue for, a legal organ market would be culpable for cases in which persons 
motivated by their economic desperation were to sell an organ within that market.  
                                                 
245 Ghods, Ossareh, and Khosravani, “Comparison of Some Socioeconomic Characteristics of Donors and 
Recipients in a Controlled Living Unrelated Donor Renal Transplant Program,” 2626; and Ghods, and 
Savaj, “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation,” 1140. 
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If economic desperation were the only reason why some persons may be willing 
to sell their organs in a legal organ market, this would violate the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Furthermore, presuming this concern is true, it would violate this principle 
even if Taylor is correct and we reject the view that economic desperation is coercive. 
This is because of how I argue in chapter 3 that the principle of respect for autonomy is 
violated when market participants are subjected to undue influence or constraint in the 
purchase or sale of health care goods or services. So if it is correct that economic 
desperation would motivate some persons to sell their organs while, at the same time, 
they genuinely oppose selling their organs, “economic desperation” can be considered to 
be an undue influence because of how it appears to manipulate the choice of would-be 
organ sellers in a way that they do not fully endorse. 
Prima facie this concern shows that a legal organ market is unethical on my view. 
This is because even in a regulated organ market, there can be cases in which would-be 
organ sellers are strictly motivated by their economic desperation while otherwise being 
genuinely opposed to selling their organs. However, a legal organ market could 
successfully address this concern if were to implement a vetting procedure capable of 
consistently differentiating between would-be organ sellers who are strictly motivated by 
their economic desperation but who otherwise oppose selling their organs, and those who, 
regardless of their motive, are not genuinely opposed to selling their organs.  
4. Economically Desperate Sellers may not receive a Fair Price for their Organs 
 A fourth concern of a legal organ market is that economically desperate sellers 
may fail to receive a fair price for their organs. Again, while we do not know how many 
  
 
175
would-be sellers in the United States may be affected by this concern, we have reason to 
assume from statistics of the Iranian model of paid organ donation that most would-be 
sellers are likely to be economically poor. There are two primary bases of this concern. 
First is the idea that the economic desperation of organ sellers creates an underlying 
imbalance of power in the organ sale that disproportionately favors would-be buyers.246 
Second, as Cherry notes, economically desperate sellers may be willing to sell their 
organs for a relatively small amount of money because even a small amount of money 
would be relatively advantageous for them.247 
A. How Would Failing to Receive a Fair Price for One’s Organs Violate the Ethical 
Limits of Health Care Markets? 
 
There are two ways in which economically desperate sellers failing to receive a 
fair price for their organs could violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of 
health care markets. First, failing to receive a fair price for one’s organs could violate the 
principle of honesty. This would happen if would-be organ sellers were intentionally kept 
from receiving a fair value for their organs by whoever was paying for them.248 This is 
because violations of the principle of honest occur when participants in health care 
markets are permitted to engage in intentional deception or lying in ways not meant to 
serve patients’ best interests. All would-be organ sellers, like would-be buyers, can 
rightly be thought of as patients during the process of the organ sale because, as I 
                                                 
246 See for example; Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner, 88-89 and 90-95; Delmonico, et. al., “Ethical 
Incentives – Not Payment – For Organ Donation;” Mahoney, “The Market for Human Tissue,” 212; 
and Morelli, “Commerce in Organs.” Also see my discussion of Satz and noxious markets in chapter 1 
(specifically, the section describing Satz second condition of noxious markets being that they create 
unequal and unaccountable power between market participants). 
247 Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner, 90. 
248 Presumably, because this would be a market relationship, the “payer” would be the organ buyer(s), 
regardless of the actual institutional make-up of the market.  
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mentioned earlier, they are also undergoing a medical procedure that places them under 
the care of those performing the transplant. By intentionally failing to provide would-be 
sellers a fair price for their organs, their interests are not only treated as secondary to 
those of the buyer(s), but the would-be sellers’ interests are also not served to the same 
degree that they would be if were to receive a fair price for their organs. While this 
reasoning applies to all would-be organ sellers, this is a particularly crucial point for 
economically desperate sellers who are thought to be more vulnerable because of their 
economic desperation.  
Second, failing to provide economically desperate sellers a fair price for their 
organs could violate the principle of respect for autonomy. There are two ways this 
would seemingly occur. First, a violation of the principle of respect for autonomy would 
occur if the market were to determine organ prices via negotiation. Economically 
desperate sellers, because of their economic desperation, would seemingly lack 
bargaining power in this negotiation process. Moreover, while it makes sense that organ 
buyers would not want to jeopardize the organ sale by offering too low a price for the 
organ they wish to purchase, a negotiation process provides would-be buyers the leeway 
to offer just enough money to secure an organ sale irrespective of whether or not this 
price is “fair.” Specifically, a negotiation process over the price of organs would violate 
the principle of respect for autonomy for economically desperate sellers because of how 
their economic desperation and presumed lack of bargaining power could unfairly 
manipulate their decision-making process. 
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It is possible that a violation of the principle of respect for autonomy could also 
occur in a market in which organs prices are not negotiated. This would occur if would-
be organ sellers did not have access to and were not provided information about what 
constitutes a “fair” price for their organs.  In this case, the lack of information provided to 
would-be organ sellers would be a direct violation of the principle of respect for 
autonomy because of the foreseeable impact this would have on organ sellers, 
particularly those who are economically desperate, to make a well-informed decision 
about whether or not to continue with the organ sale.   
However it is also important to recognize that a “fair” price for transplant organs 
is not necessarily the same thing as a price equal to the maximal commodified value of 
those organs. While it would be appropriate to provide would-be sellers a price for their 
organs that shows sensitivity to their economic needs and circumstances, it would be also 
be unfair if, conversely, the price of transplant organs was so high that would-be buyers 
relying on the market could not practically afford them.  In this latter case, organ buyers 
would be exploited on the basis of their medical needs. Moreover, such exploitation in a 
legal organ market could result in a violation of the principle of increased access to 
essential health care goods and services if buyers relying on the organ market were 
unable to sufficiently meet their medical needs in some other way. What it would mean to 
determine a “fair” price for transplant organs, however, is beyond the scope of this 
project. Yet what constitutes a “fair” price for transplant organs will presumably 
minimize the potential exploitation of both sellers and buyers on the basis of economic 
desperation or medical need.  
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5. A Legal Organ Market Would Decrease Organ Donation Rates 
The last concern I address in this chapter is that a legal organ market would 
decrease organ donation rates. Part of the value of organ donation is its cultural and social 
significance as one of the highest forms of individual altruistic expression. Often, organ 
donation is metaphorically described as a “gift of life” to organ recipients.  This concern 
is primarily based on the moral argument against organ selling that, by placing a 
commodified value on organs, the purely altruistic motive to donate will be supplanted in 
some cases by a monetary motive, thereby limiting the number of opportunities 
individuals have to donate their organs, and causing some individuals who were willing 
to donate their organs to no longer be willing to donate.249  
There is some justification for this concern. One study, cited by Taylor, examines 
how a small monetary incentive alters the willingness of individuals to donate blood. 
Blood donors were broken up into two groups: A) those who regularly donate blood, and 
B) those who occasionally donate blood. Both groups were then offered $10 to donate a 
pint of blood. The $10 incentive substantially decreased the donation rate of A while 
slightly increasing the donation rate of B. According to Taylor, this result, “seems to bear 
out the anti-market view that commercial incentives will crowd out altruistic motives.”250 
In The Gift Relationship, Titmuss also provides a variety of statistical data from within 
the United States that, although now outdated, show when there are monetary incentives 
                                                 
249 See for example; Abouna, Sabawi, Kumar, and Samhan, “The Negative Impact of Paid Organ 
Donation;” Cherry, Kidney for Sale by Owner, 4-7, 14, 76, and 99-102; Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 
173; Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, 279-290 and 314.  
250 Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 174. Taylor also notes that it is fallacious to thusly conclude that even 
though payment for blood or kidneys appears to decrease altruistic donations the overall numbers of 
available blood or kidneys would also decrease.  
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the numbers paid blood donors far exceed the numbers of non-paid, altruistic blood 
donors.251 
A. How Might a Decrease in Organ Donation Rates Violate the Ethical Limits of Health 
Care Markets? 
  
For wealthy patients who would be willing use a legal organ market to buy 
transplant organs, this is not a very relevant concern. It is mostly applicable to patients 
who either could not, or who are morally opposed, to purchasing transplant organs. There 
are two ways, then, this concern could result in a legal organ market violating what I 
argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. First, this concern could 
result in a legal organ market violating the principle of increased access to essential 
health care goods and services. This would be the case if a legal organ market decreased 
donation rates, and persons who were either unable or morally opposed to purchasing 
transplant organs were consequently prevented from getting them via some form of 
voluntary donation. The reason why this case would result in a legal organ market 
violating this principle is because, again, this limit is violated when patients are prevented 
or denied access to needed health care goods or services.  
 Second, this same scenario for a legal organ market could also result in a violation 
of the principle of respect for autonomy. I argue that meeting the principle of respect for 
autonomy within health care markets requires treatment decisions neither be forced nor 
the result of undue influence or constraint. So by causing a decrease in donation rates, a 
legal organ market could reasonably be thought of as unduly constraining the abilities of 
some patients to best meet their medical needs if those patients were morally opposed to 
                                                 
251 Titmuss, The Gift Relationship, 146-153. 
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purchasing transplant organs on the market and were also unable to procure a transplant 
organ via donation.  
 However, even if a legal organ market resulted in diminishing donation rates, we 
cannot conclude that it would thusly fail to meet organ demands. Conversely, it may be 
possible that even with diminishing donation rates, a legal organ market could 
sufficiently meet the demand for transplant organs. While there is no evidence to support 
the former claim, there is some to support the latter. One of the successes of the Iranian 
model of paid organ donation is that within 11 years, from 1988 to 1999, Iran was able to 
completely eliminate their national renal transplant waiting list.252 Moreover, the study of 
the Iranian model shows that of 500 randomly chosen organ recipients, 50.4% were poor 
(using the same socioeconomic criteria as for LUDs).253  
 We must be careful, though, how we regard these results from the Iranian model. 
The Iranian model is a government-run and government-funded program that is not based 
on free market principles. However my argument about the ethical limits of health care 
markets has consistently regarded health care markets as well-regulated free markets. So 
there is still plenty of room to remain skeptical about whether or not a legal organ market 
in the United States could sufficiently address this concern about diminishing organ 
donation rates, especially since recent health care reform debates in the United States 
have shown how divided its citizens are regarding government involvement with health 
care. Yet, what we can still see from these results of the Iranian model is that it is 
possible to meet the demand for transplant organs even when organ recipients cannot 
                                                 
252 Ghods, and Savaj, “Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation,” 1137. 
253 Ibid., 1140.  
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afford to pay for them and without the need for altruistic donation. A legal organ market 
in the United States could theoretically accomplish similar success if it were to employ 
various market tools such as coupons, government-funded vouchers, government-
enforced price controls, addendums to current health insurance coverages, or special 
medical loans. Ultimately, though, if a legal organ market is to successfully address this 
concern while being within the limit of increased access, it will need to be regulated such 
that whatever supply an organ market could generate to meet organ demands, the 
distribution of those organs will need to be fair. 
6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have analyzed five concerns with respect to my argument for the 
base ethical limits of health care markets to a hypothetical legal organ market in the 
United States. I have shown how each concern could or would violate one or more of 
those limits. Although it may be possible for a legal organ market to address each 
concern to prevent it from violating the limits I argue for, a legal organ market that 
allowed any one of these concerns to come to fruition would be unethical. It would be 
odd, for example, to claim that a legal organ market is ethical when measures have not 
been taken to either minimize the possibility of would-be sellers lying about their health 
status, or to minimize the potential health-risks to would-be sellers and buyers, or to try 
to prevent would-be sellers and buyers from being coerced or exploited, or to try to 
prevent a potential decrease in organ donation rates from limiting access to transplant 
organs for those in need.  
At this point, though, the moral concerns about organ selling continue to block the 
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establishment of a legal organ market. Some, however, have chosen not to accept the 
illegality of organ selling as a deterrent to purchasing transplant organs. Recent news 
stories show that persons within the United States are engaging in publicly veiled organ 
sales.254 Coupled with the current organ shortage in the United States, whether the 
willingness of some United States citizens to engage in unregulated organ sales justifies 
the partial decommodification of organs, as Radin and Satz would likely say it does, or 
whether this means we should continue to work within the paradigm of organ donation 
while remaining committed to a ban on organ sales is still a question for further debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254 See for example; Associated Press, “Man says he sold kidney in U.S. for $20k;” and Associated Press, 
“44 arrested in N.J. corruption probe.” 
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Conclusion 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that we ought to impose ethical limits 
on health care markets. When applying the views of Anderson, Radin, and Satz to health 
care goods and services we see that, because of how health care goods and services can 
affect an individual’s overall well being in ways that most other commodities do not, 
properly valuing health care goods and services requires a wider set of qualifications and 
considerations beyond their mere commodification. While it is improper to value health 
care goods and services merely as commodities, we also see, with particular respect to 
Satz, why banning the sale of health care goods and services might also be inappropriate, 
because of how bans on needed goods can lead to worse outcomes, like the creation of 
black markets in those goods. I then argued that in order to ethically treat health care 
goods and services as commodities, their sale should be limited according to the 
principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential health care 
goods and services. I argued for these three limits because of how each appears to respect 
the noncommodified ways persons can value health care goods and services and because 
of the role each plays  in ideal interactions between health care professionals and patients 
and market transactions between buyers and sellers. I then applied this argument to two 
health care markets: the pharmaceutical industry and a hypothetical legal organ market. 
For the former, I showed how many of the practices of the pharmaceutical industry 
violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets. For the 
latter, I showed the extent to which a legal organ market in the United States could or 
would violate these limits. 
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There is, however, a further question about my view that I have yet to address. 
What might be an appropriate response when the sale of health care goods or services 
violates one or more of the limits for which I argue? The rest of this chapter briefly 
discusses three possible answers to this question, and lays the foundation for future 
research on this topic.  
1. Three Responses for Dealing with Violations to the Ethical Limits of Health Care 
Markets 
  
I have argued that when health care markets violate one of more of the limits for 
which I argue, they should be considered unethical. But it would be both foolish and 
inaccurate to think that all health care markets that violate one or more of these limits can 
or should be regarded in the same way. One possible response to when the sale of health 
care goods or services violates one or more of the limits for which I argue is that the 
goods or services in question should be decommodified – that is, removed from market 
sale. Anderson’s view might justify this response because of how, when applied to health 
care goods and services, her view shows that the noncommodifiable value(s) of health 
care goods and services is undermined when the production of those goods and services 
is controlled by market norms. Yet it is doubtful that Anderson’s view could be used to 
totally justify this response, because her view also justifies the continued use of health 
care markets based on the idea that persons must be free to commodify goods they either 
own or that are embodied in their persons. We have also seen how neither the views of 
Radin nor Satz would justify this response. Furthermore, based on the suggestions I 
discuss for how the pharmaceutical industry might reform itself to comply with the limits 
for which I argue, my view also implies that violations of these limits should not result in 
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market bans of those goods and services. Not only might Satz be correct that market bans 
on needed goods could lead to the creation of black markets in those goods, but market 
bans on the sale of health care goods and services in the United States would be 
impractical because of both the wide use of the free market in the production and 
distribution of health care goods and services, and the foreseeable likelihood that a large 
number of United States citizens would be opposed to removing health care goods and 
services from the free market (as is perhaps evident by the discursive reaction to the 
recent attempts by the United States government to reform the distribution of health care 
goods and services).  
 Another possible response to when the sale of health care goods and services 
would violate the limits for which I argue is to partially decommodify the health care 
goods or services in question. This is the suggestion Satz gives when markets in needed 
goods are noxious. Given how Radin argues that commodified goods that traditionally 
have not been commodified can be characterized in terms of incomplete 
commodification, she too may endorse this response (although Satz claims that Radin 
actually endorses removing health care goods and services from the market altogether, 
which I believe is an incorrect interpretation of Radin’s view).255  
 Yet I am not sure about the degree to which partial decommodification is an 
appropriate response. As Satz employs the concept, “partial decommodification” involves 
regulating a good a means to provide minimum provisions of that good to all. If, 
however, we broaden the scope of the term “health care goods or services” from my 
original limit of things persons use to meet their health care needs, to include goods or 
                                                 
255 Satz, “Noxoius Markets,” 25; and chapter 1, note 62. 
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services that do not meet a medical need but are still considered to fall within the realm 
of health care, then the use of partial decommodification to deal with violations of the 
limits for which I argue would be too narrow. Consider, for example, the market in 
cosmetic plastic surgery. Cosmetic plastic surgery is a procedure provided by medically 
trained surgeons to patients who do not often times have an underlying medical need for 
it. If the cosmetic plastic surgery market were to violate any of the ethical limits of health 
care markets for which I argue (although, again, the principle of  increased access to 
essential health care goods and services would not likely be applicable to this market, 
except for cases in which we are dealing with reconstructive plastic surgery as opposed to 
cosmetic plastic surgery), partial decommodification seems to be inappropriate in this 
case since it is unlikely the goal would be to ensure some minimal access of cosmetic 
plastic surgery to all. 
 These two responses are also seemingly inadequate for another reason. Assume, 
for example, that the pharmaceutical industry at-large were to reform itself so that it no 
longer pervasively violates the ethical limits for which I argue, but it was still the case 
either that a small number of pharmaceutical companies continued to consistently violate 
one or more of these limits, or that a pharmaceutical company might have (perhaps 
unintentionally) violated these limits on one or some occasions, but otherwise has 
complied with them. For pharmaceutical drugs, or other health care goods and services in 
which the market is subject to similar circumstances, decommodification or partial 
decommodification seems inefficient so long as the overall culture of the health care 
market does not violate the limits for which I argue. The problem with these two 
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responses is that both only work toward addressing how to deal with these violations at 
the macro-level of health care markets, but are not particularly helpful for addressing 
violations that occur at the micro-level of individual health care providers.  
 A third response for when the sale of health care goods or services would violate 
one or more of the limits for which I argue is to implement a system of warnings, fines, 
and sanctions against the entities culpable for the violation(s). There are three apparent 
advantages of this response, with the latter two showing how it is seemingly preferable to 
either total or partial decommodification of the health care goods or services in question. 
First, although it does not suggest any sort of decommodification of health care goods 
and services, this response recognizes and is sensitive to the idea that health care goods 
and services are not properly valued merely as commodities, and that in treating them as 
commodities the focus remains on ethically meeting patients’ medical needs. Second, by 
allowing for the health care goods or services in question to continue being treated as 
commodities, this response helps avoid any possibly disruptions in their (efficient) 
production or distribution that might occur as a result of removing them, either totally or 
partially, from the free market. Third, the use of warnings, fines, and sanctions is more 
flexible than either total or partial decommodification in that they can be applied at both 
the macro-level of heath care markets and the micro-level of individual health care 
providers. For this response to work in practice, though, it would be necessary to ensure 
that whatever warnings, fines, and sanctions were implemented, that they be severe 
enough to sufficiently dissuade actions within health care markets that would clearly or 
intentionally violate what I argue should be the base ethical limits of health care markets.  
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2. Possibilities for Future Research on this Topic 
 There are several possibilities for future research on this topic stemming from the 
arguments I have made throughout this dissertation. First, from what I have said here in 
the conclusion, more work needs to be done regarding what the appropriate response(s) 
should be for when the sale of health care goods or services would violate the ethical 
limits of health care markets for which I argue. For example, while I argue that partial 
decommodification would be too narrow – applying only to health care markets in which 
goods or services are necessary to meet medical needs – this does not necessarily 
disqualify partial decommodification from being an appropriate response for health care 
markets in goods and services that are necessary for individuals to meet their medical 
needs. Also, there remain questions with respect to the third suggestion such as: what sort 
of warning, fines, or sanctions would produce the desired outcome of consistently getting 
the sale of health care goods and services to conform to the ethical limits for which I 
argue; and how would these warnings, fines, and sanctions be enforced – by some 
regulatory agency like Food and Drug Administration, by the industries responsible for 
producing the goods or services, or by some other means like a collaboration between 
regulatory agencies and associations such as the Food and Drug Administration, the 
American Medical Association, and the Securities Exchange Commission? 
 Second, stemming from the initial concern about the ends of health care being 
incommensurable with the ends of the market, there is a question about whether or not 
there are some health care goods or services that should never be for sale. Addressing this 
question appears to require at least two foci. One focus would need to address the idea 
  
 
189
that there may be some health care goods or services that are valued to such a degree that 
it would impossible to ethically commodify them. In the previous chapter I abstained 
from arguing about the morality of organ selling. Still, the debate continues about 
whether or not organ commodification should be considered moral or legal. Another 
focus of this question may need to address current markets in health care goods or 
services that are legal but that are also ethically contentious. I noted in the last section 
how cosmetic plastic surgery falls within the realm of health care, but often does not 
medically benefit patients. The pharmaceutical industry is also criticized for sometimes 
producing and marketing drugs that have questionable medicinal value, such as drugs like 
Viagra for erectile dysfunction (a condition that does not necessarily impede a man’s 
ability to live a healthy life). Here, instead of arguing that the good or service in question 
is too valuable to commodify, the concern is that the good or service in question should 
not be commodified because its application does not actually serve to meet a bona fide 
medical need. 
 In chapter 2 I argue that the principle of increased access to essential health care 
goods and services is based, in part, on a right to health care. Ethicists, like Daniels, who 
write extensively on questions concerning a right to health care, have tried to show why 
such a right exists, and what sorts of health care goods or services qualify as something 
that persons have a right to. However there still appears to be room within this large body 
of work to address nuanced questions regarding a right to health care and what constitutes 
“fair” or “equitable” access to health care goods or services. One such question is: what 
might be the appropriate ethical limit(s) of a right to health care? Addressing this 
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particular question will likely require categorizing health care goods and services 
according to things such as their cost(s) and the range and degree of medical necessity 
they serve. Then, once we have a clearer idea of the different kinds of ways to categorize 
health care goods and services, we can then begin to argue for specific limits to right to 
health care that help us discern which health care goods and services ought to be included 
under this right, and to what degree.  
 Also in chapter 2, I briefly mentioned how the principle of increased access could 
possibly apply to markets in needed goods other than health care. Whether or not this 
means that my view regarding the base ethical limits of health care markets has broader 
application than just health care is an open question. The ways that I have argued for 
honesty, respect for autonomy, and the principle of increased access to essential health 
care goods and services have focused exclusively on their application to health care 
markets. Another possible topic for future research, then, is trying to see if, how, and 
what changes to my arguments might be necessary to apply my view of the base ethical 
limits of health care markets to other kinds of markets in non-medical needed goods.  
 The last possibility for future research that I discuss here is the applicability of my 
view to the international production or delivery of health care goods and services. From 
the onset, I narrowed the scope of my research and arguments to the United States.  But 
economic, cultural, and governmental differences make it unclear what sort of impact 
these arguments might, or could, have on an international scale. There are some places in 
which the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and increased access to essential 
health care goods and services might not translate well as ethical limits of health care 
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markets. For example, while medical paternalism is not nearly as present in Italian health 
care relationships as it once was, Italian-trained doctors traditionally have placed a 
greater importance on protecting patients from “frightening” information than on 
providing them detailed information about their health (as the latter is believed to impede 
patient-treatment by causing patients to feel overwhelmed and isolated).256 In other 
places, economic underdevelopment seems to cause the opposite effect of what health 
care markets intend by preventing the efficient and efficacious provision of  health care 
goods and services to persons in need.257 My intuition is that applying my view to the 
international production or delivery of health care goods and services will be most 
successful in economically developed nations, but that regardless of where the 
international focus would be, substantial alterations to my arguments will be necessary to 
account for whatever differences may exist between health care relationships in the 
United States and elsewhere.  
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Appendix 1: PhRMA’s Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals 
 
1. Basis of Interactions  
 
Our relationships with healthcare professionals are regulated by multiple entities and are 
intended to benefit patients and to enhance the practice of medicine. Interactions should 
be focused on informing healthcare professionals about products, providing scientific and 
educational information, and supporting medical education.  
 
Promotional materials provided to healthcare professionals by or on behalf of a company 
should: (a) be accurate and not misleading; (b) make claims about a product only when 
properly substantiated; (c) reflect the balance between risks and benefits; and (d) be 
consistent with all other Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements governing 
such communications.  
 
2. Informational Presentations by Pharmaceutical Company Representatives and 
Accompanying Meals  
 
Informational presentations and discussions by industry representatives and others 
speaking on behalf of a company provide healthcare providers with valuable scientific 
and clinical information about medicines that may lead to improved patient care.  
 
In order to provide important scientific information and to respect healthcare 
professionals’ abilities to manage their schedules and provide patient care, company 
representatives may take the opportunity to present information during healthcare 
professionals’ working day, including mealtimes. In connection with such presentations 
or discussions, it is appropriate for occasional meals to be offered as a business courtesy 
to the healthcare professionals as well as members of their staff attending presentations, 
so long as the presentations provide scientific or educational value and the meals (a) are 
modest as judged by local standards; (b) are not part of an entertainment or recreational 
event; and (c) are provided in a manner conducive to informational communication.  
 
Any such meals offered in connection with informational presentations made by field 
sales representatives or their immediate managers should also be limited to in-office or 
in-hospital settings.  
 
Inclusion of a healthcare professional’s spouse or other guest in a meal accompanying an 
informational presentation made by or on behalf of a company is not appropriate. 
Offering “take-out” meals or meals to be eaten without a company representative being 
present (such as “dine & dash” programs) is not appropriate.  
 
3. Prohibition on Entertainment and Recreation  
 
Company interactions with healthcare professionals are professional in nature and are 
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intended to facilitate the exchange of medical or scientific information that will benefit 
patient care. To ensure the appropriate focus on education and informational exchange 
and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, companies should not provide any 
entertainment or recreational items, such as tickets to the theater or sporting events, 
sporting equipment, or leisure or vacation trips, to any healthcare professional who is not 
a salaried employee of the company. Such entertainment or recreational benefits should 
not be offered, regardless of (1) the value of the tems; (2) whether the company engages 
the healthcare professional as a speaker or consultant, or (3) whether the entertainment or 
recreation is secondary to an educational purpose.  
 
Modest, occasional meals are permitted as long as they are offered in the appropriate 
circumstances and venues as described in relevant sections of this Code. 
 
4. Pharmaceutical Company Support for Continuing Medical Education  
 
Continuing medical education (CME), also known as independent medical education 
(IME), helps physicians and other medical professionals to obtain information and 
insights that can contribute to the improvement of patient care, and therefore, financial 
support from companies is appropriate. Such financial support for CME is intended to 
support education on a full range of treatment options and not to promote a particular 
medicine. Accordingly, a company should separate its CME grant-making functions from 
its sales and marketing departments. In addition, a company should develop objective 
criteria for making CME grant decisions to ensure that the program funded by the 
company is a bona fide educational program and that the financial support Is not an 
inducement to prescribe or recommend a particular medicine or course of treatment. 
  
Since the giving of any subsidy directly to a healthcare professional by a company may 
be viewed as an inappropriate cash gift, any financial support should be given to the 
CME provider, which, in turn, can use the money to reduce the overall CME registration 
fee for all participants. The company should respect the independent judgment of the 
CME provider and should follow standards for commercial support established by the 
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) or other entity that 
may accredit the CME. When companies underwrite CME, responsibility for and control 
over the selection of content, faculty, educational methods, materials, and venue belongs 
to the organizers of the conferences or meetings in accordance with their guidelines. The 
company should not provide any advice or guidance to the CME provider, even if asked 
by the provider, regarding the content or faculty for a particular CME program funded by 
the company.  
 
Financial support should not be offered for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal 
expenses of non-faculty healthcare professionals attending CME, either directly to the 
individuals participating in the event or indirectly to the event’s sponsor (except as set out 
in Section 9 below). Similarly, funding should not be offered to compensate for the time 
spent by healthcare professionals participating in the CME event.  
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A company should not provide meals directly at CME events, except that a CME 
provider at its own discretion may apply the financial support provided by a company for 
a CME event to provide meals for all participants. 
 
5. Pharmaceutical Company Support for Third-Party Educational or Professional 
Meetings  
 
Third-party scientific and educational conferences or professional meetings can 
contribute to the improvement of patient care, and therefore, financial support from 
companies is appropriate. A conference or meeting is any activity, held at an appropriate 
location, where (a) the gathering is primarily dedicated, in both time and effort, to 
promoting objective scientific and educational activities and discourse (one or more 
educational presentation(s) should be the highlight of the gathering), and (b) the main 
incentive for bringing attendees together is to further their knowledge on the topic(s) 
being presented.  
 
Since the giving of any subsidy directly to a healthcare professional by a company may 
be viewed is an inappropriate cash gift, any financial support should be given to the 
conference’s sponsor, which, in turn, can use the money to reduce the overall conference 
registration fee for all attendees. When companies underwrite medical conferences or 
meetings other than their own, responsibility for and control over the selection of content, 
faculty, educational methods, materials, and venue belongs to the organizers of the 
conferences or meetings in accordance with their guidelines.  
 
Financial support should not be offered for the costs of travel, lodging, or other personal 
expenses of non-faculty healthcare professionals attending third-party scientific or 
educational conferences or professional meetings, either directly to the individuals 
attending the conference or indirectly to the conference’s sponsor (except as set out in 
Section 9 below). Similarly, funding should not be offered to compensate for the time 
spent by healthcare professionals attending the conference or meeting.  
 
6. Consultants  
 
Consulting arrangements with healthcare professionals allow companies to obtain 
information or advice from medical experts on such topics as the marketplace, products, 
therapeutic areas and the needs of patients. Companies use this advice to inform their 
efforts to ensure that the medicines they produce and market are meeting the needs of 
patients. Decisions regarding the selection or retention of healthcare professionals as 
consultants should be made based on defined criteria such as general medical expertise 
and reputation, or knowledge and experience regarding a particular therapeutic area. 
Companies should continue to ensure that consultant arrangements are neither 
inducements nor rewards for prescribing or recommending a particular medicine or 
course of treatment.  
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It is appropriate for consultants who provide advisory services to be offered reasonable 
compensation for those services and reimbursement for reasonable travel, lodging, and 
meal expenses incurred as part of providing those services. Any compensation or 
reimbursement made in conjunction with a consulting arrangement should be reasonable 
and based on fair market value.  
 
Token consulting or advisory arrangements should not be used to justify compensating 
healthcare professionals for their time or their travel, lodging, and other out-of-pocket 
expenses. The following factors support the existence of a bona fide consulting 
arrangement (not all factors may be relevant to any particular arrangement):  
 
  • a written contract specifies the nature of the consulting services to be provided 
and the basis for payment of those services;  
  • a legitimate need for the consulting services has been clearly identified in 
advance of requesting the services and entering into arrangements with the prospective 
consultants;  
  • the criteria for selecting consultants are directly related to the  identified purpose 
and the persons responsible for selecting the consultants have the expertise necessary to 
evaluate whether the particular health- care professionals meet those criteria;  
  • the number of healthcare professionals retained is not greater than the number 
reasonably necessary to achieve the identified purpose;  
  • the retaining company maintains records concerning and makes appropriate use 
of the services provided by consultants;  
  • the venue and circumstances of any meeting with consultants are conducive to 
the consulting services and activities related to the services are the primary focus of the 
meeting; specifically, resorts are not appropriate venues. 
 
While modest meals or receptions may be appropriate during company-sponsored 
meetings with healthcare professional commercial consultants, companies should not 
provide recreational or entertainment events in conjunction with these meetings.  
 
It is not appropriate to pay honoraria or travel or lodging expenses to non-faculty and 
non-consultant healthcare professional attendees at company-sponsored meetings, 
including attendees who participate in interactive sessions.  
 
7. Speaker Programs and Speaker Training Meetings  
 
Healthcare professionals participate in company-sponsored speaker programs in order to 
help educate and inform other healthcare professionals about the benefits, risks and 
appropriate uses of company medicines. Any healthcare professional engaged by a 
company to participate in such external promotional programs on behalf of the company 
will be deemed a speaker for purposes of this Code, and the requirements of Section 7 
apply to company interactions with that healthcare professional in his or her capacity as a 
  
 
218
speaker. Company decisions regarding the selection or retention of healthcare 
professionals as speakers should be made based on defined criteria such as general 
medical expertise and reputation, knowledge and experience regarding a particular 
therapeutic area, and communications skills. Companies should continue to ensure that 
speaking arrangements are neither inducements nor rewards for prescribing a particular 
medicine or course of treatment.  
 
Speaker training is an essential activity because the FDA holds companies accountable 
for the presentations of their speakers. It is appropriate for healthcare professionals who 
participate in programs intended to train speakers for company-sponsored speaker 
programs to be offered reasonable compensation for their time, considering the value of 
the type of services provided, and to be offered reimbursement for reasonable travel, 
lodging, and meal expenses. Such compensation and reimbursement should only be 
offered when (1) the participants receive extensive training on the company’s drug 
products or other specific topic to be presented and on compliance with FDA regulatory 
requirements for communications; (2) this training will result in the participants 
providing a valuable service to the company; and (3) the participants meet the general 
criteria for bona fide consulting arrangements (as discussed in Section 6 above). Speaker 
training sessions shoul be held in venues that are appropriate and conducive to 
informational communication and training about medical information; specifically, 
resorts are not appropriate venues.  
 
Any compensation or reimbursement made to a healthcare professional in conjunction 
with a speaking arrangement should be reasonable and based on fair market value. Each 
company should, individually and independently, cap the total amount of annual 
compensation it will pay to an individual healthcare professional in connection with all 
speaking arrangements. Each company also should develop policies addressing the 
appropriate use of speakers, including utilization of speakers after training and the 
appropriate number of engagements for any particular speaker over time.  
 
Speaker programs may include modest meals offered to attendees and should occur in a 
venue and manner conducive to informational communication.  
 
While speaker programs offer important educational opportunities to healthcare 
professionals, they are distinct from CME programs, and companies and speakers should 
be clear about this distinction. For example, speakers and their materials should clearly 
identify the company that is sponsoring the presentation, the fact that the speaker is 
presenting on behalf of the company, and that the speaker is presenting information that 
is consistent with FDA guidelines. Beyond providing all speakers with appropriate 
training, companies should periodically monitor speaker programs for compliance with 
FDA regulatory requirements for communications on behalf of the company about its 
medicines.  
 
8. Healthcare Professionals Who Are Members of Committees That Set   
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Formularies or Develop Clinical Practice Guidelines  
 
Healthcare professionals who are members of committees that set formularies of covered 
medicines or develop clinical practice guidelines that may influence the prescribing of 
medicines often have significant experience in their fields. That experience can be of 
great benefit to companies and ultimately to patients if these individuals choose to serve 
as speakers or commercial consultants for companies. To avoid even the appearance of 
impropriety, companies should require any healthcare professional who is a member of a 
committee that sets formularies or develops clinical guidelines and also serves as a 
speaker or commercial consultant for the company to disclose to the committee the 
existence and nature of his or her relationship with the company. This disclosure 
requirement should extend for at least two years beyond the termination of any speaker or 
consultant arrangement.  
 
Upon disclosure, healthcare professionals who serve as speakers or consultants for 
companies should be required to follow the procedures set forth by the committee of 
which they are a member, which may include recusing themselves from decisions 
relating to the medicine for which they have provided speaking or consulting services.  
 
9. Scholarships and Educational Funds  
 
Financial assistance for scholarships or other educational funds to permit medical 
students, residents, fellows, and other healthcare professionals in training to attend 
carefully selected educational conferences may be offered so long as the selection of 
individuals who will receive the funds is made by the academic or training institution. 
“Carefully selected educational conferences” are generally defined as the major 
educational, scientific, or policy-making meetings of national, regional, or specialty 
medical associations.  
 
10. Prohibition of Non-Educational and Practice-Related Items  
 
Providing items for healthcare professionals’ use that do not advance disease or treatment 
education — even if they are practice-related items of minimal value (such as pens, note 
pads, mugs and similar “reminder” items with company or product logos) — may foster 
misperceptions that company interactions with healthcare professionals are not based on 
informing them about medical and scientific issues. Such non-educational items should 
not be offered to healthcare professionals or members of their staff, even if they are 
accompanied by patient or physician educational materials. 
 
Items intended for the personal benefit of healthcare professionals (such as floral 
arrangements, artwork, music CDs or tickets to a sporting event) likewise should not be 
offered.  
 
Payments in cash or cash equivalents (such as gift certificates) should not be offered to 
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healthcare professionals either directly or indirectly, except as compensation for bona 
fide services (as described in Sections 6 and 7). Cash or equivalent payments of any kind 
create a potential appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest.  
 
It is appropriate to provide product samples for patient use in accordance with the 
Prescription Drug Marketing Act.  
 
11. Educational Items  
 
It is appropriate for companies, where permitted by law, to offer items designed primarily 
for the education of patients or healthcare professionals if the items are not of substantial 
value ($100 or less) and do not have value to healthcare professionals outside of his or 
her professional responsibilities. For example, an anatomical model for use in an 
examination room is intended for the education of the patients and is therefore 
appropriate, whereas a DVD or CD player may have independent value to a healthcare 
professional outside of his or her professional responsibilities, even if it could also be 
used to provide education to patients, and therefore is not appropriate.  
 
Items designed primarily for the education of patients or healthcare professionals should 
not be offered on more than an occasional basis, even if each individual item is 
appropriate. 
 
12. Prescriber Data  
 
Companies use non-patient identified prescriber data to facilitate the efficient flow of 
information to healthcare professionals. Such prescriber data, which does not identify 
individual patients, may serve many purposes, including enabling companies to: (a) 
impart important safety and risk information to prescribers of a particular drug; (b) 
conduct research; (c) comply with FDA mandated risk management plans that require 
drug companies to identify and interact with physicians who prescribe certain drugs; (d) 
track adverse events of marketed prescriptions drugs; and (e) focus marketing activities 
on those healthcare professionals who would most likely benefit from information about 
a particular drug.  
 
Companies that choose to use non-patient identified prescriber data to facilitate 
communications with healthcare professionals should use this data responsibly. For 
example, companies should (a) respect the confidential nature of prescriber data; (b) 
develop policies regarding the use of the data; (c) educate employees and agents about 
those policies; (d) maintain an internal contact person to handle inquiries regarding the 
use of the data; and (e) identify appropriate disciplinary actions for misuse of this data.  
 
In addition, companies should respect and abide by the wishes of any healthcare 
professional who asks that his or her prescriber data not be made available to company 
sales representatives. Companies may demonstrate this respect by following the rules of 
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voluntary programs that facilitate prescribers’ ability to make this choice.  
 
13. Independence and Decision Making  
 
No grants, scholarships, subsidies, support, consulting contracts, or educational or 
practice related items should be provided or offered to a healthcare professional in 
exchange for prescribing products or for a commitment to continue prescribing products. 
Nothing should be offered or provided in a manner or on conditions that would interfere 
with the independence of a healthcare professional’s prescribing practices.  
 
14. Training and Conduct of Company Representatives 
 
Pharmaceutical company representatives play an important role in delivering accurate, 
up-to-date information to healthcare professionals about the approved indications, 
benefits and risks of pharmaceutical therapies. These representatives often serve as the 
primary point of contact between the companies who research, develop, manufacture and 
market life-saving and life-enhancing medicines and the healthcare professionals who 
prescribe them. As such, the company representatives must act with the highest degree of 
professionalism and integrity. 
 
Companies should ensure that all representatives who are employed by or acting on 
behalf of the companies and who visit healthcare professionals receive training about the 
applicable laws, regulations and industry codes of practice, including this Code, that 
govern the representatives’ interactions with healthcare professionals. In addition, 
companies should train their representatives to ensure that they have sufficient 
knowledge of general  science and product- specific information to provide accurate, up-
to-date information, consistent with FDA requirements.  
 
Companies should provide updated or additional training in all of these areas as needed 
for their representatives who visit healthcare professionals.  
 
Companies should also assess their representatives periodically to ensure that they 
comply with relevant company policies and standards of conduct. Companies should take 
appropriate action when representatives fail to comply. 
 
15. Adherence to Code  
 
All companies that interact with healthcare professionals about pharmaceuticals should 
adopt procedures to assure adherence to this Code.  
 
Companies that publicly announce their commitment to abide by the Code and who 
complete an annual certification that they have policies and procedures in place to foster 
compliance with the Code will be identified by PhRMA on a public web site. The 
certification must be signed by the company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief 
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Compliance Officer. The website will identify the companies who commit to abide by the 
Code; provide contact information for their Chief Compliance Officers; and, at the 
appropriate time, publish the status of each company’s annual certification.  
 
Any comments received by PhRMA relating to a company’s observance of the Code or 
conduct that is addressed by the Code will be referred by PhRMA to the relevant 
company’s Chief Compliance Officer.  
 
In addition, companies are encouraged to seek external verification periodically, meaning 
at least once every three years, that the company has policies and procedures in place to 
foster compliance with the Code. PhRMA will prepare general guidance for such external 
verification and will identify on its web site if a company has sought and obtained 
verification of its compliance policies and procedures from an external source. 
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Appendix 2: PhRMA Guiding Principles: Direct to Consumer Advertisements About 
Prescription Medicines 
 
1. These Principles are premised on the recognition that DTC advertising of prescription 
medicines can benefit the public health by increasing awareness about diseases, educating 
patients about treatment options, motivating patients to contact their physicians and 
engage in a dialogue about heal the concerns, increasing the likelihood that patients will 
receive appropriate care for conditions that are frequently under-diagnosed and under-
treated, and encouraging compliance with prescription drug treatment regimens.  
 
2. In accordance with FDA regulations, all DTC information should be accurate and not 
misleading, should make claims only when supported by substantial evidence, should 
reflect balance between risks and benefits, and should be consistent with FDA approved 
labeling. Accordingly, companies should continue to base promotional claims on FDA 
approved labeling and not promote medicines for off-label uses, including in DTC 
advertisements.  
 
3. DTC television and print advertising which is designed to market a prescription drug 
should also be designed to responsibly educate the consumer about that medicine and, 
where appropriate, the condition for which it may be prescribed. During the development 
of new DTC television advertising campaigns, companies should seek and consider 
feedback from appropriate audiences, such as health care professionals and patients, to 
gauge the educational impact for patients and consumers.  
 
4. DTC television and print advertising of prescription drugs should clearly indicate that 
the medicine is a prescription drug to distinguish such advertising from other advertising 
for non-prescription products.  
 
5. DTC television and print advertising should foster responsible communications 
between patients and health care professionals to help patients achieve better health and a 
more complete appreciation of both the health benefits and the known risks associated 
with the medicine being advertised.  
 
6. In order to foster responsible communication between patients and health care 
professionals, companies should spend an appropriate amount of time to educate health 
professionals about a new medicine or a new therapeutic indication and to alert them to 
the upcoming advertising campaign before commencing the first DTC advertising 
campaign. In determining what constitutes an appropriate time, companies should take 
into account the relative importance of informing patients of the availability of a new 
medicine, the complexity of the risk-benefit profile of that new medicine and health care 
professionals’ knowledge of the condition being treated. Companies are encouraged to 
consider individually setting specific periods of time, with or without exceptions, to 
educate health care professionals before launching a branded DTC television or print 
advertising campaign. Companies should continue to educate health care professionals as 
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additional valid information about a new medicine is obtained from all reliable sources.  
 
7. Working with the FDA, companies should continue to responsibly alter or discontinue 
a DTC advertising campaign should new and reliable information indicate a serious 
previously unknown safety risk.  
 
8. Companies should submit all new DTC television advertisements to the FDA before 
releasing these advertisements for broadcast.  
 
9. DTC print advertisements for prescription medicines should include FDA’s toll-free 
MedWatch telephone number and website for reporting potential adverse events. DTC 
television advertisements for prescription medicines should direct patients to a print 
advertisement containing FDA’s toll-free MedWatch telephone number and website, 
and/or should provide the company’s toll-free telephone number.  
 
10. Companies that choose to feature actors in the roles of health care professionals in a 
DTC television or print advertisement that identifies a particular product should 
acknowledge in the advertisement that actors are being used. Likewise, if actual health 
care professionals appear in such advertisements, the advertisement should include an 
acknowledgement if the health care professional is compensated for the appearance.  
 
11. Where a DTC television or print advertisement features a celebrity endorser, the 
endorsements should accurately reflect the opinions, findings, beliefs or experience of the 
endorser. Companies should maintain verification of the basis of any actual or implied 
endorsements made by the celebrity endorser in the DTC advertisement, including 
whether the endorser is or has been a user of the product if applicable. 
 
12. DTC television and print advertising should include information about the availability 
of other options such as diet and lifestyle changes where appropriate for the advertised 
condition.  
 
13. DTC television advertising that identifies a product by name should clearly state the 
health conditions for which the medicine is approved and the major risks associated with 
the medicine being advertised.  
 
14. DTC television and print advertising should be designed to achieve a balanced 
presentation of both the benefits and the risks associated with the advertised prescription 
medicine. Specifically, risks and safety information, including the substance of relevant 
boxed warnings, should be presented with reasonably comparable prominence to the 
benefit information, in a clear, conspicuous and neutral manner, and without distraction 
from the content. In addition, DTC television advertisements should support responsible 
patient education by directing patients to health care professionals as well as to print 
advertisements and/or websites where additional benefit and risk information is available.  
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15. All DTC advertising should respect the seriousness of the health conditions and the 
medicine being advertised.  
 
 
16. In terms of content and placement, DTC television and print advertisements should be 
targeted to avoid audiences that are not age appropriate for the messages involved. In 
particular, DTC television and print advertisements containing content that may be 
inappropriate for children should be placed in programs or publications that are 
reasonably expected to draw an audience of approximately 90 percent adults (18 years or 
older).  
 
17. Companies are encouraged to promote health and disease awareness as part of their 
DTC advertising. 
  
18. Companies should include information in all DTC advertising, where 
appropriate, about help for the uninsured and underinsured. 
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